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A B S T R A C T
This thesis is a collection of three independent chapters accompanied
by an introductory chapter motivated by two recent economic devel-
opments: the unconventional monetary policies in the Euro Area and
the Greek crisis.
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter; it outlines the ECB’s response
to the recent financial crisis, the main events of the Greek crisis that
followed and provides a brief literature review on the dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with financial frictions, the
class of models employed in this thesis.
Chapter 2, the main chapter of the thesis, examines the post-2008
European Central Bank’s liquidity enhancing policies and provides
evidence of risk-taking incentives of monetary policy. The chapter’s
main result, using a novel DSGE model with financial frictions on the
supply and the demand side of credit, is that when the central bank
supplies liquidity during turbulent times, banks grant loans to riskier
firms and this consequently has a negative impact on the performance
of the economy.
Chapter 3 examines the impact of quantitative easing in a restricted
financial participation economy with financial frictions on two as-
pects: on household inequality and QE’s effect on aggregate demand
in a low financial inclusion environment. I find that government bond
purchases increase aggregate demand and through the earning het-
erogeneity channel this leads to a reduction of consumption and in-
come inequality. I also show that in an economy with a low degree of
financial inclusion, QE might have contractionary effects.
Chapter 4 shows that the Greek Recession lies in the category of
Great Depressions defined by Kehoe and Prescott. By using the Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model and also the neoclassical growth
model calibrated to the Greek data, the TFP is acknowledged as the
main source of fluctuations during the Greek Recession.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The 2008 Financial Crisis triggered one of the biggest recessions in
modern economic history. The major central banks in Europe and the
US: the FED, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Eng-
land (BoE), have used extensively their policy tool kits to combat the
financial distress and stimulate the economy. Initially, they engaged
in interest rate cuts that subsequently brought the policy rates close to
their effective lower bound. This necessitated the use of non-standard
-unconventional- monetary policies. The extension of existing reverse
operations under longer maturities and the asset purchase programs
were the most popular among those. These policies were adapted
with different weight and a different timing by each central bank for
the reasons associated with the financial structure of each region (see
Gros, Alcidi, and Giovannini (2012), Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010)).
Nevertheless, in the Euro Area (EA) inflation is still below 2%, the tar-
get set by the ECB, and economic growth is weak. At the same time
in the EA interest rates are at their lowest level since the first policy
rate reduction in November 2008 and at the moment these lines are
written a new monetary stimulus package is under discussion.1
The aforementioned policy challenges necessitated the development
of a new branch of macroeconomics research focusing on transmis-
sion channels of monetary policy, linkages between the financial and
the real sector and reviewing the unconventional monetary policy
tools, some of them hadn’t been subject of academic research in the
past. Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, financial frictions played
a limited role in most Real Business Cycles (RBC) and New Keyne-
sian (NK) models, called collectively as Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models. There was a gap in the literature on
models that can produce aggregate fluctuations from credit market
imperfections, as occurred in the 2008 crisis. A few exceptions were
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) among
others. The DSGE models with financial frictions developed after the
crisis became the new standard tool in central banks research depart-
ments, academia, and policy-making.
In Section 1.1 of this Chapter, I analyse the policy tools the ECB em-
ployed to ease the banking sector frictions and stimulate the economy.
This section serves as an extended introduction mainly of Chapter 2,
the central chapter of the thesis, and Chapter 3. Both chapters are
1 "European Central Bank paves way for fresh stimulus package", Financial Times, 25
July 2019
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associated with the post-crisis monetary policy developments in the
Euro Area. Section 1.2 provides a brief account of the developments
of the Greek crisis, the main motivation of Chapter 4. Finally, Section
1.3 overviews the literature on DSGE models with financial frictions.
1.1 the ecb’s response to the crisis
The ECB responded to the economic downturn with the use of stan-
dard and non-standard monetary policy tools in two phases. The first
phase was at the onset of the financial crisis while the second started
when the sovereign crisis of the periphery members took place. The
standard policies adopted were policy rates cuts and the reduction
the banks’ reserve requirements from 2% to 1%. The non-standard
tool kit, labelled as "enhanced credit support", included the matu-
rity extension of Long Term Refinancing Operations, the creation the
Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations and several programs of
outright asset purchases entitled as Asset Purchase Programme (APP)
(Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2012)).
policy rates cuts The ECB began its monetary stimulus with
a sequence of key interest rates cuts, starting on October 2008. There
are three key policy rates in the ECB’s institutional framework, each
one for a different operation: the rate for the marginal lending facility
which offers overnight loans to the banking sector, the rate of main
refinancing operations which provides various-term liquidity to the
banks and the rate of the deposit facility which banks use in order
to make overnight reserves deposits. Figure 1 depicts the key ECB
policy rates path from 1999 to 2019.
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In a surprising move in June 2014, the ECB dropped the deposit
facility rate below zero becoming the first major central bank that im-
plements a negative interest rate policy. Since March 2016 the deposit
facility rate is constant at -0.4%.2
Due to the interest rates being on their lower effective bound, the
ECB proceeded to a balance sheet expansion following the FED and
the BoE. While the FED and the BoE focused primarily on the QE,
the ECB initially adopted measures aiming to support banks liquidity,
funding and at encouraging banks to provide credit. The expansion
of the ECB’s balance sheet has come about firstly largely through repo
operations – that is, the provision of loans in exchange for collateral
and secondly through its asset purchase programme (see Giannone
et al. (2012)).
Figure 2 shows the ECB assets composition from 1999 to 2018.3 As
the Figure shows, lending to euro area credit institutions for mone-
tary policy operations (red square dotted line) was a tool extensively
used by the ECB since its first years mostly for the fine-tuning of the
banks’ liquidity. Nonetheless, the ECB lending to the banking institu-
tions increased substantially after the 2008 Crisis with the maturity
extension of the Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) and the
introduction of the TLTRO (Targeted LTRO), both aimed at improving
banks liquidity and stimulate lending. The introduction of QE came
with a significant delay; only after 2014 the purchases of Euro resi-
dents assets (black solid line) has surpassed in magnitude the central
bank’s lending to the banking sector.
banking liquidity support : ltro & tltro Liquidity sup-
port to the banking sector was mainly an extension of the maturity of
already existing regular operations. In the first phase of the operation,
in October 2008, the ECB increased LTROs maturities to 12 months
and changed the variable rate (fixed amount) allotment to a fixed-rate
full allotment. This allowed intermediaries to have unlimited access
to short term funding at a fixed rate. Later, at December 2011 LTROs
maturity increased to 3 years and e1 trillion was distributed to the
Euro area banks. On June 2014, the ECB employed a new tool targeted
on increasing lending to the real sector of the economy.4 The TLTROs,
an extension of the LTROs, had 48 months maturity and could ben-
efit the institutions engaged in lending. Specifically, the amount that
banks could borrow, as well as the borrowing rate, were linked to
the amount of loans given to non-financial corporations and house-
holds. A total of €400bn has been injected into the banking system
through five auctions since September 2014. On June 2016, a new TL-
2 Denmarks Nationalbank, Bank of Japan, Swiss National Bank and the Sveriges Riks-
bank also implemented a negative rates policy.
3 To enhance clarity, assets not associated with ECB’s monetary policy stimulus have
been categorised as ’other assets’.
4 Mario Draghi, 5 June 2014.
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Other assets: Gold and gold receivables, claims on non-euro area
residents denominated in foreign currency, claims on euro area res-
idents denominated in foreign currency, claims on non-euro area
residents denominated in euro, other claims on euro area credit
institutions denominated in euro and other assets.
TRO lending package was introduced, the TLTRO II, with a maturity
of 4 years, supporting the efforts of ECB to enhance credit supply in
the economy (ECB (2015)).5 3 years later, on June 2019, the ECB intro-
duced a third TLTRO programme (TLTRO III) to "further favourable
bank lending conditions and to support the accommodative stance of
monetary policy".6
quantitative easing : app The ECB postponed substantially
the start of its assets purchase programmes in contrast with the FED
and the Bank of England. It started buying relatively small amounts
of covered bonds in 2009 but only after 2015 expanded its purchases
amount significantly with the introduction of the Asset Purchase Pro-
gramme (APP).
The ECB announced its first covered bond purchase programme al-
most a year later after its first liquidity enhancing interventions. Pre-
cisely, on 2 July 2009, the Eurosystem launched its first covered bond
purchase aimed at bonds issued by banks on the primary and sec-
ondary markets. The size of the program was €60bn and it is consid-
ered relatively small compared to its other interventions.7 In Novem-
ber 2011, the Eurosystem launched a second covered bond purchase
programme which reached a nominal amount of €16.4bn and in Octo-
5 ECB, Press Release, 10 March 2016.
6 ECB, Press Release, 6 June 2019.
7 ECB, Press Release, Purchase programme for covered bonds, 4 June 2009.
1.1 the ecb’s response to the crisis 5
ber 2014 a third programme was announced. On January 2015, ECB
announced the Expanded Asset Purchase Programme with the inclu-
sion of bonds issued by euro area central governments, agencies and
European institutions and monthly asset purchases to amount to €60
billion.8 This programme was a collection of different buying opera-
tions according to the assets purchased. It included purchases from
corporate sector bonds, public sector securities and asset-backed se-
curities. Overall for its APP programme the ECB spent €2.6 trillion.
APP net asset purchases ended on December 2018. At present, the
ECB reinvests the principal payments from maturing securities pur-
chased under the asset purchase programme.
In Chapter 2, I assess the banking liquidity support policy of the
ECB and specifically the LTROs. Most notably, I build and estimate
for the euro area a DSGE model with financial frictions on the supply
and demand of credit by merging two seminal macro-finance mod-
els: Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010). I show that this policy provides risk-taking incentives of mon-
etary policy to the banking sector. When the central bank supplies liq-
uidity during turbulent times this leads banks to grant loans to riskier
firms. This increases the firms’ default probability on new credit and
worsens the performance of the economy. Additionally, I find that
borrower’s risk increase can explain the recent reserve accumulation
by the banking system. Lastly, I evaluate the effects of negative inter-
est rates on excess reserves and assess the welfare implications of the
liquidity provision policies.
In Chapter 3, I evaluate the effect of quantitative easing (asset pur-
chase programme in the euro area terminology) on two dimensions.
Firstly, on how QE changes inequality between asset holders and
hand to mouth consumers. I build and calibrate a Neo-Keynesian dy-
namic, general equilibrium model for the Euro Area, by combining
Gertler and Karadi (2013) and Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007),
that incorporates limited assets market participation, financial fric-
tions and allows central bank purchases from banks and households.
Results suggest that due to the stimulating effects of QE on aggre-
gate demand and the exchange of the risky assets of investors with
risk-free reserves by the central bank, hand to mouth consumers are
benefited relatively more resulting in the reduction of income and
consumption inequality. Secondly, I show that in an economy with a
low degree of financial inclusion, QE has contractionary effects when
no redistribution of profits is assumed. This is a complementary re-
sult to Bilbiie (2008) on his finding for the possible adverse effects of
an accommodative monetary policy shock. This result changes when
a redistribution tax scheme is assumed.
8 ECB, Press Release, ECB announces expanded asset purchase programme, 22 Jan-
uary 2015.
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1.2 the greek crisis
One of the characteristics that make the euro crisis unique and chal-
lenged the EA financial architecture, is the sovereign debt crisis of
the periphery members which followed the aftermath of the financial
crisis of 2007–08. Greece, compared to the other periphery members,
was the EA country mostly hit by the euro crisis experiencing a nine
years recession. Between 2008 to 2014, Greece’s real per capita GDP
dropped by 26.3%.9 Its unemployment rate sky-rocketed from 7.8%
to 27.8% during the same period and the country considered unable
to borrow from the international markets.
Due to the euro integration, Greece was initially considered a finan-
cially sustainable country similar to its counterparts in the euro area.
Its credit rating by Fitch turned from A in 2009 to the non-investment
grading of CCC in 2015. Prior to the crisis, the annual spread on ten-
year sovereign bond yields between Germany and countries such as
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy was close to zero. Starting
at 2009 and for a very prolonged period the country became unable
to borrow from the international markets; its bond yields reached un-
precedented levels for an economically developed nation. Figure 3
shows the 10-year Greek government bond yields from 2000 to 2019.
As it can be seen since 2010, bond yields increased to historically high
levels reaching 30% in 2012, only to reduce to their pre-crisis levels in
late 2017.
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Figure 3: 10-Year Benchmark Greek Government Bond Yields. Data source:
FRED database
Greece, being unable to borrow, entered three financial assistance
programmes funded by the IMF, the ECB and the ESM/EFSF in 2010,
2012, and 2015. The bailout amounts were provided to the country
9 Ireland’s GDP dropped by 10.6%, Italy’s by 12%, Spain’s by 10% and Portugal by
7.9%.
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conditional on the implementation of major structural reforms. The
total amounts of loans distributed from its lenders were €288.7bn
making it the biggest bailout in history.10 Reforms focused mainly
on the deregulation of the labour market, privatizations, tax admin-
istration and increase of the country’s competitiveness. Greece’s ad-
justment programmes eliminated the primary deficit following the
tight fiscal consolidation adopted by the government. The 10.10 % fis-
cal deficit in 2009 turned to a primary surplus of 4.41% in 2018 (see
Meghir et al. (2017)). Greece’s financial assistance programmes ended
after 8 years on 20 August 2018 and now the country has entered a
post-programme monitoring scheme by its former creditors.
In Chapter 4, following the methodology established by Hayashi
and Prescott (2002) and Conesa, Kehoe, and Ruhl (2007), I explore
the role productivity growth played in the development of the Greek
Recession. By employing the neoclassical growth model and the fi-
nancial frictions model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), I
quantify whether and by how much the Greek Recession can be ex-
plained by the total factor productivity drop. Findings suggest that
TFP decline can account for the biggest fraction of the Greek GDP
downturn in both models.
1.3 dsge models with financial frictions : a brief liter-
ature review
The origins of the Great Recession and the subsequent sovereign
debt crisis that followed underlined the importance of financial fric-
tions in the macroeconomic analysis. The credit crunch in 2008 due
to the financial sector imbalances was a sharp reminder that finan-
cial instability can be a key driver of business cycles fluctuations.
Furthermore, the study of the unconventional monetary policy tools
employed by the three influential central banks, mainly instruments
that supported banks’ solvency, required models enriched with a fi-
nancial sector. Early economic thinkers such as Fisher (1933) and
Keynes (1936) had emphasized the importance of financial frictions
for the study of economics. Despite this, only in the aftermath of
the Great Recession macroeconomic models that incorporate finan-
cial frictions became the new standard in macroeconomics research.
This review aims to provide a summary of the literature developed
on the two most widely used approaches of introducing financial fric-
tions which also this thesis is built on, the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
(KM) collateral constraint and the Townsend (1979) costly state verifi-
cation. A more comprehensive literature review is provided in Brun-
nermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2013), Levine (2019) and Duncan
and Nolan (2018).
10 ESM: Explainer on ESM and EFSF financial assistance for Greece, August 2018.
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Prior to the recent crisis, there were two approaches on models
incorporating financial frictions: the first originates from the costly
state verification setting of Townsend (1979) while the second, from
the work of Hart and Moore (1994) on human capital inalienability
which was later developed in the incomplete markets model with
collateral constraints by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
The costly state verification by Townsend (1979) (extended further
in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)) is
built on the asymmetric information between an entrepreneur and the
lender of a project about its future payoff. While the entrepreneur has
full information for her project’s payoff, the lender cannot observe it
unless she pays a monitoring cost. In this setting, the optimal contract
is a debt contract. The lender does not have to verify the true state and
pay the monitoring cost as long as the debtor does not default. In the
model, when the project is risky the lender charges a higher interest
rate. This creates a spread between internal and external financing,
the so-called external finance premium. This mechanism along with
non-linear costs in the adjustment of capital was brought into a gen-
eral equilibrium and complete dynamic New-Keynesian framework
by the seminal work of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) (BGG).
The introduction of capital adjustment costs leads to variations in
Tobin’s-q and creates an endogenous feedback loop between asset
prices and investment –the so-called financial accelerator.
The above approach has been the main source of financial frictions
in many macro models. Most notably Christiano, Motto, and Ros-
tagno (2014) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) introduce
the financial accelerator mechanism into a New-Keynesian DSGE model.11
The authors identify the standard deviation of the entrepreneur’s id-
iosyncratic shock -the risk shock- as the main driver of business cy-
cles fluctuations. In Benes and Kumhof (2015) there are two sources
of asymmetric information: the first between the entrepreneurs and
the lenders (banks) and the second between banks and the financial
authority which charges a penalty for any deviation from the mini-
mum capital requirements. In their model setting, they show the im-
portance of the countercyclical capital buffers in improving welfare.
Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2016) also make use of the BGG fi-
nancial accelerator and show that the optimal contract includes in-
dexation to the aggregate return on capital, household consumption,
and the return to internal funds.12
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) framework originating from Hart and
Moore (1994) depart from the costly state verification used in the pa-
pers described above and adopt a collateral constraint on borrowing.
11 This is considered a leader in the DSGE literature that incorporates financial frictions,
see Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2018).
12 More studies include the works of Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Quinta and Rabanalb
(2014), Fiore and Tristani (2012), Faia and Monacelli (2007), Christensen, Meh, and
Moran (2011) and Leduc and Natal (2017) among others.
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This occurs due to a commitment problem rather than asymmetric in-
formation; borrowers cannot commit to repay debt and so must hold
collateral as a guarantee. Furthermore, durable goods are both a fac-
tor of production and can also be used as collateral. In the event of a
reduction of the value of capital, the firm’s net worth falls as a result
and the collateral constraint becomes tighter creating a feedback loop
similar to the BGG model.
One of the most influential studies employing the KM limited con-
tract enforceability is the Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) (GK). Gertler
and Kiyotaki add a banking sector with financial frictions in a canon-
ical DSGE model. Following KM’s collateral constrain design, they
introduce an agency problem between depositors and banks. This
emerges due to the desire of bankers to divert their funds back to
their households. Bankers are required to comply with an inventive
compatibility constraint which assures that banks will have no incen-
tive to divert. The constraint becomes tighter as the banks’ net worth
declines, reducing the value of loans the banks can provide and thus
investment. Gertler and Karadi (2011) enriched the GK framework in
a New-Keynesian model and study the effects of liquidity provisions
by the central bank to the banking sector in times of crisis. Iacoviello
(2005) studies the housing market in a new-Keynesian setup apply-
ing collateral constraints à -la KM to real estate values for firms (pa-
tient entrepreneurs) and to debt for (impatient) households. Lastly,
Mertens and Ravn (2011) employ a similar model to Iacoviello (2005)
with real estate, nominal debt, KM financial frictions and patient-
impatient agents.13
In Chapter 2, I build a framework by combining Gertler and Kiy-
otaki (2010) with Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). This mod-
elling structure allows credit frictions to operate simultaneously orig-
inating from both the demand and the supply side of credit between
three agents: banks, entrepreneurs and households. On the supply
side of credit, there is an agency problem between the depositors
and the banks: the financial intermediaries can divert at any time a
fraction of their assets and return it to their families. This implies
an endogenous incentive compatibility constraint on the bank’s abil-
ity to obtain funds that assures depositors’ funds safety and creates
a wedge between the interest rate on loans and the deposit interest
rate when the constraint is binding. On the demand side of credit
between firms and banks, I incorporate the costly state verification
setting. Banks in order to observe the entrepreneurs’ payoff when
they default, have to pay a monitoring cost. A premium emerges be-
tween the interest rate on capital and the discount rate due to the
monitoring costs. Finally, a last departure of the two seminal models
is the introduction of an endogenously determined remain and exit
13 More studies following the KM approach include: Bocola (2016), Gertler, Kiyotaki,
and Queralto (2012), Akinci and Queralto (2017), Mendoza (2010) among others.
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probability of the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs decide whether they
exit taking as given the loan interest rate. They stay in life as long as
the level of their leverage satisfies the minimum banks’ profitability.
In the GK model, firms cannot rely on their net worth to finance in-
vestment. In other words, if there is no financial intermediation there
is no production. In the same fashion, in the BGG setting it is assumed
that investors lend directly to borrowers, without the intervention of
financial intermediaries. In Chapter 2, both firms and banks can accu-
mulate net worth; and this plays a crucial role in the model’s dynam-
ics since a change in the value of capital now affects both banks and
entrepreneurs through the feedback loop of the financial accelerator.
Furthermore, in the BGG and GK original contexts, financial frictions
are considered either or the lender’s or the borrower’s side. Yet, the
global crisis highlighted the importance of frameworks that can com-
bine credit and funding frictions on firms and banks simultaneously.
Lastly, in the new framework suggested, the firm’s external finance
premium depends also on the bank behaviour. A bank’s decision to
reduce credit and increase the interest rate after a negative shock will
affect the premium that the firm must pay contrary to the BGG model
where the premium only depends on the firms’ behaviour and lever-
age.
In Chapter 3, I combine the GK frictions with a two-agent New
Keynesian model. The two-agent model was developed initially by
Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) and extended further by Debor-
toli and Galí (2018) and Bilbiie (2008) among others.14 I also enrich
it with central bank purchases from banks and households. Lastly, in
Chapter 4 I use the BGG model as the financial friction model em-
ployed to study the Greek Recession.
14 A detailed literature review on two-agent New Keynesian models follows on Chap-
ter 3.
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F I N A N C I A L C R I S I S , M O N E TA RY B A S E E X PA N S I O N
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abstract This chapter examines the post-2008 European Central
Bank’s liquidity enhancing policies and provides evidence of risk-
taking incentives of monetary policy. I build and estimate a dynamic,
general equilibrium model that incorporates financial frictions in both
the supply and demand for credit and allows banks to receive liq-
uidity and hold reserves. When the central bank supplies liquidity
during turbulent times, banks grant loans to riskier firms. This in-
creases the firms’ default probability on new credit and worsens the
performance of the economy. Additionally, I find that borrower’s risk
increase can explain the recent reserve accumulation by the banking
system. Lastly, I evaluate the effects of negative interest rates on ex-
cess reserves and assess the welfare implications of the liquidity pro-
vision policies.
Versions of this chapter have been presented in the 5th ECB Forum on Central
Banking, the RES conference 2018, the 2018 RES Junior Symposium, the 5th Money
Macroeconomics and Finance (MMF) PhD Conference in the University of Kent and
the 22nd Annual International Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and Interna-
tional Finance. A previous version is a Working Paper No 0218, School of Economics,
University of Surrey. It is currently under review in the Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control.
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2.1 introduction
Since the onset of the Great Recession, central banks in the US and
the Euro area have employed a number of non-standard monetary
policy tools, most of them not previously analysed in the macroeco-
nomic policy literature. The extension of existing reverse operations
under longer maturities and the asset purchase programs were the
most popular among those tools. Although the key scope of these
direct funding programs was the stabilization of economic activity
through a credit expansion, especially in the Eurozone, credit and
output levels are still below pre-crisis levels. Additionally, on both
continents there has been a rapid increase in banks’ reserves holdings.
This led commentators, analysts and policy makers to criticize banks
for hoarding reserves out of emergency funds instead of lending them
to the real sector.1 At least in part to counter such hoarding, the ECB
decided to penalize reserve holdings by charging negative interest
rates on its reserves accounts. This paper studies these recent macroe-
conomic developments and their consequences for the Euro Area
macroeconomy. The paper’s main finding is that the ECB’s liquidity
provision, namely the Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs),
was beneficial for the banking system but not for the macroeconomy
due to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (this channel is
returned to momentarily).
This paper’s main economic insight can be summarized as follows:
Consider an increase in entrepreneurial risk which reduces firms’
net worth, raises their probability of default and sets off a recession
through a Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) financial accelera-
tor mechanism.2 To counter such a recession, a central bank might
provide liquidity directly to the banking sector as in the the case of
ECB’s LTROs. While such a policy would potentially halt the eco-
nomic downturn, it simultaneously makes banks supply fresh credit
to -now- riskier firms giving rise to a risk-taking channel. Reinforced
by the lower cost of borrowing, firms leverage up their net worth
(which in and of itself increases their likelihood of default). Higher
default rates lead to higher bankruptcy costs and less available cap-
ital for production. A threshold exists where the capital gains from
liquidity injections are equal to the capital losses due to bankruptcy
costs. In the estimated model I find that the capital losses dominate
1 Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2012), The truth about all those excess reserves (The
Economist), Central Bank reserve creation in the era of negative money multipliers
(Voxeu), Draghi Unveils Historic Measures Against Deflation Threat (Bloomberg), ECB
Doing Whatever It Takes Can’t Make Euro-Area Banks Lend (Bloomberg) and many
others. Philadelphia Fed President Charles Plosser expressed concern about what
would occur “were all those excess reserves to start flowing out into the economy in
the form of loans or purchases of other assets”
2 The definition of entrepreneurial risk follows Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014)
risk shock, i.e., an increase in idiosyncratic production risk.
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the central bank’s capital injections and lead to lower investment and
output.
Additional results show that an increase of riskiness in the credit
demand side is the reason behind the banks’ excess reserves accumu-
lation. Our results show that the central bank is able to induce banks
to lower their reserves holdings and extend credit only when interest
rates on reserves become significantly negative. Lastly, the adverse ef-
fects of an in-crisis liquidity mechanism are confirmed by a negative
impact on consumers’ welfare.
This study introduces agency problems associated with financial
intermediation in an otherwise standard business cycles model and
estimates the model for the Euro Area. A modelling framework is pre-
sented where banks are able to receive and store emergency liquidity
funds from the central bank into their reserve accounts. By combin-
ing Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) with Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) (henceforth GK and BGG respectively) a setting is developed
where increased risk (in the sense of risk shock by Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno (2014)) reduces firms’ net worth, increases their likeli-
hood of default and makes banks reduce credit.3
The main result of this study is in line with findings from the em-
pirical literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (see
Jiménez et al. (2014)). The risk-taking channel describes the notion
that monetary policy affects the quality and not just the quantity of
bank credit. Empirical studies show that expansionary monetary pol-
icy induces banks to grant loans to more risky firms which increases
the borrowers likelihood of default. In the general equilibrium setting
that I employ, this leads to negative effects to the macroeconomy.4
There is need to emphasize that this paper examines only a chan-
nel and a specific instrument the ECB used, namely the LTROs. No
general conclusions on the sign of the full impact of the ECB’s accom-
modative monetary policy can be derived. To do that we must take
into account all the other instruments used which is not the scope of
this paper.
3 This study does not claim that a risk shock was the sole source of the Euro Area
Crisis. Following Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) showing that risk shocks
account for a 60% of GDP fluctuations, they are used as the primary source of dis-
turbance.
4 Jiménez et al. (2014) using information on borrower quality from credit registry
databases for Spain have identified that a monetary expansion induces risk-shifting.
Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez (2017) using a measure of ex-ante risk taking based
on the bank’s assessment of risk at the time the loan was made find qualitatively sim-
ilar results for the U.S. See also Allen and Gale (2000), Diamond and Rajan (2012),
Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydró (2014),Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis (2017), Buch,
Eickmeier, and Prieto (2014), Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez (2010),
Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) and Lown and Morgan (2006) among other and the
literature review in the end of this section.
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The ECB proceeded in measures aiming to support banks’ liquid-
ity funding and therefore encouraging banks to provide credit.5 The
main tool used, the LTRO, is a type of open market operation that
takes place as reverse transaction and is the main liquidity provi-
sion tool of the ECB. Starting from October 2008 the ECB steadily
increased the maturities of the LTRO from 3 months to 36 months.6
Therefore, financial intermediaries could have unlimited access to
short term funding. At the same time a significant increase of the
banks excess reserves took place.7 LTRO funding and the banks’ ac-
cumulation of excess liquidity are depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: LTRO and excess reserves in the Eurosystem. Data source: ECB
Despite the fact that the ECB has more than doubled its balance
sheet, creating a remarkable expansion of the Eurosystem’s monetary
base, bank lending has not shown any signs of expansion yet as Fig-
ure 5 shows. Monetary base expansion, although unprecedented in
5 ECB’s response was in two phases with the use of non-standard monetary policies
labelled as “enhanced credit support". Firstly at the onset of financial crisis and later
when the Euro sovereign crisis took place. These included the maturity extension
of Long Term Refinancing Operations, the creation the Targeted Long Term Refi-
nancing Operations (TLTROs), the reduction in banks’ reserve requirements from
2% to 1%, an asset purchase program and numerous other non-standard measures
described in detail by Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2012).
6 Only for it’s second intervention, the ECB supplied to the banks 1 trillion Euro via
the LTRO the scheme.
7 In the Eurosystem framework, banks either hold their reserves as excess reserves
where they get a zero remuneration or in the deposit facility, the account where
banks make deposits with the central bank and earn an interest. Before 2008 both
assets’ level was insignificant and were only used for banking micro-management.
Since I am not interested in the micro-management allocation of banks between
the deposit facility and the current accounts, in the model I use the deposit facility
account as the representative reserve account. The model can be extended easily to
include also the current accounts (reserves outside of the deposit facility) as an asset
that pays no interest.
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Figure 5: Loans from Monetary Financial Institutions to Non-Financial Cor-
porations in the Euro Area (Year on Year % Growth). Data source:
ECB
its size, has not worked as intended. Banks’ credit growth remains
low in the Eurozone and hence investment.
This paper also analyses the effects of the newly introduced the
negative interest rates or reserves practiced by the ECB and other
central banks.8 Interest rates in the present setting are constrained by
the lower bound which is set by the model economy’s riskless rate.
Being unable to have negative rates, I employ a penalty function for
accumulating reserves which turns positive when reserves exceed a
threshold value, similar to a tax on reserves. When banks accumulate
reserves below a specific threshold they have some gains (e.g. efficient
and liquidity gains). When the level of reserves surpass the threshold
banks pay a cost to the central bank. After an increase of the reserve
penalty, a reduction of the banks’ reserve position and an increase in
credit follows which lead to an overall economic upturn. Lastly, using
consumption equivalence measure based on conditional welfare as in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I find that the recent ECB’s policies
had a small but negative impact on welfare.
The modelling structure allows credit frictions to operate simulta-
neously originating from both the demand and the supply side of
credit, an approach that has not yet been discussed in the literature.
On the supply side, an agency problem between the depositors and
the banks is introduced. The financial intermediaries can divert at
any time a fraction of their assets and return it back to their fami-
lies as in Hart and Moore (1998). This implies an endogenous con-
straint on the bank’s ability to obtain funds that assures depositors’
funds safety. A wedge between the interest rate on loans and the de-
posit interest rate is generated when the constraint is binding. As
8 Apart from the ECB, negative interest rates have been implemented also by Den-
marks Nationalbank, Bank of Japan, Swiss National Bank and the Sveriges Riksbank.
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for the demand side friction, a costly state verification (CSV) prob-
lem as initially proposed by Townsend (1979) is introduced. Banks
in order to observe the defaulting entrepreneurs payoff, must pay a
monitoring cost. These monitoring costs can be interpreted as a cost
of bankruptcy as in Bernanke (1981). A premium emerges between
the interest rate on capital and the discount rate, the equivalent of
the deposit rate in the model. An endogenously determined remain
and exit probability of the entrepreneurs is introduced in this new
framework. Entrepreneurs decide whether they exit taking as given
the loan interest rate. They stay in life as long as the level of their
leverage satisfies the minimum banks’ profitability.
related literature Macroeconomic models with financial fric-
tions have populated a substantial fraction of the macro literature
after the Great Recession following the seminal papers of Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (see Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) among many oth-
ers).9 Prior to the financial frictions models, most of the existing mod-
ern macroeconomic models do not take into account that monetary
policy is implemented through the banking system, as it occurs in
practice. Instead, most assume that central banks directly control in-
terest rates or monetary aggregates and abstract from how the trans-
mission of monetary policy may depend on the conditions of banks.
Interactions between reserves, open market operations, banking and
the macroeconomy introduced in this paper, aim to build a closer
approach to the real world monetary policy implementation.
The risk-shifting channel of monetary policy, the main result of
this paper, has regained attention after the Great Recession which
has been characterised from substantial monetary easing from the
central banks. Allen and Gale (2000), Diamond and Rajan (2012) were
among the first to identify the risk-shifting channel of monetary pol-
icy. In an empirical framework Jiménez et al. (2014) and Ioannidou,
Ongena, and Peydró (2014) find that monetary expansion induces
banks to grant loans to more risky firms which increases the likeli-
hood of default. Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez (2017) find similar
results for the U.S. 10 Adrian and Shin (2010) build a theoretical model
and show that expansionary monetary policy increases the risk tak-
ing of the banking sector by relaxing the bank capital constraint due
to moral hazard problems. In my knowledge the present paper is the
9 Also Eggertsson and Woodford (2003b), Curdia and Woodford (2011), Gertler and
Karadi (2011). For a comprehensive literature review on the developments of models
with financial factors see Gertler and Gilchrist (2018).
10 For more studies that identify the risk-taking channels see: Delis, Hasan, and Myloni-
dis (2017), Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto (2014), Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-
Ibanez (2010), Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) and Lown and Morgan (2006) among
others.
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first study that introduces the channel of risk-shifting in lending after
liquidity operations in a quantitative framework.
There are many studies on the ECB’s LTROs which are close to the
subject of this paper: Cahn, Matheron, and Sahuc (2017), Joyce et al.
(2012), Bocola (2016), Kwaak (2017) to name a few. These, assume a
direct relationship between the non-standard credit measures and the
bank lending. Specifically, they omit the reserves that are being cre-
ated from these operations. Thus, in these models it is assumed that
all the emergency funding from the central bank transforms directly
to credit, which is a strong assumption.
Finally, the last strand of literature that this paper relates to are
the studies on banks’ excess reserves. After the recent reserve accu-
mulation by the banking sector there is a growing literature on the
subject which goes back to Frost (1971). Bianchi and Bigio (2014) de-
velop a new framework to study the implementation of monetary pol-
icy through the banking system. They find that the unprecedented
increase in reserves is due to a substantial and persistent contrac-
tion in loan demand since the benefits of holding reserves relative to
loans are increased. Their results are in line with this paper’s findings.
Primus (2017) designs a DSGE model where banks hold reserves but
mainly focuses on the effects that reserve requirements can have in
the middle-income countries.
layout The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
model and section 2.3 describes the important economic mechanisms.
Section 2.4 explains the data used and the estimation of the model.
Finally, section 2.5 presents the quantitatively analysis and section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 the model
The model is built on and extends two leading approaches in the
credit market frictions literature: The seminal work of Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999) that introduced the “financial accelerator” in a
general equilibrium setting and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Due to
the model length, the model is divided in two parts: The standard
part of the model and the financial frictions. Section 2.2.1 describes
the standard part of the model, employed in the most Real Business
Cycles literature. Section 2.2.2 describes the financial frictions compo-
nents. Finally, section 2.2.3 closes the model by providing the mone-
tary and fiscal rules.
All variables are in real terms abstracting from the notion of money.
There are five types of agents. Households, financial intermediaries,
entrepreneurs, capital goods producers and retailers, and a govern-
ment that conducts both fiscal and monetary policy. To enhance intu-
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ition on the model mechanism, the flows between agents are summa-
rized in figure 6.
Banks
Ent/neurs
Firms
Households
CB
C.G.P
Deposits
Labour
Bonds
Loans
Reserves LTRO
Capital
Capital
Figure 6: Model Summary. CGP are the capital goods producers, CB is the
central bank
2.2.1 Standard Part of the Model
households There is a continuum of households with identical
preferences. Within each household there are three different member
types: $ workers, σ bankers and p1´$´ σq entrepreneurs. House-
hold members differ in the way they obtain earnings. Workers supply
labour, bankers manage the financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs
manage the non-financial firms. All return their earnings back to their
families.11 Within the family there is perfect consumption insurance.
The preferences of the representative household take the following
form:
Et
8ÿ
i“0
βiζc,trlnpCt`iq ´ χ
1` N
1`
t`i s, (1)
Ct denotes the per capita consumption of the household members
and Nt the supply of labour. β P r0, 1s is the discount factor,  is the
inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply, χ ą 0 is the relative utility
weight of labour and t` i is the time subscript. Finally, ζc,t is pref-
erence shock that follows an AR(1) process. Because of the stochastic
11 This approach follows GK and allows for within-household heterogeneity but also
sticks to the representative approach representation. Abstracting from consumption
for the bankers and entrepreneurs makes the model presentation simpler.
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setting, households make expectations for the future based on what
they know in time t and Et is the expectation operator at time t.
The budget constraint of the representative household is
Ct ` Tt `Dh,t`1 “WtNt `Πt ` RtDh,t, (2)
where
Dh,t`1 “ Dt`1 `Dg,t`1. (3)
Household allocates funds to consumption, taxes Tt and two types of
savings: lending deposits Dt`1 to banks and one period government
bonds Dg,t`1. Both assets have no risk and are perfect substitutes of
each other. Rt is the gross return for the bonds and the deposit hold-
ings respectively (the interest factor) in period t. The household’s fi-
nancial resources are from labour income, Wt is the real wage, bond
and deposits returns and the net payouts to the household from own-
ership of both non-financial firms and financial intermediaries Πt.
The problem of the representative household is to choose Ct,Nt,Dt,Dh,t
in order to maximize its expected utility (1) subject to the budget
constraint (2) at every period. Solution of the household’s problem
is shown in Appendix A.1. There is a turnover between workers,
bankers and the entrepreneurs which ensures that bankers and en-
trepreneurs will never accumulate enough own funds to finance their
activities. This will be explained in detail in the next section.12
capital and consumption goods production The non-financial
firms are separated into two types: goods producers and capital pro-
ducers. Capital evolves according to the law of motion of capital
Kt`1 “ kqt`1rIt ` p1´ δqKfts. (4)
The variable Kft denotes the amount of capital available for time t pro-
duction. 13 This is different than the amount of capital at the end of
the previous period as some is lost because of monitoring costs. kqt
denotes a capital quality shock and follows a first order autoregres-
sive process. This is a simple way to introduce an exogenous source
of variation in the value of capital.14
Goods Producers.— Goods producers are owned by the entrepreneurs.
They combine capital received from the entrepreneurs at no cost, and
labour to produce goods under a constant returns to scale produc-
12 This follows Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler, Kiy-
otaki, and Queralto (2012).
13 This follows the setting by Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2016).
14 Many recent papers make use of the exogenous disturbance in the capital. See
Gertler and Karadi (2011), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) among others.
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tion function. Production is also subject to a total factor productivity
shock At that follows a first order autoregressive process.15
Yt “ AtpKftqαN1´αt .
The decision problem of the goods producers is to choose Kft and
Nt in order to maximize their profits. Profit maximization implies
standard input demands for labour and capital:
Wt “ p1´αq
`Kft
Nt
˘α
Zt “ α
`Nt
Kft
˘1´α.
Capital Goods Producers.— Capital goods producers produce new
capital and sell it to entrepreneurs at a priceQt. Investment on capital
(It) is subject to adjustment costs. Their objective is to choose tItu8t“0
to solve:
max
Iτ
Et
8ÿ
τ“t
Λt,τ
"
QtIt ´ r1` f˜
˜
Iτ
Iτ´1
¸
Iτs
*
.
where the adjustment cost function f˜ captures the cost of investors to
increase their capital stock:
f˜
˜
Iτ
Iτ´1
¸
“ η
2
˜
Iτ
Iτ´1
´ 1
¸2
Iτ.
η is the inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital. The
solution to the decision problem of the investors yields the competi-
tive price of capital:
Qt “ 1`
´
η
Iτ
Iτ´1
´ Iτ
Iτ´1
´1
¯
` η
2
´ Iτ
Iτ´1
´1
¯2´ηΛt,τ I2τ`1
I2τ
´ Iτ
Iτ´1
´1
¯¯
.
2.2.2 Financial Frictions
entrepreneurs Each entrepreneur i purchases raw capital ki,t`1
from the capital goods producers at price Qt in a competitive mar-
ket and fund this purchase with their equity nEi,t`1 and credit li,t`1
obtained from the financial institutions. The entrepreneur’s balance
sheet is:
Qtki,t`1 “ li,t`1 `nEi,t`1. (5)
15 It might be argued that since the idiosyncratic shock to entrepreneurs’ capital is used,
an aggregate productivity shock is redundant. Nevertheless I stick to the original
BGG formulation and include the productivity shock.
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The entrepreneur transfers the purchased capital to the retail firm in
order to produce goods. Capital yields its marginal product Zt`1. At
the end of the period, she sells the undepreciated capital back to the
capital goods producer at price Qt`1. Therefore, the average return
per nominal unit invested in period t is:
Rk,t`1 “ kqt`1
rZt`1 ` p1´ δqQt`1s
Qt
, (6)
In every period t an idiosyncratic shock ψi transforms the newly
purchased ki,t`1 raw units of capital into ψiki,t`1 effective units of
capital. It is assumed that ψ follows a unit-mean log normal distribu-
tion. The idiosyncratic shock is drawn from a density fpψtq and the
probability of default is then given by:
ppψ¯q “
ż ψ¯
0
fpψqdψ. (7)
Following Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) I call the standard
deviation of logpψq denoted by σt, the risk shock. It is the cross sec-
tional dispersion in ψ and it is allowed to vary stochastically over
time. Intuitively, is an increase in the volatility of the entrepreneurs
distribution of good and bad signals. As it will be shown in the sim-
ulations, a positive risk shock will lead to an increase in the standard
deviation σψ of the idiosyncratic shock ψ that the entrepreneurs re-
ceive.
A threshold value of ψi called ψ¯t`1 divides the entrepreneurs that
cannot pay back the loan and interest from those who can repay. It is
defined by
Rl,t`1li,t`1 “ ψ¯t`1Rk,t`1Qtki,t`1. (8)
Rl,t`1 is the rate to be decided in the debt contract between the
entrepreneur and the banker. When ψi ě ψ¯t`1 the entrepreneur
repays the bank the amount Rl,t`1li,t`1 keeps the profits equal to
ψ¯t`1Rk,t`1Qtki,t`1 ´ Rl,t`1li,t`1 and continues production. If ψi ă
ψ¯t`1 the entrepreneur has negative net worth resulting in bankruptcy
and default. When an entrepreneur defaults, is then being monitored
by a bank which acquires her assets. The expected net worth of the
entrepreneurs is
Etrp1´ Γtpψ¯t`1qqRk,t`1Qtki,t`1s, (9)
where
Γtpψ¯t`1q “
ż ψ¯t`1
0
ψfpψqdψ` ψ¯t`1p1´ ppψ¯t`1qq. (10)
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and 1´ Γtpψ¯t`1q represents the average weight of the entrepreneurs’
gains.
If there was no cost for the banker to observe the idiosyncratic
shock ψi,t, then there would have been state-contingent contracts
that would perfectly insure the banker. Instead, in order to make en-
trepreneurs’ default costly for the banking sector, ψi is costlessly ob-
served by the entrepreneur, but it is not observed by the lender unless
he pays a fraction of their ex-post revenues. Specifically, the financial
intermediary must pay a “monitoring cost” to observe the borrower’s
realized return on capital. This follows the “costly state verification”
illustration proposed by Townsend (1979). Monitoring costs can be
interpreted as legal costs that the banks pay in the case of borrowers’
default. This cost destroys part of the capital produced by the project
and equals a proportion µ of the gross payoff of the firms capital, i.e.
µψi,t`1Rk,t`1Qtki,t`1.
The optimal contract maximizes the expected profits of the en-
trepreneur under the condition that the expected return on lending
is no less that the opportunity cost of lending. In other words, for the
financial intermediary to continue extending credit to entrepreneurs,
their expected return from credit must be always greater or equal to
the opportunity cost of its funds. The opportunity cost is the riskless
rate Rt. The loan contract must satisfy:
p1´µqRk,t`1Qtki,t`1
ż ψ¯t`1
0
ψfpψqdψ`p1´ppψ¯t`1qqRl,t`1li,t`1 ě Rtli,t`1.
(11)
The left hand side shows the expected gross return that the financial
intermediary receives over all realizations of the shock and the right
hand side the opportunity cost of lending that the intermediary has.
Using (10) the zero profit condition (11) becomes :
Rk,t`1Qtki,t`1rΓtpψ¯t`1q´µGtpψ¯t`1qs ě RtpQtki,t`1´nEi,t`1q, (12)
where µGtpψ¯t`1q are the expected monitoring costs:
Gtpψ¯t`1q “
ż ψ¯t`1
0
ψfpψqdψ
respectively. The optimal contract for the entrepreneur solves the en-
trepreneur’s expected net worth (9) subject to the zero profit condi-
tion (12). The solution is presented in Appendix A.2. Combining the
first order conditions leads to the external finance premium between
the interest gain on capital and the riskless rate:
Et Rk,t`1 “ Et ρpψ¯t`1qRt`1, (13)
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ρpψ¯t`1q “ Γ
1
tpψ¯t`1q
rpΓtpψ¯t`1q ´ µGtpψ¯t`1qqΓ 1tpψ¯t`1q ` p1´ Γtpψ¯t`1qpΓ 1tpψ¯t`1q ´ µG 1tpψ¯t`1qqs
.
Aggregation.— At the end of the period a fraction σE,t of entrepreneurs
decides to remain and the rest disappear and replaced by an equal
number of workers. This assumption ensures that entrepreneurs will
not fund all investments from their own accumulated capital. The
probability of remaining is not constant, in contrast with the BGG,
and it is adjusted taking as given the loan interest rate that they have
to pay to the banks. Specifically, it adjusts at every time t such that the
level of leverage satisfies the zero profit condition (11). Exit doesn’t
necessarily mean default.Thus, σE,t is a time varying probability. The
probability of default and the remaining probability are characterized
by a negative relationship.16
The new entrants receive a start up fund transferred from the old
entrepreneurs which is equal to a proportion ξE of their wealth. By
the law of large numbers the aggregate net worth for every entrepreneurs
i at the end of the period t is p1´ Γt´1qψ¯tRk,tQt´1ki,t. Integrating
over all entrepreneurs we get the aggregate net worth at the end of
period t where capital letters denote aggregate variables.
NEt`1 “ pσE,t ` ξEqpr1´ Γt´1pĎψtqsRk,tQt´1Ktq.
banks Each bank j allocates its funds to credit lj,t`1 and reserves
xj,t`1. It funds its operations by receiving deposit from households
dj,t`1, emergency funding from the central bank mj,t and also by
raising equity nBj,t`1. From the above specification, it follows that the
bank’s balance sheet is:
lj,t`1 ` xj,t`1 “ nBj,t ` dj,t`1 `mj,t`1. (14)
The bank’s net worth evolves as the difference between interest
gains on assets and interest payments on liabilities net the cost of
holding excess reserves.
nBj,t`1 “ Rl,tlj,tp1´ ppψ¯tqq ` Rk,tkj,tQt´1p1´ µqGtpψ¯tq ` Rx,txj,t
´Rtdj,t ´ Rm,tmj,t ´Φpxtq. (15)
Rx,t is the interest rate of the deposit facility and Rm,t the interest rate
of the emergency funding (LTRO). Banks get repaid the principal plus
the interest of the loans from the entrepreneurs with a probability of
p1´ ppψ¯qq. The first two terms in the right hand side of the equation
is the expected return to the bank from the contract averaged over all
realizations of the idiosyncratic shock.
16 See Appendix A.3 for further details.
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Banks have to pay reserve accumulation costs Φpxtq when their re-
serve holdings exceed a specific level. This captures the recent ECB’s
negative interest rate policy applied when banks’ over-accumulated
excess reserves. At first sight, introducing a penalty for accumulating
reserves might seem odd. The reasoning behind that is that interest
rates in the present setting are constrained by the lower bound which
is set by the riskless rate Rt. Therefore, introducing negative interest
rates is not a straightforward process making the reserve accumula-
tion penalty a working alternative. To capture this I follow Glocker
and Towbin (2012) and the penalty as a fraction of net worth depends
on the size of the total excess reserves:
ΦpxtqnBt “
´κ
2
x2t ` xt
¯
ζx,t,
or Φpxtq “
`
κ
2Υ
2
tn
B
t ` Υt
˘
ζx,t and Υt “ xt{nBt . In the parametriza-
tion I set  to be negative. When excess reserves holdings are below
the threshold ´2κ banks have efficiency gains from holding liquidity.
As the excess reserves increase and overpass the threshold banks have
costs due to the increased reserve penalty. ζx,t is a transitory reserve
penalty shock. An unanticipated increase in the reserves’ penalty will
make banks reduces their reserves holdings and will induce credit to
the real economy.
At the end of the period an exogenously determined constant frac-
tion of bankers σB remains and the rest disappear and are replaced
by an equal number of workers.
The banker’s objective at the end of period t, is the expected present
value of future dividends:
Vj,t “ Et
8ÿ
j“1
p1´ σBqσj´1B Λt`1nBj,t`1. (16)
In order to set a limit to the bankers borrowing from either the de-
positors or the central bank, I introduce an endogenous constraint on
the banks ability to borrow in the same fashion as in GK and others. A
banker j after collecting deposits from households and liquidity from
the central bank may decide to divert a fraction of these funds. This
occurs when the bank’s value from diverting is higher than its fran-
chise value. It is assumed that the bank can steal a fraction θ P r0, 1s of
the expected non-defaulting loans net a fraction θω P r0, 1s ă θ of the
central bank liquidity. The cost of stealing for the banker is that the
creditors can force the intermediary into bankruptcy at the beginning
of the next period. This sets a limit to the bankers borrowing from
either the depositors or the central bank. In order for the banks’ cred-
itors to continue providing funds to the bank, the following incentive
constraint must always hold:
Vj,t ě θrp1´ ppψ¯tqqlj,t ´ωmj,ts. (17)
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Bank’s value must be greater or at least equal with the value of its di-
vertable assets. When this constraint holds bankers have no incentive
to steal from their creditors. In the case where the constraint binds a
spread between the risky and the riskless interest rate emerges. As I
will show below this will be the case in times of a negative shock. A
reduction of the banker’s net worth will make the constraint to bind
and a spread increase occurs.
The value of the bank at the end of period t´ 1 must satisfy the
Bellman equation:
Vj,t´1plj,t´1, xj,t´1,dj,t,mj,t´1q “ Et´1Λt´1,t
8ÿ
i“1
tp1´ σBqnBj,t
` σBmax
dj,t
r max
lj,t,xj,t,mj,t
Vtplj,t, xj,t,dj,t,mj,tqsu. (18)
Banker’s problem is to maximize (16) subject to the balance sheet (14)
and liquidity constraint (17).
Proposition 1. A solution to the banker’s dynamic program is
Vj,tplj,t, xj,t,dj,t,mj,tq “ ABnBj,t.
The marginal value of the banker’s net worth AB is then:
AB “ µtφt ` νd,j,t ` κ
2
Υ2t .
µt is the spread, φt is the maximum leverage and νd,j,t is the marginal loss
from deposits.
Proof. See appendix A.4.
The proposition clarifies the role of the bank’s net worth in the
model. We can rewrite the incentive constraint using the linearity of
the value function as
AB
θ
ě rp1´ ppψ¯tqqlj,t ´ωmj,ts
nBj,t
.
The adjusted leverage of a banker cannot be greater than AB{θ. The
right hand side shows that as the net worth of the banker decreases
the constraint is more likely to bind. Proposition 1 also implies that
even there is heterogeneity in the bankers’ holdings and net worth,
this does not affect aggregate dynamics. Hence, the transition from
the individual to aggregate variables takes place in the same way as
in the previous section.
The maximum adjusted leverage ratio of the bank is defined as
φj,t “ νd,j,t `
κ
2Υ
2
t
p1´ ppψ¯tqqθ´ µt . (19)
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Maximum adjusted leverage ratio depends positively on the marginal
cost of the deposits νd,j,t and reserves and on the excess value of
bank assets µt. As the credit spread increases, banks franchise value
Vt increases and the probability of a bank to divert its funds declines.
From the other hand as the proportion of assets that a bank can divert,
θ increases, the constraint binds more.
Aggregation.— Aggregate net worth is the sum of the new bankers’
and the existing bankers’ equity: NBt`1 “ NBy,t`1 `NBo,t`1. Young
bankers’ net worth is the earnings from loans multiplied by ξB which
is the fraction of asset gains that being transferred from households
to the new bankers
NBy,t`1 “ ξBrRl,tLts
and the net worth of the old is the probability of survival for an exist-
ing banker multiplied by the net earnings from assets and liabilities
NBo,t`1 “ σBrRl,tLt ` Rx,tXt ´ RmMt ´ RtDt ´ΦtpXtqs.
2.2.3 Fiscal, Monetary Policy and Resource Constraint
Government acts as both fiscal and monetary authority. Its fiscal role
is limited on collecting lump sum taxes Tt to finance its public expen-
ditures GSt. I assume that the level of the government expenditures is
at a fixed level relative to output (γG) and subject to a transitory shock
gt that follows an AR(1) process. Hence, GSt “ pγGSYtqgt. As a mon-
etary authority, it supports the banking liquidity by providing Mt
funds at interest rate Rm,t, it accommodates banks’ excess reserves
Xt at an interest rate Rx,t and issues bonds to finance its expenses
Dg,t, bought by households at an interest rate Rt. The government
budget constraint thus is:
GSt`Mt´Dg,t´Xt “ Tt`Rm,tMt´1´RtDg,t´1´Rx,tXt´1. (20)
The monetary authority’s liquidity policy follows the policy rule in-
troduced by Gertler and Karadi (2011). At every crisis episode, loosely
defined as a period when the credit spread increases, the central bank
increases the liquidity provision to the banking sector according to
the following rule:
χm,t “ χm ` κmEtrpRl,t`1 ´ Rt`1q ´ pRssl ´ Rssqs, (21)
where χm,t “ MtLt`Xt is the fraction of the total bank assets financed
through LTRO and χm is its steady state value. pRssl ´ Rssq is the
steady state premium. The intensity of the liquidity intervention de-
pends on the liquidity feedback parameter κm which is always posi-
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tive. According to this rule, liquidity to the banking sector increases
as the spread increases relative to its steady state level.
Finally, the resource constraint of the economy is:
Yt “ Ct ` Itr1` f˜
´ It
It´1
¯
s `GS`ΦpXtq ` µGtpψtqRk,tQtKt.
Final output may be either transformed into consumption good, in-
vested, used by the government for its spending or used up in moni-
toring costs and reserve costs. Lastly, the amount of capital available
for production is given by Kft “ p1´ µGtqKt. Available capital equals
the initial capital net of the capital destroyed due to the expected
monitoring costs.
2.3 bankers’ optimal asset allocation and the risk-taking
channel
This section presents in detail the main mechanisms of the model and
is divided in two parts. In the first, I show the optimal allocation deci-
sions of the bankers along with how the risk-taking incentives affect
the allocation of capital. In the second, the economic mechanism that
drives the adverse effects of liquidity injections in the presence of risk
and bankruptcy costs is explained. To enhance clarity, the explanation
is accompanied by a graph that captures the main ingredients of the
mechanism in a static framework.
2.3.1 Bankers’ Optimal Allocation
The following relations describe how the bankers allocate their funds
between reserves and loans and how the risk-taking channel emerges
from the optimal decisions. These yield from the solution of the bankers
problem17. Next, I describe how the interest rates are determined en-
dogenously in the model.
At optimum, the demand for excess reserves for the bank is such
that the marginal benefit for investing in one unit of reserves, νx,j,t,
equals the marginal cost from using on unit of short term debt νd,j,t
and the marginal cost of raising one unit of reserves18.
νx,j,t “ νd,j,t `Φ 1pxj,tq.
17 The full solution is presented in detail in Appendix A.4.
18 This relation yields directly from the first order condition of the banker’s problem
with respect to excess reserves xt.
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The bank’s credit supply to non-financial firms is:19.
lj,t “ φj,tnBj,t ` 11´ ppψ¯tqpωmj,tqloooooooooomoooooooooon
risk-taking
. (22)
Available credit depends on two components: the banks’ own funds
and the liquidity received by the central bank. When the liquidity
policy is absent (mj,t “ 0), then the bank adjust its loan supply ac-
cording to the product between leverage φj,t and net worth. At tur-
bulent times, when the central bank injects liquidity into the system
(mj,t ą 0) banks that receive LTRO funds will increase their lending
compared to the no liquidity case but they engage in risky lending.
Banks search for yield and increase the lending to the non-financial
firms which during crises have a higher likelihood of default. I de-
note this as the risk-taking component. Risky lending occurs using
the central bank funds and this captures the risk-shifting channel of
monetary policy.
The bank’s demand for loans is determined from the expected lend-
ing rate.
Et Rl,t`1 “ λtp1` λtq
θ
EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1loooooooooooooomoooooooooooooon
liquidity component
`Et Rt`1 1
1´ ppψtqloooooooooomoooooooooon
risk component
.
Two components determine the expected lending rate. The first, is
due to the binding funding constraints for the bankers. When the con-
straint binds, bankers cannot get new funding to explore new prof-
itable activities. Hence they adjust the loan rate. This will be referred
as the liquidity component. The second one reflects the compensation
that bankers demand when the firms’ probability of default increases.
This is the risk component.20
The interest rate of the LTRO funding is endogenously determined
as follows:
Rm,t “ ωRl,t `
ˆ
1´ω 1
1´ ppψ¯tq
˙
Rt.
The liquidity funding interest rate is a weighted average of the loan
rate and the deposit rate. I calibrate the parameter values in order to
have a liquidity funding interest rate below the loan rate but slightly
above the riskless rate. Lastly, the interest rate on reserves is defined
as a function of the riskless rate Rx,t “ τRt.
19 The optimal lending decision of the banker yields from the compatibility constraint
in conjunction with the FOC for lt and mt under the assumption that the constraint
is always binding.
20 Bocola (2016) using another source of uncertainty (an increase of future sovereign
default) instead of the firms’ default, shows the existence of the same two sources of
frictions between the loan and the risk free rates.
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2.3.2 The Adverse Effects of Liquidity Injections
The main result of this study is the negative consequences of the liq-
uidity injections when borrowers’ default is an equilibrium outcome.
The economic mechanism is the following. Consider an increase of
the entrepreneur’s risk. This reduces firms’ net worth, raises their
probability of default due to standard financial accelerator effects and
reduces banks’ net worth. As equation (22) shows, when liquidity pol-
icy is absent, and the shock hits, banks cut on lending. The striking
result comes up when a central bank in order to halt the recession
provides liquidity to the banking sector.
Newly injected liquidity mt relaxes the constraint of the banks as
(17) shows. This, following equation (22), makes banks supply fresh
credit to - now - riskier firms thus increasing the risk exposure of
banks. As a result, firms probability of default will increase more and
more monitoring -bankruptcy- costs have to be paid by the bankers
thus more capital has to be destroyed. A threshold exists when the
loss from the destruction of capital is equal to the gain from the new
capital injections. When the capital destruction dominates the capital
injections, as it is the case presented by the estimated model, less cap-
ital is available for production. Reinforced with financial accelerator
effects, this makes the recession more severe.
Figure 7 gives a static example of the mechanism in the case of the
marginal entrepreneur with zero net worth. In that case the balance
sheet of the entrepreneur is QtKt “ Lt. All the loans from the banks
are transformed into capital purchased from the capital goods pro-
ducers. The initial mass of entrepreneurs is F and the initial capital is
KAt . When a risk shock hits, the dispersion of the idiosyncratic shock
of the entrepreneurs’ increases and this leads to a higher number of
defaults. The total mass of firms reduces to FA. Due to the monitoring
costs, the bank has to pay a fraction of the capital of the defaulting
entrepreneurs. The capital that is destroyed by this operation is the
horizontal line area on the top right of the graph. The available capital
for production after the shock in the no liquidity case KA,ft is shown
by the doted area.
When the central bank provides liquidity the incentive constraint of
the bank relaxes and this leads to a credit extension. The new higher
level of capital is KBt , above K
A
t . Due to the risk shock, the low price
of capital and the low net worth now more firms default. When banks
are willing to supply higher credit to risky firms this implies a higher
probability of default, with larger expected monitoring costs for the
lender. Therefore the total mass of firms reduces to FB, which is lower
than the mass of firms FA in the no policy case. Now the total capital
that is destroyed due to monitoring costs is the thick outlined square
and the available capital for production KB,ft is the graph area net of
the capital destroyed due to monitoring.
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Figure 7: Adverse Effects of Liquidity Injections
The following proposition presents the condition under which the
gains from liquidity injections are smaller than the bankruptcy costs.
Proposition 2. If the gains from liquidity pKBt ´ KAt q are smaller than
the losses due to increased expected monitoring costs pµGBt pψ¯t`1qKBt ´
µGAt pψ¯t`1qKAt q, the available capital after the liquidity expansion KB,ft will
be lower than the available capital without the liquidity policy KA,ft .
Proof. The available capital after the destruction due to monitoring
costs in the no policy case is: KA,ft “ p1´ µGAt qKAt and in the policy
case: KB,ft “ p1´µGBt qKBt . The difference between the liquidity policy
available capital and the no policy is:
KB,ft ´KA,ft “ pKBt ´KAt q ´ pµGBt pψ¯t`1qKBt ´ µGAt pψ¯t`1qKAt q
Since Gtpψ¯t`1q is increasing on the likelihood of default, for the
above expression to be negative it must be that pµGBt pψ¯t`1qKBt ´
µGAt pψ¯t`1qKAt q ą pKBt ´KAt q.
In the quantitative analysis following in the next section using the
estimated model for the Euro Area, the gains from liquidity injections
are proven to be smaller than the losses giving rise to the adverse
effects of the liquidity policy.
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2.4 estimation and model inference
This section presents the model estimation, the priors and the pos-
teriors for the analysis and descriptive statistics. Finally, I compare
the model’s moments with the Euro Area data moments at the prior
values of the parameters.
2.4.1 Data
I use quarterly Eurozone data from Q1:2000 to Q1:2017. This includes
four standard variables used in macroeconomics analyses: GDP, con-
sumption, investment and the base interest rate of the ECB. Addi-
tionally, 4 financial variables are used: credit to non-financial corpora-
tions, credit spread between the lending rate and the short rate, bank
reserves and non-financial firms net worth. The NFC net worth is ob-
tained through the Dow Jones index for the Euro area. The rest of the
variables are downloaded from the ECB Statistical Warehouse and the
European Commission. Before the estimation all the variables apart
from the credit spread and interest rate are transformed into real vari-
ables by dividing with the GDP delfator. Then they are expressed as
per capita terms by dividing them with the active labour force.
Prior to the analysis following Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
(2014) I transform the data as follows: For GDP, consumption, invest-
ment, credit, reserves and net worth I take the logarithmic first differ-
ence and then remove the sample mean. I leave the interest rates in
levels removing the sample mean.
2.4.2 Priors and Posteriors
The parameters in the model are divided into two categories. The first
set of parameters is calibrated at the standard values in the business
cycles literature and the second set is estimated. I fix the depreciation
rate of capital δ at 0.025, the capital share α at 0.33 and the Inverse
Frisch elasticity of labour supply  at 0.33 as in Gerali et al. (2010) and
Gelain (2010) where both study the Euro Area economy. The relative
utility of labour χ is calibrated at 5.584 such as to ensure a level of
labour hours close to 1{3 in steady state. The ratio of government
spending to GDP is fixed at 0.2, consistent with the Euro Area data
(see for example Christoffel and Schabert (2015)) and the discount
factor β at 0.9973 which is equivalent to a 4% annual interest rate, a
value close to the historical time series of the interest rate and also in
line with several estimations for the Euro Area.
I want to ensure that the model captures a bankers’ leverage ratio
of 4 and a bank capital to lending ratio of 0.25 close to the value
suggested by Christoffel and Schabert (2015). Therefore, σB and ξB
are calibrated at 0.955 and 0.009 respectively. In order to capture the
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unconventional character of the LTRO policy, I choose a very low level
for the steady state value of the LTRO operations χm equal to 0.1%.
I set the rate on reserves equal to the rate of the riskless asset which
is the case according to the pre-2009 Euro data and I define τ equal
to one. Lastly, I target a marginally positive level of excess reserves
of around 1% in steady state by calibrating  to -0.2. In this way I
allow for some liquidity management gains from holding reserves.
The parameter values are presented in Table 1.
Par. Definition Value
Households
β Discount rate 0.99
χ Relative utility weight of labor 5.584
B Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.333
Banks
ω Divertable fraction of LTRO 0.3
ξB Entering bankers initial capital 0.009
σB Bankers’ survival rate 0.955
 Gains from reserves -0.2
τ Interest on reserves relative to the riskless rate 1
Resource constraint and government policy
δ Depreciation of capital 0.025
α Capital share 0.33
γGS Steady state fraction of government expenditures to output 0.2
χm Steady state value of the LTRO 0.001
Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values
The second set of parameters consists of the estimated parameters
following the Bayesian techniques surveyed by An and Schorfheide
(2007). There are two categories of the parameters, one related to the
bankers’, entrepreneurs’ and investment parameters and the other
set which are associated with the shocks in the model. Table 2 shows
the prior distribution used for each of the parameter, its mean and
standard deviation and also the mode of the posterior distribution.
The steady-state value of the risk shock has a mode of its poste-
rior distribution of 0.3180 which is close to the findings of Heideken
(2009) for the Euro Area. The monitoring cost mode of the posterior
distribution is 17.95%. It has been estimated by Heideken (2009) that
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Prior Posterior
Par. Definition Prior dist Mean Std Mode
Economic Parameters
κ Costs of reserve holdings beta 10 3.5 13.0122
µ Monitoring costs beta 0.15 0.073 0.1795
η Inverse elasticity of net investment norm 5 3 1.5074
ξE Transfer to entering entrepreneurs beta 0.005 0.002 0.0023
θ Fraction of assets divertable beta 0.15 0.07 0.1585
σSSψ Steady-state idiosyncratic shock beta 0.2 0.075 0.3180
Shocks
Autocorrelations
ρσ Risk shock beta 0.5 0.2 0.9796
ρψ Capital quality shock beta 0.5 0.2 0.9936
ρA Productivity shock beta 0.5 0.2 0.8557
ρg Gov. spending shock beta 0.5 0.2 0.9318
ρζ Marginal efficiency of inv. shock beta 0.5 0.2 0.9982
ρζc Consumption pref. shock beta 0.5 0.2 0.8881
ρζx Excess reserve penalty shock beta 0.5 0.2 0.9062
Std, shock innovations
σ Risk invg 0.0123 0.2 0.07169
ψ Capital quality invg 0.0123 0.2 0.04788
A Productivity invg 0.0123 0.2 0.04744
g Gov. spending invg 0.0123 0.2 0.02351
ζ Marginal efficiency of investment invg 0.0123 0.2 0.06162
ζc Consumption pref. invg 0.0123 0.2 0.02401
ζx Excess reserves penalty invg 0.0123 0.2 0.02301
Table 2: Estimated Parameter Values
in the Euro area the monitoring costs are about 27% and it is close
to the value suggested by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) of
21.49%. The mode parameter for transfers to the new entrepreneurs
ξE is 0.0023 and the steady-state idiosyncratic shock 0.3180, both close
to the values shows in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014). The
estimated diversion parameter θ yields a value close to the common
found interval in the literature [0.15-0.30]. Lastly, the inverse elastic-
ity of net investment to the price of capital η equal to 1.50 a value
significantly lower than the estimated value from Gerali et al. (2010)
for the Eurozone.
Table 3 reports the steady-state properties of the model when pa-
rameters are set to their mode under the prior distribution. The data
values are calculated as the average of each variable relative to the
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average level of output. The model manages to deliver well the ratios
of different variables. Consumption, investment, government spend-
ing and reserves follow closely the data moments. Credit to output
is capturing the fact that is far above all the other statistics but the
model overestimates it’s value.
Variable Model Data
C{Y 0.592 0.561
I{Y 0.223 0.216
L{Y 3.22 1.68
G{Y 0.200 0.182
X{Y 0.013 0.011
Table 3: Steady State Properties at Priors vs. Euro Data
2.5 quantitatively analysis
This section illustrates the policy recommendations that the model
can provide by performing two different sets of experiments. In what
follows, I present the impulse response functions to a number of
model’s structural shocks and then I estimate the welfare gains (or
costs) from a number of different policy actions. To solve the model I
apply an approximation to the policy functions. The numerical strat-
egy is based on perturbation methods as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004) and is well-suited for the specific modelling framework, given
the large number of state variables.
2.5.1 Impulse Response Functions
2.5.1.1 Risk-Taking Channel
The first objective is to simulate an economic downturn, similar to
the one the Euro economy has experienced in the end of 2007, and
see how the model economy responds. Then, I show the results of
the same exercise when the central bank supplies liquidity following
the feedback rule (21). I provide the impulse response functions to
a 1% standard deviation increase in the risk shock for both cases. In
the first exercise, the feedback parameter κm in the policy rule is set
to 0 whereas in the second case to 100 following the value chosen by
Gertler and Karadi (2011).
The results are reported in Figure 8. The blue line (circles) shows
the responses to an 1% standard deviation increase of the risk shock
when the central bank does not provide liquidity. The economic mech-
2.5 quantitatively analysis 35
0 5 10 15
-5
0
5
Pe
rc
en
t D
ev
ia
tio
n
fro
m
 S
te
ad
y 
St
at
e A. Output
0 5 10 15
-30
-20
-10
Pe
rc
en
t D
ev
ia
tio
n
fro
m
 S
te
ad
y 
St
at
e B. Credit
0 5 10 15
-30
-20
-10
Pe
rc
en
t D
ev
ia
tio
n
fro
m
 S
te
ad
y 
St
at
e C. Investment
0 5 10 15
-25
-20
-15
-10
Pe
rc
en
t D
ev
ia
tio
n
fro
m
 S
te
ad
y 
St
at
e D. Reserves
0 5 10 15
10
20
30
40
An
nu
al
 B
as
is
 P
oi
nt
s E. Spread
0 5 10 15
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Pe
rc
en
t D
ev
ia
tio
n
fro
m
 S
te
ad
y 
St
at
e F. Default
0 5 10 15
-25
-20
-15
-10
Pe
rc
en
t D
ev
ia
tio
n
fro
m
 S
te
ad
y 
St
at
e G. Bank Net Worth
0 5 10 15
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
D
ev
ia
tio
n
fro
m
 S
te
ad
y 
St
at
e H. Risk Shock
No Policy
Liquidity Policy
Figure 8: Impulse responses to an increase of the risk shock
anism here is as follows: as the riskiness of the entrepreneurial project
increases banks charge higher interest rates to cover the costs, thus
the spread increases. Entrepreneurs now are more likely to default
as it’s more difficult to repay back their loans. Banks lend less and
credit drops. With fewer financial resources, entrepreneurs purchase
less capital, which reduces investment. This leads to a fall in output
and consumption. The fall in investment produces a fall in the price
of capital, which reduces the net worth of entrepreneurs, and this
magnifies the impact of the jump in risk through financial accelerator
effects.
The red line (stars) displays the responses when the central bank
follows the liquidity feedback rule. Extra liquidity provides extra
funds for the banks, relaxes their constraint and allows them to re-
duce the lending interest rate and increase credit. They also increase
their reserve holdings as they use a portion of the fresh liquidity to
invest in the safe asset. The central bank policy improves the health
of the financial institutions and that can be seen by the increase in
their net worth. On the credit demand side, the higher level of credit
increases the firms’ likelihood of default as they leverage more due to
the lower cost of credit. This occurs in conjunction with the low level
of net worth and capital price. Since more defaults occur, monitoring
costs for banks increase and more capital is being destroyed. There-
fore, lower entrepreneurial net worth leads to less capital purchase
and a higher drop in investment and output compared to the no pol-
icy scenario. According to this result and following Proposition 2, the
capital losses from the bankruptcy costs dominate the capital gains
from the liquidity injections.
The above mechanism describes the potential problem of the open
market operations in turbulent times. Although banks spend the liq-
uidity injected to new credit, this credit ends up to insolvent non-
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financial corporations. The liquidity provided by the central bank is
driving excessive risk-taking from the banks as the riskiness of the
firms has increased and banks face moral hazard problems.
2.5.1.2 Negative Interest Rates
I continue with an exercise trying to capture the effect of the nega-
tive rates on reserves. This is simulated by an increase in the penalty
rate for holding reserves. In other words, banks have to pay more
to accumulate excess reserves. It encapsulates the recent European
Central Bank policy of charging fees to reserves. Figure 9 shows the
response of a set of variables to an 1% standard deviation increase in
the reserves’ penalty level.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to an increase of the reserve penalty
It can be seen that as the penalty for reserves increases, banks at
least in the sort run give up their reserves position and extend their
credit supply. That gives a push to the economy. Entrepreneurs bor-
row more and hence they invest more. This has an immediate con-
sequence on output and consumption which both increase. Since the
model cannot account for negative interest rates for the aforemen-
tioned reasons described in the model section, there is no estimate
on what is the optimal level of interest rates that will stimulate lend-
ing. Nevertheless, the above exercise presents a general evidence that
the recently announced policy of the European Central Bank to tax
reserves can stimulate lending.
As a second exercise associated with the negative rates, I measure
the stochastic steady state path of reserves and credit for different
values of the penalty parameter rate that the central bank sets. Figure
10 shows the stochastic steady state path of reserves (red starts) and
credit (blue circles) for parameter values κm P r0, 100s. As the penalty
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rate increases, banks hold less reserves and expand their credit to non-
financial corporations thus increasing the welfare gains. This comes in
line with the unprecedented policy of the ECB to charge the banks of
the Euro Area for holding reserves. As the cost of reserves increases,
banks will reduce their reserve holdings and increase credit. At the
same time, in order to achieve the reserves reduction to a substantial
level, the penalty parameter must increase to almost ten times the ini-
tial steady state value. Bringing the above results to the recent central
bank unconventional measures, the general intake is that negative in-
terest rates will make the banks adverse in increasing credit but only
when the rates that are charged are negative enough.
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Figure 10: Stochastic Steady State Path of Credit and Reserves
2.5.2 Measuring Welfare Costs
In order to conduct policy analysis, I will now present the welfare
costs (or gains) in terms of consumption units between i) the adoption
of aggressive liquidity supply scheme by the central bank and ii) the
no policy rule.
Since the non-stochastic steady state for the two different regimes
is different, the unconditional expectation of welfare leaves out the
dynamics associated with the stochastic steady state. Therefore, fol-
lowing Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) I proceed with the welfare
conditional on the initial state being the non-stochastic steady state.
At time zero, the state vector is the same for both policies, in other
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words all state variables equal their steady states. This ensures that
in both regimes we start from the same initial values. Given that in a
first order approximation the welfare Wt equals to it’s non-stochastic
steady state I will proceed with a second order approximation to de-
termine the effects of different regimes on lifetime utility. I define the
welfare associated with the no policy scheme conditional on a partic-
ular state of the economy in period 0 as:
Wn0 “ E0
8ÿ
t“0
βtUpCnt ,Nnt q,
where the Cnt ,N
n
t denote the consumption units and labour hours
spend under the no policy scheme. In a similar way I define the con-
ditional welfare associated with the liquidity supply scheme as:
Wl0 “ E0
8ÿ
t“0
βtUpClt,Nltq,
where Clt,N
l
t denote the consumption units and labour hours spend
under the liquidity supply scheme.
Let λc be the conditional welfare cost (or gain) for the consumer
of adopting a liquidity policy rather than a no action policy by the
central bank. In other words λc is the fraction of consumption that the
household would need each period in the liquidity supply regime to
yield the same welfare as would be achieved in the no policy regime.
Formally λc is chosen to solve
Wl0 “ E0
8ÿ
t“0
βtUpp1` λcqCnt ,Nnt q.
A positive value for λc means that the household prefers the liquidity
policy regime - i.e. it would need extra consumption when the liquid-
ity regime is on to be indifferent between the two regimes. In contrast,
a negative value of λc means that the household prefers the no policy
regime. Substituting the utility function given in equation (1) we can
rewrite the above expression as:
Wl0 “ Et
8ÿ
i“0
βirlnppCt`iqp1` λcqq ´ χ
1` N
1`
t`i s
“ lnp1´ λ
cq
1´β `W
n
0 .
Solving for λc we have:
λc “ exptpWl0 ´Wn0 qp1´βqu ´ 1. (23)
Table 4 shows the welfare analysis results. It presents the total value
of conditional welfare in the scenario with liquidity policy and the
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no policy scenario and also the consumption equivalent metric that
yields from the transition between the two policies. The consumption
equivalence is measured in percentage terms. This metric is an indi-
cation of how much consumption units in percent are lost or gained
from the transition to the new policy. The conditional welfare as is
reported in Table 4 decreases as we move from the no policy regime
to the liquidity policy regime. The loss is about -0.075 % of consump-
tion units. Hence, the liquidity policy is not considered to be welfare
improving.
Additional to the conditional welfare comparisons, I present the
second moments of selected variables for the two different policy
regimes. As expected, consumption volatility increases after the liq-
uidity policy, from 0.73 to 0.77. Output and credit volatility behave in
a similar manner and also the discount rate and the credit spread as
the liquidity policy stabilizes and reduces the spread.
No Policy Liquidity Policy
Welfare
Conditional Welfare Cost 0 -0.07487
Standard Deviation
Output 0.73164 0.76671
Consumption 0.74892 0.77856
Investment 1.27563 1.39319
Credit 0.39258 0.49376
Spread 0.14932 0.29376
Discount Rate 0.57421 0.59422
Table 4: Welfare Costs and Second Moments
2.6 conclusion
Since 2008, the ECB has massively increased its balance sheet in order
to provide liquidity to financial institutions. Nevertheless, the macroe-
conomic environment seems still fragile. Banks have increased their
reserves holdings while credit growth is in low levels. In this paper I
assess the effectiveness of the main liquidity mechanism employed by
the ECB, the LTROs, using an estimated DSGE model with financial
frictions on the demand and the supply side of credit. I find that
LTROs improved the banks’ health but the macroeconomy would
have been better off should the liquidity policy hasn’t taken place.
This result follows from the risk-shifting channel of monetary policy.
The main economic intuition is as follows. Consider an increase in
entrepreneurial risk which reduces firms’ net worth, raises their prob-
ability of default and sets off a recession through a Bernanke, Gertler,
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and Gilchrist (1999) financial accelerator mechanism. To counter such
a recession, a central bank might provide liquidity directly to the
banking sector as in the the case of ECB’s LTROs. While such a
policy would potentially halt the economic downturn, it simultane-
ously makes banks supply fresh credit to - now - riskier firms giv-
ing rise to a risk-taking channel. Reinforced by the lower cost of bor-
rowing, firms leverage up their net worth (which in and of itself in-
creases their likelihood of default). Higher default rates lead to higher
bankruptcy costs and less available capital for production. A thresh-
old exists where the capital gains from liquidity injections are equal
to the capital losses due to bankruptcy costs. In the estimated model
I find that capital losses dominate the capital injections and lead to
lower investment and output.
Measuring the welfare costs of the liquidity provision against the
no liquidity scenario confirms the above result. Specifically, I show
that there is a welfare loss of -0.075% in consumption equivalent met-
ric, constituting this policy not welfare improving.
Finally, I assess the effectiveness of negative interest rates. Given
the impossibility of interest rates in the negative territory in the model
due to the lower bound constraint, I employ a penalty function for
accumulating reserves. When banks accumulate reserves below the
threshold they have some gains (e.g. efficient and liquidity gains).
When the level of reserves surpass the threshold banks pay a cost to
the central bank similar to a tax on reserves. I show that an increase in
the reserve penalty will reduce banks’ reserve position and increase
credit supply.
3
A S S E T P U R C H A S E S , L I M I T E D A S S E T M A R K E T S
PA RT I C I PAT I O N A N D I N E Q U A L I T Y
abstract This chapter examines the impact of quantitative eas-
ing in a restricted financial participation economy on two aspects: on
household inequality and its effect on aggregate demand in a low fi-
nancial inclusion environment. I build and calibrate a Neo-Keynesian
dynamic, general equilibrium model for the Euro Area that incorpo-
rates limited assets market participation, financial frictions and al-
lows central bank purchases from banks and households. I show that
government bond purchases increase aggregate demand and benefit
hand to mouth consumers due to wage increases while bond hold-
ers experience an income reduction due to the risk-free reserves they
receive. As a result, consumption and income inequality are reduced.
Secondly, I show that in an economy with a low degree of financial in-
clusion, QE might have contractionary effects. This depends crucially
on the type of fiscal policy assumed.
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3.1 introduction
The Great Recession signalled the start for the extensive adoption of
new monetary policy instruments often mentioned as unconventional
monetary policy tools. Unconventional monetary policy comprises of
all non-standard instruments a central bank can use. The one most ex-
tensively used in the recent crisis is the purchase of long-term assets,
known as Quantitative Easing (QE hereafter).1 Those programmes
aimed to hold down the long-term interest rates and stimulate ag-
gregate demand. Although empirical literature has shown that the
goal of the programmes has been achieved (see Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) among others), a question lately posed by
policymakers (Yellen, 2016; Bernanke, 2015; Draghi, 2016) and has
gained the media attention is whether and in what extend asset pur-
chase programmes have contributed to the increase of wealth inequal-
ity.2 This paper shows, in a model calibrated for the Euro Area, that
QE benefits the households in the bottom of the net worth distribu-
tion relatively more than their counterparts in the higher levels of
the distribution leading to a reduction of inequality. Secondly, it il-
lustrates that QE could be contractionary when is applied in a low
financial inclusion (or asset market participation) environment. As it
will be explained in detail, this depends on the tax scheme set by the
fiscal authority.
This study introduces limited asset markets participation (LAMP),
agency problems associated with financial intermediation and a QE
framework in an otherwise standard business cycles model with sticky
prices. LAMP is modelled by introducing financially constrained and
unconstrained agents (hereafter Keynesian and Ricardians or equiva-
lently Optimizers and Hand to Mouth consumers). Unconstrained agents
can hold assets and smooth consumption across time and states while
constrained agents cannot hold assets and consume only their wage
income and transfers. By combining Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés
(2007) (GLS hereafter) and Gertler and Karadi (2013) a setting is de-
veloped where central bank purchases of government bonds or pri-
vate assets and the exchange of those with reserves, create direct and
indirect effects on the real economy and ultimately on the inequality
between the two income groups.
I evaluate inequality between the two groups in terms of consump-
tion and income inequality following Krueger and Perri (2006). I as-
sess two cases: government bond purchases and a conventional ac-
commodative monetary policy shock. The responses of a bond pur-
1 QE has different names depending on the region that was used. For example, in
US the term used was ‘Large-Scale Asset Purchases’ and in the Euro Area ‘Asset
Purchase Programmes’.
2 Does Quantitative Easing Mainly Help the Rich? (CNBC), Debate rages on quan-
titative easing’s effect on inequality (Financial Times), Quantitative easing helped
vulnerable more than rich, says ECB (Financial Times).
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chase programme, when -following the recent events- the policy rate
remains constant for a year, reflect the responses of a conventional ac-
commodative interest rate shock. Asset purchases increase aggregate
demand and hence wages. This general equilibrium effect benefits
the hand to mouth consumers who consume only their wage income.
Ricardian agents are forced to sell a fraction of their bond holdings to
the central bank in exchange with zero-interest bearing reserves. This
reduces their income and results in the reduction of consumption in-
equality.
Following Bilbiie (2008), I provide a set of results on the impact of
conventional monetary policy and QE on aggregate demand condi-
tional on the degree of asset market participation. This is examined
under two tax schemes: a no-redistribution scheme and a profit redis-
tribution scheme. I show analytically and numerically that under the
no redistribution scheme, below a threshold level of financial inclu-
sion, QE and conventional MP are contractionary. When assets mar-
ket participation is above the threshold, both policies have the well
documented stimulating effects on output. In the model calibrated
for the Euro Area, when the fraction of the population with access to
asset markets is below 53%, QE has contractionary effects. This result
depends on the fiscal policy tax scheme assumed: under a profit re-
distribution tax scheme, the contractionary effects of both policies do
not longer hold for any degree of asset market participation.
Recent studies on the households’ wealth distribution, originating
from Mankiw (2000), have shown the existence of a population share
without access to financial markets.3 Finding the share of households
without access to the financial markets requires household-level data
on household balance sheets. I document the marginal net worth dis-
tributions of the Euro Area households by making use of the Eurosys-
tem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). I restrict
attention to the first wave of the HFCS data conducted mainly in 2009
and 2010. This is done in order to eliminate as possible the effects of
the 2008 financial crisis and it occurred well before the start of ECB’s
QE in March 2015. The data has been collected from 15 Euro Area
member states for a sample of more than 62,000 households. Table 5
reports the marginal distribution of net worth across the Euro Area
households. The definition of net worth is the difference between total
household assets and total household liabilities.4 In detail, the table
3 Their estimates of the households without financial markets access are close to what
this study finds. Krueger, Mitman, and Perri (2016) using PSID and SCF surveys for
the US population find that 40% oh the households hold no net worth. Albonico,
Paccagnini, and Tirelli (2014) conducting a study for the Euro Area find that the
share of non-asset holders is 39% over the period 1993-2012.
4 Total assets include real assets and financial assets (deposits (sight and saving ac-
counts), mutual funds, bonds, shares, money owed to the households and insurance
and pension plans). Total liabilities include any form of debt including mortgages
loans, non-mortgage loans (consumer credit loans, private loans and other loans not
collateralised on household’s real estate property), credit lines/bank overdrafts debt
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reports the cross sectional average, as well as the share of the total net
wealth held by each of the five quantiles of the corresponding distri-
bution. The value of each quantile corresponds to the mean (first col-
umn) and the median (second column) of the households’ net wealth
in each quantile.
As table 5 reveals, the bottom 40% holds essentially no net worth
at all, whereas the top quantile holds the 80.1% of the total wealth.
Comparing the median with the mean measures we observe signifi-
cant differences in the average households’ net wealth. Nevertheless,
the shares of each quantile are very similar between the two mea-
sures. In line with the data, I assume that 40% of the households in
the model are financially constrained.
Net Worth
Mean Median
Mean (2010 EUR) 386,060 303,182
% Share by:
Q1 -0.2 0.1
Q2 1.5 1.7
Q3 5.7 7.1
Q4 12.1 15.2
Q5 80.1 75.8
Table 5: Net Worth Mean and Marginal Distribution. Data Source: Eurosys-
tem Household Finance and Consumption Survey.
Quantitative easing is the process characterized by a central bank
creating new money (reserves) electronically in order to make large
purchases of long-term assets. QE is not tax-financed, and there is no
interest in who’s paying for the QE. Agents who have access to finan-
cial markets sell their assets to the central bank and get zero-interest
reserves. All three QE programs conducted by the Federal Reserve
since 2008, the Bank of England, and the ECB represent examples of
simultaneous purchases of long-term bonds in exchange for newly
created reserves (Christensen and Krogstrup (2018a)). Recent models
of the transmission of QE on asset prices, such as Vayanos and Vila
(2009), do not include central bank reserves and hence do not allow
for the supply of these to affect asset prices. In this paper, I show
that when reserves are taken into account, the banks’ optimization
problem remains the same. Furthermore, the market for central bank
reserves is segmented in the sense that banks are the only agents able
to hold and receive central bank reserves. When private agents sell as-
sets to the central bank, they receive at the same time deposits from
and credit card debt. For more information see: The Eurosystem household finance
and consumption survey-results from the first wave, 2013.
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their bank, which is entitled to receive the corresponding reserves
from the central bank. As it will be shown in Section 3.2, the model
constructed includes these characteristics.
There are several channels identified as monetary policy transmis-
sion channels. Most of them predict a reduction of inequality between
asset and non-asset holders in the case of monetary easing. Although
this property is certainly present, this occurs due to a separate char-
acterization of each specific channel without taking into account the
aggregate effects of QE. These include notably its stabilising impact
on economic activity, employment, and wage income.
As firstly introduced by Tobin (1958); Tobin (1969), the portfolio rebal-
ancing channel, describes the gains of the asset holders resulting from
the increased asset prices. When the non-bank investors sell their as-
sets to the central bank, they may search for alternative long-term as-
sets. This will lead to an increase of asset prices and boost the wealth
of the asset holders. This will intuitively give rise to inequality due
to what Coibion et al. (2017) describe as the income composition chan-
nel: The fact that there is heterogeneity across households in terms of
income sources. Yet, the portfolio rebalancing channel neglects the im-
pact of the short-run interest rate reductions that an accommodative
monetary policy such as the QE will create and will have a negative
impact on the asset holders.
A second channel is the financial segmentation channel or bank funding
channel. In the case of the quantitative easing it can also be thought as
the reserves segmentation channel. This describes the fact that banks
are the only agents in the model that can hold and purchase central
bank reserves. Therefore, the bank owners are the only ones to benefit
from an increase in central bank money supply and lead to higher
consumption for those agents Williamson (2008).
Thirdly, the portfolio channel describes the effects of different port-
folio composition across households. Data shows that low-income
households hold cash whereas higher-income households invest in
capital. Under an accommodative monetary policy like the QE in-
flationary pressures will hurt the cash holders and give a relative
advantage to the capital investors increasing consumption inequality.
On the other hand, through savings redistribution channel tends to
benefit borrowers more than savers under accommodative monetary
policy. Since the main aim of QE programs is to keep low the inter-
est rates, borrowers with a variable rate loan will be better off after
a successful program. Given the insights from Kaplan, Violante, and
Weidner (2014) and the theoretical contribution of Auclert (2019) that
wealthy tend to be liquidity constrained this could reduce more the
consumption inequality between the wealthy and the rest of the soci-
ety.
Lastly, households labour earnings might react differently to mon-
etary policy decisions and this gives rise to the earning heterogeneity
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channel. Various unemployment risk and different wages rigidities
across households can affect income inequality according to the pol-
icy directed by the central bank. In the case of QE, given that the
programme manages to stimulate the economy, a reduction of unem-
ployment will help the households in the bottom of the distribution
and reduce economic inequality.
Many past studies claim the ineffectiveness of the quantitative eas-
ing programmes. The main rationale is that since the government will
adjust the taxes as required, asset prices will remain constant. Most
of these studies are in a way reminiscent of the Ricardian equivalence.
Wallace (1981) was the first to show that open market operations are
not effective under the assumption of the same return between money
and assets purchased and a fixed fiscal policy stance. The result re-
mains the same in future studies built on more relaxed assumptions
(Sargent and Smith (1987); Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984); Eg-
gertsson and Woodford (2003a); Curdia and Woodford (2010)).5 These
neutrality results arise from the assumption that changes in the cen-
tral bank’s balance sheet are financed with lump sum taxes and the
rates of all assets are equal. This is very different in the case of the QE
since i) central banks do not increase taxes to provide reserves in the
economy, ii) return on reserves and bonds are not perfect substitutes.6
related literature This study relates to several strands of the
macro-finance literature. Firstly, it makes use of financial frictions.
This addition to macroeconomic models goes back to Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and a recent
post-crisis revival originated by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).7 This pa-
per is the first one that adds financial fictions à-la Gertler and Karadi
(2011) in a model with limited asset markets participation.
Neo-Keynesian heterogeneous agents macroeconomic models is a
currently developing literature that this study also draws upon. Galí,
López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) firstly introduced a Neo-Keynesian
two-agent (TANK) framework to study the effects of government
spending consumption. Related to the present paper, Bilbiie (2008)
using a version of GLS without capital accumulation shows that an
expansionary monetary policy shock can have contractionary effects
when asset markets participation is low, namely the existence of In-
5 Sargent and Smith (1987) and Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) show that the
result holds even if money is dominated as a rate of return in contrast with Wallace’s
assumption. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a) show that the irrelevance result still
holds in a representative agent framework under the assumption that there is a
satiation level for reserves for an economy at the zero lower bound. Curdia and
Woodford (2010) extend this framework to a DSGE heterogeneous agent model and
show that the Wallace result still holds
6 See also Rocheteau, Wright, and Xiao (2018) for a critique on Wallace (1981).
7 For a comprehensive literature review see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov
(2013).
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verted Aggregate Demand Logic.8 Recently, Kaplan, Moll, and Vi-
olante (2018), Ravn and Sterk (2016) and McKay and Reis (2016) have
developed an Aiyagari-type heterogeneous agent framework with
New Keynesian nominal rigidities (HANK) making the characteriza-
tion and study of the full income and wealth distribution feasible. As
shown by Debortoli and Galí (2018), a framework with two agents can
identify differences in average consumption between the constrained
and unconstrained agents but lacks on characterising consumption
heterogeneity within the subset of unconstrained households. Since
the main focus on this paper is on the interactions between the two
types of agents, it suffices to use a less rich setting of heterogeneity.
Lastly, following the debate on monetary policy and its impact on
inequality there is a growing number of studies that focus on this. The
evidence on the effects of monetary policy on inequality is mixed. Ex-
isting empirical studies are focused on the effects of monetary policy
shocks. Coibion et al. (2017) find that a positive shock to the policy
rate, as identified by Romer and Romer (1998), increases the Gini co-
efficient of income. Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou (2017) do a similar
exercise for the UK. They show that a one standard deviation policy
contraction raises the Gini coefficient by about 1 %. They also measure
the effect of the QE by proxy £200bn of QE purchases as an 100 bps
drop in government bonds yields. This approach however ignores the
impact of the QE to asset prices. Furceri, Loungani, and Zdzienicka
(2018) study a panel of 32 countries and find that contractionary mon-
etary policy shocks increase income inequality on average. Guerello
(2017) also follows the process of identifying the effect of monetary
policy shocks on measures of economic inequality in the Euro Area.9
On the contrary, Bunn, Pugh, Yeates, et al. (2018) find that most house-
holds benefited overall from monetary policy between 2008 and 2014,
relative to what would have otherwise happened having QE not taken
place. In the same vein, Bivens (2015) shows that inequality has been
reduced in the US comparing it with the counterfactual scenario of a
QE absence.10
Several studies use structural models to exam the effect of mon-
etary policy on inequality. Dolado, Motyovszki, and Pappa (2018)
focus on labour frictions and conclude that a monetary policy eas-
ing increases income inequality between skilled and unskilled work-
ers. Gornemann, Kuester, and Nakajima (2016) use a heterogeneous
agents framework, as developed by Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018),
accompanied with matching frictions. In this setting labour-market
risk is countercyclical and endogenous to monetary policy. For a
higher welfare level, an addition of unemployment stabilization to
the dual mandate of the central banks is proposed. Lastly, Hohberger,
8 Studies using a TANK framework also include Colciago (2011), Monacelli (2009) and
Bilbiie, Monacelli, and Perotti (2013), Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2004).
9 See also Montecino, Epstein, et al. (2015) for U.S. Saiki and Frost (2014) for Japan.
10 For a comprehensive literature review see Colciago, Samarina, and Haan (2018).
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Priftis, and Vogel (2019) in parallel work have conducted a study
where they compare consumption and income inequality after a QE
shock. They do this in a standard NK setting using a two-agent mod-
elling framework. Their results show that consumption and income
inequality drop after a QE policy in line with this study. In my knowl-
edge, there is no other study employing a TANK model with financial
frictions and an explicit framework for asset purchases by the central
bank to measure changes in inequality.
layout The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
model. Section 3.3 provides analytical results on the inverted aggre-
gate demand logic of QE. Section 3.4 shows the calibration and the
quantitative results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 the model
The model is a version of the Gertler and Karadi (2013) enriched with
the two agent framework of Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007)
and the New Keynesian component similar to Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005). The model apart from the two agent finan-
cial frictions framework and nominal price rigidities includes two -
empirically relevant- frictions:11 Assets are imperfect substitutes and
the market for central bank reserves is segmented.12
The economy is populated by two types of households: a measure
λ of rule of thumb and 1´ λ optimising households, a continuum of
firms and financial intermediaries, capital goods producers and re-
tailers, a monetary authority and a fiscal authority. Ricardian house-
holds, hold deposits, firm shares and government bonds and smooth
consumption across time and states. Keynesian households are hand
to mouth consumers without any capital holdings and their income
is solely their labour wage net of taxes (or transfers).
Banks lend to firms, hold bonds and receive deposits and reserves
from the households and the central bank respectively. They are con-
strained by the directives of minimum capital requirements in the
spirit of Basel III.
The central bank works under a conventional Taylor rule, but can
also engage in asset purchases and pay the investors back the same
value in newly created reserves. The interest rate on reserves is equal
to the risk-free rate, thus agents in equilibrium do not have any inter-
est in holding reserves. They do only when they are obliged by the
central bank.
11 Christensen and Krogstrup (2018b) and Andrade et al. (2016) also make use of the
same frictions.
12 For evidence for asset imperfect substitutability see Hamilton and Wu (2012),Krish-
namurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).
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3.2.1 Households - The Two Agents Framework
All households are assumed to have identical preferences, given by
Et
8ÿ
i“0
βiUpCst`i,Lst`iq (24)
Cst`i denotes the per capita consumption of the household members
and Nst`i the supply of labour. The super-index s P rR,Ks specifies
the household type (“Ricardian” or “Keynesian”), as discussed be-
low. β P r0, 1s is the discount factor. Because of the stochastic set-
ting, households make expectations for the future based on what they
know in time t and Et is the expectation operator at time t.
The utility functional form is specified as
Et
8ÿ
i“0
βirlnpCt`iq ´ χ
1` L
1`
t`i s, (25)
where  is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply, χ ą 0 is the
relative utility weight of labour.
ricardian households A constant fraction of households 1´λ
has access to capital markets. They can hold one period government
bonds, bank deposits and firm shares. There are limits on house-
hold participation by assuming transaction costs in trading securi-
ties. When a Ricardian household wants to hold private securities SRt
above the threshold S¯R it faces a holding cost equal to 12κpSRt ´ S¯Rq2s.
When its bond holdings BRt are above the threshold B¯R, the house-
hold has to pay the cost 12κpBRt ´ B¯Rq2. Accordingly, there is a certain
amount of each asset that the household can hold costlessly. Going
above these levels involves transaction costs which are increasing at
the margin. Note that under this setting, Ricardian households could
be also financially constrained due to adjustment costs, similar to the
wealthy hand to mouth consumers in Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner
(2014).13
The Ricardian households budget constraint then is
CRt ` TRt `DRt ` qtrBRt ` 12κpB
R
t ´ B¯Rq2s `QtrSRt ` 12κpS
R
t ´ S¯Rq2s
“WtLRt `Πt ` Rd,tDRt´1 ` Rb,tqt´1BRt´1 ` Rk,tQt´1SRt´1,
(26)
whereDRt “ DBt `DMt . Deposits are households deposit accountsDBt
and bank deposits created by money balances (reserves) that house-
13 In Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014) rich households could be financially con-
straint due to adjustment costs. In the same setting and following Kaplan, Moll, and
Violante (2018), bonds and stocks can be thought as illiquid assets and deposits as
the liquid asset.
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holds get back in their account when they sell assets to the central
bank DMt (reserves can only be held by the banking sector). Both are
remunerated in the same risk-free rate Rd,t. BRt are one period govern-
ment bonds, SRt are household’s firm shares. Rb,t is the gross return
for the bonds and the deposit respectively in period t. Rk,t is the inter-
est gain from the private securities. WRt is the real wage which both
types take as given. TRt are taxes (or gains if negative) that Ricardian
households must pay every period. Finally, households have income
Πt from the ownership of both non-financial firms and financial in-
termediaries.
The problem of the Ricardian household is to choose CRt ,L
R
t ,D
R
t ,B
R
t ,S
R
t
in order to maximize its expected utility (25) subject to the budget
constraint (26) at every period. Let uc,t denote the marginal utility of
consumption and Λt,t`1 denote the household’s stochastic discount
factor (the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution)
Λt,t`1 ” βucR,t`1
ucR,t
. (27)
The intertemporal optimality conditions for Ricardian households
take the form
EtΛt,t`1Rd,t`1 “ 1 (28)
for the riskless deposits and cash balances. The choices for private
securities and long-term government bonds are given by
SRt “ S¯R ` EtΛt,t`1pRk,t`1 ´ Rt`1qκ
BRt “ B¯R ` EtΛt,t`1pRb,t`1 ´ Rt`1qκ
Households hold always the frictionless amount of each asset. Their
demand for extra units is increasing in the excess return relative to
the respective curvature parameter that governs the marginal transac-
tion cost. As marginal transaction costs go to zero, excess returns dis-
appear: There is frictionless arbitrage between the two assets and all
assets’ interest rates are equalized. On the other hand, when marginal
transaction costs go to infinity, households’ asset demands go to their
respective frictionless capacity values, S¯Rt and B¯
R
t .
The labour market follows a competitive structure. Each household
is choosing the quantity of hours supplied given the market wage
Wt. Thus, the wage is the same for both types of households. The
Ricardians’ optimal labour supply decision is
uRc,tWt “ χpLRt q. (29)
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keynesian households The remaining fraction λ of households,
the Keynesian agents, are hand to mouth consumers. Their partici-
pation in financial markets is constrained. Thus, they only consume
their income at every period t without being able to transfer wealth
between time and states. Their budget constraint is
PtC
K
t “ PtWtLKt ` PtTKt . (30)
CKt ,L
K
t , T
K
t denote, respectively, consumption, hours worked and taxes
(or transfers).
Keynesian agents maximize their utility subject to their simple bud-
get constraint. Accordingly, the level of consumption will equate labour
income specified by (30). The labour supply of rule-of-thumb house-
holds must satisfy
uKc,tWt “ χpLKt q. (31)
Due to the very form of the logarithmic utility function, combining
(30) and (31) we find the hours that the Keynesian agents supply:
LKt “
¨˝
1´ TKt
CKt
χ
‚˛p
1
1` q
. (32)
The more transfers they receive the less hours they are willing to
work.
As it will be shown in Proposition 4 momentarily, the Keynesian
agents’ taxation is the only fiscal variable that matters for the model’s
allocation. Ricardian agents internalize the government budget con-
straint through their government bond holdings. A change in the tax
rate (or transfer) of the rule of thumb consumers implies a change in
their taxes today or in the future.14 In the analysis section I study two
tax rules for the Keynesian agents: a no-redistribution scheme where
transfers to Keynesian agents are zero and a fiscal rule that taxes the
profits of Ricardian households and rebates them to hand to mouth
consumers.
aggregation Aggregate variables are given by a weighted aver-
age of the corresponding variables of each household type.
Ct ” p1´ λqCRt ` λCKt (33)
Lt ” p1´ λqLRt ` λLKt (34)
14 Similar results are obtained for the TANK model in Bilbiie, Monacelli, and Perotti
(2013).
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Assets are owned only by the Ricardian households. The H super-
script denotes the total holdings of households.
SHt ” p1´ λqSRt
MHt ” p1´ λqMRt
BHt ” p1´ λqBRt
Dt ” p1´ λqDRt
3.2.2 Financial Frictions
banks Banks are funded from depositors and lend to non-financial
firms and the government. Each bank j allocates its funds to buying
a quantity sj,t of financial claims on non-financial firms at price Qt
and government bonds bBj,t`1 at price qt. Their income resources are
deposits from households dj,t`1, and the capital equity nj,t`1 accu-
mulated.
Let Zt be the net period income flow to the bank from a loan that
is financing to a firm and δ the depreciation rate of capital being
financed. Then the rate of return to the bank on the loan, Rk,t`1, is
given by:
Rk,t`1 “ Zt ` p1´ δqQt`1
Qt
. (35)
We assume each bond is a perpetuity that pays one dollar per period
indefinitely. The real rate of return on the bond Rb,t`1 is given by:
Rb,t`1 “ 1{Pt ` qt`1
qt
.
When the central bank buys bonds or shares through the Quanti-
tative Easing mechanism banks receive reserves mj,t remunerated at
the riskless interest rate Rm,t “ Rt. Since reserves bear less interest
compared to shares and bonds, banks have no inventive to hold them
in equilibrium when they are not supplied from the central bank in
exchange form bond buying. Purchases of households’ assets are ac-
companied by an increase of bank’s reserves and consequently the
credit of those reserves to the deposit account of households. There-
fore, there are two types of reserves and deposits. Reserves that gets
the bank in exchange of bank owned assets mBj,t and reserves that
banks get due to the households’ assets sells to the central bank mHj,t.
Deposits split in standard household deposits dBj,t and deposits cre-
ated due to the new households’ reserves dMj,t.
Formally, the bank’s balance sheet is:
Qts
B
j,t ` qtbBj,t `mBj,t `mHj,t “ nj,t ` dBj,t ` dMj,t. (36)
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It easily follows that mHj,t “ dMj,t. The banks’ reserves increase due to
households’ asset sale is accompanied by an increase in deposits by
an equivalent amount (see McLeay, Radia, and Thomas (2014)). Thus
the bank’s balance sheet becomes: QtsBj,t ` qtbBj,t `mBj,t “ nj,t ` dBj,t.
This implies that the bank does not take into account any transactions
that occur between the central bank and the households and remain
a passive observer of those transactions Christensen and Krogstrup
(2018b). The component that differs from the conventional bank bal-
ance sheet as shown in e.g. Gertler and Karadi (2013) is the reserves
that the bank gets in exchange of its financial assets sale to the central
bank. The bank’s net worth evolves as the difference between interest
gains on assets and interest payments on liabilities.
nj,t`1 “ Rk,tQt´1sBj,t´1 ` Rb,tqt´1bBj,t´1 ` Rm,tmBj,t ´ RtdBj,t.
The banker’s objective at the end of period t, is the expected present
value of future dividends. They use the stochastic discount factor of
households Λt`1 for discounting.
Vj,t “ Et
8ÿ
j“1
p1´ σBqσj´1B Λt`1nj,t`1. (37)
Banks are required to closely follow a regulatory framework similar
to the Basel III. Notably, banks should fulfil specific capital require-
ments. The regulatory framework specifies that the banks should
have a franchise value always greater or at least equal with a frac-
tion θ of a risk weighted measure of their assets. In the calibration
of the model it is assumed that loans to firms have a risk-weighting
of 100%, sovereign bonds purchases risk coefficient ∆ equals to 50%
and the central bank reserves’ risk coefficient ω equals to 0%. These
values follow the ones specified by the Basel III framework for BBB+
to BBB- graded bonds and firm shares. that specifies. The representa-
tive bank considered here is a big systemic bank with the maximum
values for each specific buffer that should hold a fraction of 20% of
the risk weighted assets.15 The regulatory constraint of the bank is:
Vj,t ě θrQtsBj,t `∆qtbBj,t `ωmBj,ts. (38)
Since, reserves have a risk-weighting of 0%, the minimum capital re-
quirement constraint can be simplified to Vj,t ě θrQtsBj,t `∆qtbBj,ts.
15 More details on the Basel III Capital Adequacy Ratio are presented in the
parametrization Section 3.4.1.
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The value of the bank at the end of period t´ 1 must satisfy the
Bellman equation:
Vj,t´1psBj,t´1,bBj,t´1,mBj,t,dBj,tq “ Et´1Λt´1,t
8ÿ
i“1
tp1´ σBqnj,t
` σBmax
dj,t
r max
sBj,t,b
B
j,t,m
B
j,t
VtpsBj,t,bBj,t,mBj,t,dBj,tqsu. (39)
Banker’s problem is to maximize (37) subject to the balance sheet (36)
and the minimum capital requirement constraint (38).
Proposition 3. A solution to the banker’s dynamic program is
Vj,tpsBj,t,bBj,t,dBj,t,mBj,tq “ ABj,t.
The marginal value of the banker’s net worth AB is then:
AB “ µstφt ` νd,j,t.
µst is the stochastic spread between the loan and the deposit rates, φt is the
maximum leverage and νd,j,t is the marginal loss from deposits.
Proof. See appendix B.3.
The proposition clarifies the role of the bank’s net worth in the
model. We can rewrite the incentive constraint using the linearity of
the value function as
AB
θ
ě rQts
B
j,t `∆qtbBj,t `ωmBj,ts
nBj,t
. (40)
The adjusted leverage of a banker cannot be greater than AB{θ. The
right hand side shows that as the net worth of the banker decreases
the constraint is more likely to bind. Proposition 1 also implies that
even there is heterogeneity in the bankers’ holdings and net worth,
this does not affect aggregate dynamics. Hence, the transition from
the individual to aggregate variables takes place in the same way as
in the previous section.
The maximum adjusted leverage ratio of the bank is defined as
φj,t “ νd,j,t
θ´ µst
. (41)
Maximum adjusted leverage ratio depends positively on the marginal
cost of the deposits νd,j,t and reserves and on the excess value of
bank assets µst . As the credit spread increases, banks franchise value
Vt increases and the probability of a bank to divert its funds declines.
From the other hand as the proportion of assets that a bank can divert,
θ increases, the constraint binds more.
An important aspect that can be derived from the result of by (40)
is the role of the risk weights on every asset. When the risk-weighting
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coefficient of an asset is equal to 0, this asset has no impact on the de-
mand for financial claims. As the Basel III regulatory framework dic-
tates, reserves risk-weighting coefficient ω is equal to 0%. Therefore,
banks do not take reserves into account when they decide on their
asset allocation. This, proves that while Gertler and Karadi (2013)
neglect reserves in their analysis, when reserves are a riskless asset,
the model’s critical equation –the incentive constraint– remains intact
from the reserves inclusion.
Aggregation.— Let SBt be the total quantity of loans that banks inter-
mediate, BBt the total number of government bonds they hold,M
B
t the
total quantity of reserves and Nt their total net worth. The aggregate
balance sheet is:
QtS
B
t ` qtBBt `MBt “ Nt `DBt . (42)
Since the leverage ratio (41) does not depend on factors associated
with individual banks’ characteristics we can sum up across banks
and get the aggregate incentive constraint in terms of the total net
worth in the economy.
QtS
B
t `∆qtBBt `ωMBt “ φtNt (43)
The above equation gives the overall demand for assets QtSt. Intu-
itively, when the constraint is binding the demand for assets is con-
strained by the net worth of the bank. Hence, in times of crisis, where
a deterioration of net worth takes place, demand for assets will de-
cline. Leverage ratio (41) depends positively on the marginal cost of
the deposits and on the excess value of bank assets µt. As the dif-
ference between the lending and the discount rate increases, banks
franchise value Vt increases and the probability of a bank to divert
funds declines. From the other hand as the proportion of assets that
a bank can divert, θ increases, the constraint binds more.
Aggregate net worth is the sum of the new bankers’ and the ex-
isting bankers’ equity: Nt`1 “ Ny,t`1 `No,t`1. Young bankers’ net
worth is the earnings from loans multiplied by ξB which is the frac-
tion of asset gains that being transferred from households to the new
bankers
Ny,t`1 “ ξrRk,tQt´1SBt´1 ` Rb,tqt´1BBt´1 ` Rm,tMBt´1s
and the net worth of the old is the probability of survival for an exist-
ing banker multiplied by the net earnings from assets and liabilities
No,t`1 “ σrRk,tQt´1SBt´1` Rb,tqt´1BBt´1` Rm,tMBt´1´ RtDBt s.
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3.2.3 Central Bank Asset Purchases and the Government
central bank purchases Central bank can use two policy tools.
Firstly, it can adjust the policy rate according to the Taylor rule spec-
ified momentarily. Secondly, it can engage in risky asset purchases
from households and banks. When private banks are balance sheet
constrained, excess returns on assets rise. This can have negative con-
sequences on the real economy especially when those excess returns
are excessively high. Central bank purchases will relax financial con-
straints, increase aggregate demand as is concluded in a different
setting by Araújo, Schommer, and Woodford (2015).
The central bank is able to purchase either from the banks or the
households, private assets SGt and bonds B
G
t . It does that by paying
the assets purchased by their respective price Qt and qt. To finance
those purchases it creates electronically reserves. Here it is assumed -
as in reality- that the central bank can create freely reserves without
any cost for the Bank or for the taxpayers. These reserves are trans-
ferred to the banks balance sheets as banks assets in exchange to the
bonds or loans purchased. The same occurs for asset purchases held
by households. What changes in this case is that banks receive the
reserves and extend the deposits of the former asset holders house-
holds. Formally the asset purchases fraction of the central bank’s bal-
ance sheet is:
QtS
G
t ` qtBGt “Mt.
With the last addition of the central bank in the model, three agents
can holds assets or bonds: Ricardian households, banks and the cen-
tral bank. The total quantity of loans is decomposed as:
St “ SBt ` SHt ` SGt (44)
and for the bonds:
Bt “ BBt `BHt `BGt (45)
If we combine these identities and insert them to the balance sheet
constraint of the banks we have:
QtSt ď φNt `QtSHt `QtSGt `∆pqtBGt ` qtBHt ´ qtBtq (46)
The above constraint implies that when government purchases either
loans or bonds it relaxes the balance sheet constraint of the bank-
ing sector. This can, in financial stress periods, reduce the excess re-
turns and stimulate the economy. When this constraint does not bind
and the inequality holds, asset or bond purchases by the government
are neutral. This happens due to frictionless arbitrage that character-
izes the economy when the banks has no binding constraint. Wallace
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(1981) in his seminal paper has make use of that assumption to for
the neutrality theorem of the open market operations.
Equation (46) gives another insight on the asset purchase mecha-
nism. Buying loans or bonds does not have the same impact to the
loosening of the banks’ balance sheet constraint. In fact, since loans
have a risk-weight ration of 100%, purchases of loans by the central
bank relaxes the constraint more than the purchase of bonds with
a risk-weight coefficient ∆ ă 100%. Intuitively, the central bank ac-
quiring government bonds frees up less bank capital than does the
acquisition of a similar amount of private loans.
government Government acts as both fiscal and monetary au-
thority. Its fiscal role is dual: collecting lump sum taxes Tt to finance
its public expenditures G¯ and taxing non-financial firms profits to
redistribute them back to the Ricardian households. The level of the
government expenditures is fixed and relative to output by γG. Hence,
G¯ “ γGYt. The government is taxing profits at rate tpr and giv-
ing back the proceedings lump-sum to hand to mouth households:
TKt “ tprProft. Below I will also examine a second no-redistribution
tax scheme which gives zero profits to the hand to mouth consumers.
Government, also holds the total stock of bonds which is assumed
to remain fixed at the level B¯. Lump sum taxes are defined as: Tt “
λTKt ` p1´ λqTRt .
As a monetary authority, its role is to adjust the short term inter-
est rate and also engage in asset purchases. The asset purchases are
funded by reserves Mt which are remunerated at the riskless rate Rt.
The government budget constraint thus is:
G¯´ Tt ` qt´1Rb,tB¯´ qtB¯` qtBGt `QtSGt
“ Rb,tqt´1BGt´1 ` Rs,tQt´1SGt´1 ´ RtMt´1 `Mt. (47)
.
From the set of equations above it is now clearer to understand
when the irrelevance theorem holds. Since the government creates as
many reserves as the value of the assets purchased pMt “ qtBGt `
QtS
G
t q, then in the case of frictionless arbitrage between the existing
assets pRs,t “ Rb,t “ Rtq, the market operations are indeed irrelevant.
But since the financial frictions included in the model disrupt the
frictionless arbitrage, asset purchases have effect on the real economy.
The share of the total assets that is purchased by the government
follows a second order stochastic process as in Gertler and Karadi
(2013). Specifically,
SGt “ φs,tSt,
58 asset purchases , limited asset markets participation and inequality
BGt “ φb,tBt.
Proposition 4. Fiscal policy matters only through the impact of taxes (trans-
fers) on Keynesian agents. Therefore, the only fiscal variables needs to be
defined is the Hand to Mouth transfers (or taxes).
Proof. I make use of the Optimizers budget constraint (26), the bank’s
-owned by Ricardian agents- balance sheet (36), the taxes aggregator
and the government budget constraint (47). Substituting the latter
three equations in the optimizers’ budget constraint and using the fi-
nancial variables aggregator the aggregate resource constraint yields:
CRt ` G¯1´ λ ´
λ
1´ λT
K
t ` adjtB,Su “WtLRt . (48)
Where adjtB,Su are the adjustment costs for bonds and shares that
households have to pay, defined in (26).
Taxes on Ricardian agents and any short of government bond de-
cision do not matter for the allocation. Notice that the total reserves
the central bank creates are equal to the reserves the banks and the
households hold after the QE namely Mt “ mBt `mHt .
Monetary policy is also characterised by a simple Taylor rule. It
sets the nominal interest rate it such as to respond to deviations of
inflation and output from its flexible price equilibrium level Y˚:
it “ i` κpipi` κypY ´ Y˚q ` m,t,
where i is the steady state level of the nominal interest rate and m,t
an exogenous monetary policy shock. The relation between nominal
and real interest rates is given by the Fisher equation:
1` it “ Rt`1Pt`1
Pt
.
3.2.4 Standard Part of the Model
non-financial firms The non-financial firms are separated into
three types: intermediate, final goods firms (retailers) and capital
goods producers.16 There are differentiated intermediate goods i pro-
duced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate
goods firms. The differentiated goods produced are then sold and
used as inputs by a perfectly competitive firm producing the final
16 This part follows closely the supply side setting by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005).
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good. The capital goods producers invest and provide capital to the
firms. Capital stock evolves according to the law of motion of capital
Kt`1 “ rIt ` p1´ δqKts. (49)
Final-Good Firms.— The final output good is produced by a per-
fectly competitive representative firm. To produce the final output,
the firm combines a continuum of differentiated goods indexed by
i P r0, 1s produced by the intermediate firms.
The final output composite is a CES composite of all indeterminate
goods i:
Yt “
˜ż 1
0
Ytpiq´1
¸ 
´1
. (50)
 denotes the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods and
Ytpiq is the output by retailer i. The profit maximization of the retail
firm is:
max
Ytpjq
Pt
˜ż 1
0
Ytpiq´1
¸ 
´1
´
ż 1
0
PtpiqYtpiqdi.
The first order condition of the problem yields:
Pt

´ 1
˜ż 1
0
Ytpiq´1
¸ 
´1´1
´ 1

Ytpiq´1 ´1 “ Ptpiq.
Combining the previous FOC with the definition of the aggregate
final good we get:
Ytpiq “
ˆ
Ptpiq
Pt
˙´
Yt.
Nominal output is the sum of prices times quantities across all retail
firms i:
PtYt “
ż 1
0
PtpiqYtpiqdi.
Using the demand for each retailer we get the aggregate price level:
Pt “
˜ż 1
0
Ptpiq1´di
¸ 1
1´
.
Intermediate Goods Firms.— Intermediate good i P r0, 1s is produced
by a monopolist who uses a constant returns to scale production func-
tion combining capital and labour. The goods are then sold to the re-
tail firms. The intermediate good firm finances its capital needs each
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period by obtaining funds from banks and households. Funds that
finance capital holdings of the firms can be also acquired by the gov-
ernment when QE takes place. To acquire the funds to buy capital,
the firm issues Stpiq claims equal to the number of units of capital
acquired Kt`1piq and prices each claim at the price of a unit of cap-
ital Qtpiq. Then by arbitrage: QtpiqStpiq “ QtpiqKt`1piq. The funds
acquisition between goods firms and its lenders is under no friction.
Firm’s lenders can perfectly monitor the firms and there is perfect
information.
Production is subject to a total factor productivity shock At that
follows an AR(1) process. The ith intermediate good used in (50) is
produced under the following technology.
Ytpiq “ AtKtpiqαNtpiq1´α.
Intermediate good firms are not freely able to change prices each
period. Following the Calvo price updating specification each period
there is a fixed probability 1´ γ that a firm will be able to adjust its
price. Therefore, firms are not always able to maximize their profits
every period. Therefore, it is optimal to minimize their costs which
are the rental rate to capital and the wage rate for labour:
min
Ktpiq,Ntpiq
PtWtNtpiq ` PtZtKtpiq
subject to
AtKtpiqαNtpiq1´α ě
ˆ
Ptpiq
Pt
˙´
Yt.
The problem’s first order conditions are:
Wt “ P
nom
m,t piq
Pt
p1´αqAt Ytpiq
Ntpiq , (51)
Zt “ P
nom
m,t piq
Pt
αAt
Ytpiq
Ktpiq . (52)
Pnomm,t is the Lagrange multiplier of the minimization problem and
the marginal cost of the firms with Pm,t “ P
nom
m,t piq
Pt
being the real
marginal cost. Standard arguments lead to that marginal cost is equal
across firms.
Solving together (51) and (52) we find an expression for the real
marginal cost Pm,t which is independent of each specific variety:
Pm,t “
ˆ
1
1´α
˙1´αˆ
1
α
˙α
W1´αt Zαt .
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Firms’ nominal profits are: Proftpiq “ PtpiqYtpiq ´WtPtNtpiq ´
ZtPtKtpiq. Using (51) and (52) we get WtPtNtpiq “ Pnomm,t piqp1 ´
αqAtYtpiq and ZtPtKtpiq “ Pnomm,t piqαAtYtpiq, We then can write real
profits as: ProftpiqPt “
Ptpiq
Pt
Ytpiq ´ Pm,tYtpiq.17
Intermediate good firms are not freely able to change prices each
period. Each period there is a fixed probability 1 ´ γ that a firm
will adjust its price. Each firm chooses the reset price Pt˚ subject to
the price adjustment frequency constraint. Firms can also index their
price to the lagged rate of inflation with a price indexation parame-
ter γp. They discount profits s periods in the future by the stochastic
discount factor Λt,t`s and the probability that a price price chosen
at t will remain the same for some periods γs. The problem of an
updating firm is is at time t to choose Pt˚ piq to maximize discounted
real profits:
max
Pt˚ piq
Et
8ÿ
s“0
γsΛt,t`1
ˆ
Pt˚ piq
Pt`s
´ Pm,t`s
˙
Yt`spiq
subject to
Yt`spiq “
˜
Pt˚ piq
Pt`s
sź
κ“1
p1` piτ`κ´1qγp
¸´
Yt`s.
where pit is the rate of inflation from t´ i to t. The first order condi-
tion of the problem is:
Et
8ÿ
s“0
γsΛt,t`1
˜
Pt˚ piq
Pt`s
sź
κ“1
p1` piτ`κ´1qγp ´ Pm,t`s 
´ 1
¸
Yt`spiq “ 0.
Using the constraint and rearranging we get:
Pt˚ piq “ ´ 1
Et
ř8
s“0 γsΛt,t`1Pm,t`sPt`sYt`s
Et
ř8
s“0 γsΛt,t`1P
´1
t`s
śs
κ“1p1` piτ`κ´1qγpYt`s
.
Since nothing on the right hand side depends on each firm i, all up-
dating firms will update to the same reset price, Pt˚ . By the law of
large numbers the evolution of the price index is given by:
Pt “ rp1´ γqpPt˚ q1´ ` γpΠγpt´1Pt´1q1´s
1
1´ .
Capital Goods Producers.— Capital goods producers produce new
capital and sell it to goods producers at a price Qt. Investment on
17 In Gertler and Karadi (2011) firms derive revenues from selling their good and
selling the undepreciated portion of the physical capital back to the capital pro-
ducers. Therefore profits are Proft “ PtpiqYtpiq `Qtpiqp1´ δqKtpiq ´WtPtNtpiq ´
Rk,tQt´1piqKtpiq. Substituting Rk,t from (35) we get the same equation for aggregate
real profits as in (53).
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capital (It) is subject to adjustment costs. Their objective is to choose
tItu8t“0 to solve:
max
Iτ
Et
8ÿ
τ“t
Λt,τ
"
QtIt ´ r1` f˜
˜
Iτ
Iτ´1
¸
Iτs
*
.
where the adjustment cost function f˜ captures the cost of investors to
increase their capital stock:
f˜
˜
Iτ
Iτ´1
¸
“ η
2
˜
Iτ
Iτ´1
´ 1
¸2
Iτ.
η is the inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital. The
solution to the decision problem of the investors yields the competi-
tive price of capital:
Qt “ 1`
´
η
Iτ
Iτ´1
´ Iτ
Iτ´1
´1
¯
` η
2
´ Iτ
Iτ´1
´1
¯2´ηΛt,τ I2τ`1
I2τ
´ Iτ
Iτ´1
´1
¯¯
.
Aggregation.—
Total profits of non financial firms are equal to the sum of profits
earned by intermediate good firms:
Proft “
ż 1
0
Proftpiqdi.
Under standard arguments and using that supply should equal de-
mand in all markets:
ş1
0Ntpiqdi “ Nt,
ş1
0 Ktpiqdi “ Kt, we get that
total profits of the firms are:
Proft “ Yt ´WtNt ´ZtKt. (53)
3.2.5 Resource Constraint
The resource constraint of the economy is:
Yt “ Ct ` Itr1` f˜
´ It
It´1
¯
s `G.
Final output may be either transformed into consumption good, in-
vested or used by the government for government spending.
3.3 inverted aggregate demand logic
In this section, I test analytically and quantitatively the existence of
the Inverted Aggregate Demand Logic (IADL) for the case of i) a
conventional accommodative monetary policy shock and ii) a quan-
titative easing programme. This is done under two different taxation
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schemes. Firstly, under a no redistribution scheme: transfers to Key-
nesian agents are zero; secondly under a redistributive scheme: Key-
nesians get some of the Ricardian agents’ profits as a lump-sum trans-
fer. I show that under the no redistribution scheme IADL exists while
when transfers are on the IADL concept does no longer survive.
IADL (borrowing the term from Bilbiie (2008) who first showed it
in a LAMP model without capital) is the region where the accom-
modative monetary policy, when limited asset markets participation
is low, can have contractionary effects instead of stimulating aggre-
gate demand.18 I provide analytical and numerical solutions for the
first part of the analysis without transfers while for the case where
transfers are on I show only the quantitative results since the analysis
becomes substantially more complex.
3.3.1 No-Redistribution Scheme
For the first part of the analysis, I provide analytical expressions that
show the direct effect of interest rate reduction and quantitative easing
on output. Then, I show the fraction of constrained agents that pushes
the model into the IADL area in both cases, that is making the total
effect of the two policies contractionary. To pursue this, due to the
high dimensionality of the model, I solve the model numerically.
In order to derive analytical results I make the following, not dis-
torting, assumptions: Consumption and hours worked are equal among
all the members in steady state. Therefore in steady state: N “ NK “
NR and C “ CK “ CR. The first assumption can be implemented by a
particular choice of χ, whereas the second by introducing a tax level
that make Ricardians’ consumption equal to Keynesians’. Further-
more, due to no-redistribution, I assume that Keynesian agents taxa-
tion is zero: TKt “ 0. Under these assumptions, we can express the con-
sumption and labour aggregators (33), (34) as nt “ λnKt ` p1´ λqnRt
and ct “ λcKt ` p1´ λqcRt respectively, were lower case letters denote
log deviations from the non-stochastic steady state.
The optimality condition (32) without including any tax (or trans-
fer) rule dictates that the labour supply of the Keynesian agents in
levels is always constant, therefore nKt “ 0. The labour consump-
tion optimality conditions are in log-linear terms: cKt “ wt ` nKt and
cRt “ wt ´ nRt . Using the aggregate consumption, labour consump-
tion optimal choices, and the hours worked aggregator we get:19
wt “ ct ` nt. (54)
18 A key depart from Bilbiie’s work is that the present model includes capital.
19 The derivations of the main equations of this chapter are presented in Appendix B.4
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Substituting (54) in the labour optimality condition of the Ricardian
agents:
cRt “ ct ´ 
ˆ
λ
1´ λ
˙
nt. (55)
This is a log-deviation form version of equation (B.1.2). The extra in-
formation given by the above equation is the elasticity of Ricardian
agents’ consumption to changes in aggregate consumption and em-
ployment. Trivially with no hand to mouth consumers λ “ 0, CRt
follow the aggregate consumption schedule. Introducing limited as-
set market participation in the model makes Ricardians’ consumption
reacting negatively to an increase of the aggregate employment. This
is due to wage being the rule of thumb agents’ only source of income.
Doing the same exercise for the Keynesian agents:
cKt “ ct ` nt.
Keynesian agents’ consumption schedule reacts positively in changes
of aggregate consumption and employment with elasticity . Having
the above relations in hand I proceed with the derivation of the ag-
gregate Euler equation.
The log-linearised versions of the production function and resource
constrain are yt “ αkt ` p1´ αqnt and yt “ ctsc ` itsi ` sg respec-
tively. Inserting both equations in the Ricardian agents’ consumption
function (55) and substituting the result to the Ricardians’ Euler equa-
tion cRt “ EttcRt`1u` rEttpit`1u´ rtswe arrive to the aggregate Euler
equation or IS curve:
yt “ Ettyt`1u´ 1
δ
rrt´Ettpit`1us´ 1
δ
si
sc
∆it`1` 1
δ
λ
p1´ λqp1´αqrα∆kt`1s.
(56)
where
δ “ 1
sc
´  λp1´ λqp1´αq
and sc “ Css{Yss, si “ Iss{Yss, sg “ Gss{Yss.
profits Profits play a crucial role in the analysis. As it will be
shown below is the primary reason of the IADL existence. Profits
form non-financial corporations are given by Proft “ Yt ´WtNt ´
ZtKt. Log-linearising it around the steady state (with dt “ lnppProft´
Profq{Yqq we get:
dt “ yt ´ pwt `ntq ´ pzt ` ktq. (57)
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Profits move countercyclically in response to demand shocks, a stan-
dard feature of the NK models.20
3.3.1.1 Conventional Monetary Policy
The aggregate IS curve derived above, shows that the elasticity of
aggregate demand to interest rates depends on whether we assume a
representative agent specification or a LAMP setting. Specifically, the
elasticity is sc in the case of a representative agent model pλ “ 0q,
and becomes ´1{δ when LAMP is assumed. Solving for δ “ 0 we can
find the threshold fraction of the rule of thumb agents λ˚ that make
the impact of the direct effect of an interest rate reduction ineffective:
λ˚ “ 1´α
1´α` sc . (58)
Beyond this threshold level, a further reduction of the interest rate
will have contractionary effects and this will be the region where the
parameter δ changes sign.
For a low λ below the threshold value or equivalently when fi-
nancial inclusion is high, output reacts inversely to real interest rate
changes. As we move to higher values of λ this effect is becoming
stronger. When λ ą λ˚, and the fraction of hand to mouth consumers
is big enough, δ becomes negative and distorts the well known stim-
ulating effect of accommodative monetary policy using the policy
rate. In that region lower interest rates restrain aggregate demand
and we enter the Inverse Aggregate Demand Logic region. Finally
as λ reaches its upper bound of 1 where no agent hold assets, 1{δ
decreases towards zero; the interest rate as a monetary policy tool
becomes irrelevant.
Feeding the model with the parameter values from the model’s cal-
ibration shown in detail in Section 3.4.1, I show the total impact effect
of a conventional interest rate reduction to main macro variables as a
function of rule of thumb agents, where λ P r0, 0.9s. Figure 11 part (a)
shows the total impact effect of output, aggregate consumption, Ri-
cardian and Keynesian consumption and real wage to a conventional
monetary policy shock conditional on different fractions of rule of
thumb agents. Figure 11 part (b) shows the total impact of profits.
As the rule of thumb fraction increases this shifts all variables up-
wards. This continues up to a point where aggregate demand reaches
its maximum. When λ is over the threshold of λ˚ “ 0.78 , then the
nominal interest rate has the opposite effect on the aggregate vari-
ables and an expansionary monetary policy has contractionary effects
on output. As λ reaches its upper limit, and agents cannot have in-
tertemporal decisions, monetary policy becomes ineffective. Under
the current calibration, the direct effect of the interest rate reduction
20 This is also shown by Bilbiie (2019) in a model without capital and government
sector.
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Figure 11: (a) Inverted Aggregate Demand Logic: Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 11: (b) Inverted Aggregate Demand Logic: Monetary Policy Shock
(Profits)
presented analytically in equation (58) yields a threshold value of λ˚
of 0.799 which is equivalent to the total effect threshold shown by solv-
ing the model numerically.
intuition To understand the reasoning behind the IADL it is use-
ful to first focus on the region where there is restricted limited par-
ticipation: λ ă λ˚. A reduction in interest rates leads to an increase
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in aggregate demand. Wage increases from the intertemporal substi-
tution of asset holders and this wage increase translates to a further
increase in demand, since non-asset holders consume their wage in-
come (assuming no transfers). This generates a shift in labour de-
mand upwards. As Figure 11 shows this effect is not constant across
the domain of λ values. To understand why this is the case is impor-
tant to focus on the role of profits. Profits as shown above analytically
and in Figure 11 (b) are countercyclical. Consequently, as the non as-
set market participation increases the less the negative consequences
of the profits experienced by the majority of population, the non-asset
holders. Therefore, as λ increases and until it reaches λ˚ aggregate de-
mand increases continuously. Due to the high drop of profits, when
λ ą λ˚ aggregate demand drops as a result and there is a new equi-
librium with lower output, consumption and wages. Finally, reaching
the end of the λ domain, at λ = 0.9 almost no agent holds assets and
the interest rate policy is ineffective.
3.3.1.2 Quantitative Easing
In the same spirit with the contractionary effects of the conventional
policy rate reduction, I prove that a quantitative easing programme
can have the same adverse effects in a LAMP setting. The bond buy-
ing programme in the present setting is an one time increase in the
government bond holdings and a simultaneous reduction of the hold-
ings of banks and households. Finding the direct effect of QE on output
is a more tedious process than the one of the monetary policy interest
rate change since QE is not present in the IS equation (56).
A way to introduce government bonds is through capital. From
the capital market clearing (44) we have Kt “ KBt ` KHt ` KGt . Log-
linearising it around the steady-state yields:
kt “ sHk kHt ` sBkkBt ` sGk kGt , (59)
where sHk “ KH{K, sBk “ KB{K, sGk “ KG{K. Log-linearising the aggre-
gate incentive constraint of the bank around the steady state:
QSBpQˆt ` kBt q `∆qBBpqˆt ` bBt q “ φNpφˆ`ntq.
The small letters are the log-deviations of the variables from their
steady state. Qˆt is the corresponding value for the price of capital and
qˆt for the price of bonds. Solving for the bankers’ capital holdings:
kBt “ ´∆qB
B
QSB
bBt ´ ∆qB
B
QSB
qˆt ` φN
QSB
pφˆ`ntq ´ Qˆt. (60)
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Taking the log deviations of the capital market clearing (45) and solv-
ing for the banks’ bond holdings:
bBt “ ´
sGb
sBb
bGt ` bt
sBb
´ s
H
b
sBb
bHt , (61)
where sHb “ BH{B, sBb “ BB{B, sGb “ BG{B.
Plugging (60),(61) into (59):
kt “ sHk kHt ` sBk r´∆qB
B
QSB
ˆ
´s
G
b
sBb
bGt ` bt
sBb
´ s
H
b
sBb
bHt
˙
´∆qB
B
QSB
qˆt ` φN
QSB
pφˆ`ntq ´ Qˆts ` sGk kGt . (62)
Since we are interested on the direct effect of government bond pur-
chases (assuming everything else remains constant) we are interested
in
kt “ sBk ∆qB
B
QSB
BG
BB
bGt “ ∆B
G
S
bGt . (63)
The direct effect on output using the IS equation is:
´1
δ
λα
p1´ λqp1´αq
∆BG
S
bGt . (64)
Using the fact that bGt “ B
G
t ´BG
BG
, BG “ 0, and after some algebra
manipulation the above equation becomes:
1
p1´λqp1´αqK
scαλ∆
´ λKαλ∆
BGt . (65)
Setting the above expression equal to zero, we can find the thresh-
old value λ˚ that makes the direct effect of the quantitative easing
policy ineffective. The result yields the same level of threshold with
the conventional monetary policy case, λ˚ “ 0.799. Therefore, the
value of λ that makes both the direct effect of quantitative easing and
the interest rate reduction ineffective is equivalent.
In order to find the total impact effect of the QE, I proceed with
the numerical solution of the model. This is shown in Figure 12 (a)
for the same macro variables shown in the previous exercise. As in
the case of the classical monetary policy shock, the total impact effect
is positive and increasing as long as the asset market participation
decreases. After the level of participation passes the threshold level
λ˚, QE becomes contractionary. Nevertheless, the total impact effect
of QE and MP shock is different and the threshold level of market
participation λ˚ that neutralizes the total effect of the two policies dif-
fers as well. The countercyclicality of profits as shown in Figure 12 (b)
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is the factor that produces the IADL as in the case of the conventional
monetary policy.
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Figure 12: (a) Inverted Aggregate Demand Logic: QE Shock
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Figure 12: (b) Inverted Aggregate Demand Logic: QE Shock (Profits)
3.3.2 Redistribution of Profits
In this section, I repeat the previous exercise under the assumption
that taxation is now redistributive. Then I compare the results with
70 asset purchases , limited asset markets participation and inequality
the previous analysis where a zero taxation to Keynesian agents was
assumed. Taxation is following a simple fiscal rule of redistribution
of profits to the hand to mouth consumers and is defined as:
TKt “ tprProft. (66)
I assume a 5% taxation of the Ricardians’ profits, therefore tpr “ 0.05.
It’s important to note that this is an ad-hoc choice for the profit tax pa-
rameter. Since the purpose of this exercise is to identify what changes
when transfers to Keynesian agents are non-zero, the choice of a data
driven parameter is not crucial. Nevertheless, results stay the same
for positive tax parameters. Due to the complexity of the model I ab-
stract from the analytical solution of this case and I show numerically
what is the total impact effect of a monetary policy shock and a QE
shock to output. Lastly, in order to facilitate a straightforward com-
parison between the two tax schemes I abstract from the rest macro
variables analysed in the previous subsection.
Figure 13 shows the paths of the impact effect of output after a
conventional accommodative monetary policy shock and Figure 14
after a bond purchase shock. Both plots reveal that when the tax re-
distribution scheme is active there is no IADL region. QE and conven-
tional MP policy cannot be contractionary as long as a portion of the
profits is rebated to the non-asset holders. Figure 13 shows the im-
pact effect of an interest rate drop to output as a function of λ when
there is profit redistribution (continuous line). In contrast to the no-
redistribution case (dotted line) the total impact effect to output never
crosses the zero line to the negative territory and thus remains always
expansionary. Note that the impact effect is plotted until λ “ 0.80
since the analysis is restricted to the range of λ values consistent with
a unique equilibrium. Figure 14 performs the same exercise for the
case of QE. Again, the case under profit redistribution (continuous
line) shows that QE never becomes contractionary across all possible
λ values in contrast with the no redistribution case where for high λ
values the impact effect turns to negative.
3.4 quantitative analysis
In this section I present the model’s calibration and the second set of
results of the paper: the impact of the quantitative easing and interest
rate reduction in inequality.
3.4.1 Calibration
The model’s parametrisation is done in order to match the Euro Area
characteristics and is divided in three parts: conventional, model spe-
cific and banking parameters. Conventional parameters are those used
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Figure 14: Inverted Aggregate Demand Logic (Profit Redistribution): QE
Shock
in most macro studies and are taken as standard. The selection of the
model specific parameters follows Gertler and Karadi (2013). Finally,
the calibration of the banking sector parameters is in accordance to
the Basel III framework and also in order to meet specific Euro Area
banking targets. One period in the model is one quarter. All the cali-
brated values are presented in Table 6.
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Par. Value Definition
Households
β 0.99 Discount rate
γ 0.70 Habit parameter for consumption
χ 5.584 Relative utility weight of labour
λ 0.40 Share of Keynesian agents
B 0.333 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
S¯R{S 0.500 Proportion of shares of the Ricardian
B¯R{B 0.750 Proportion of bond holdings of the Ricardian
κ 1 Portfolio Adjustment Cost
Banks
θ 0.23 Minimum Capital Requirement (incl. Additional Capital Buffers)
∆ 0.5 Risk-Weighting Coefficient on Bonds
ω 0 Risk-Weighting Coefficient on Reserves
ξB 0.009 Entering bankers initial capital
σB 0.955 Bankers’ survival rate
τ 1 Interest on reserves relative to the riskless rate
Intermediate Goods Firms
δ 0.025 Depreciation of capital
α 0.33 Capital share
Capital Goods Producers
η 10.09 Inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital
Retail Firms
 4.167 Elasticity of Substitution
γ 0.779 Probability of Keeping the Price Constant
Government Policy
γG 0.2 Steady state fraction of government expenditures to output
κpi 1.5 Inflation Coefficient in the Taylor Rule
κy - 0.125 Markup Coefficient in the Taylor Rule
tpr 5% Ricardians’ Profit Taxation Coefficient
ρ1 1.700 First AR coefficient of the bond purchase shock
ρ2 -0.710 Second AR coefficient of the bond purchase shock
Table 6: Parameter Values
The first set of parameters explained are the ones related to the
banking sector. In order to assign values to the parameters of the cap-
ital requirements constraint, I follow the Basel III framework. Calcu-
lating the Minimum Capital Requirement ratio or Capital Adequacy
Ratio (CAR) is a non-trivial exercise. In the Basel III framework it
is said that the total capital ratio must be no lower than 8%. Nev-
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ertheless, this is not the actual ratio that banks follow since this ra-
tio depends on different buffers and pillars. Specifically, sine 2010
banks must hold a minimum Common Equity Tier 1 of 4.5% risk-
weighed assets. Additionally, there is a mandatory "capital conserva-
tion buffer", equivalent to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets and a "dis-
cretionary counter-cyclical buffer" that varies from 0% to 2.5% and
depends on the national bank regulators. Lastly, on the systemic im-
portant institutions (SII), three more buffers are added to the previous
three: The Global systemically important institutions (G-SII) buffer
and, subject to national discretion, other systemically important in-
stitutions buffer (O-SII). Also the "systemic risk buffer" varying from
0% to 3% has to be added to the previous ratios.21 As a representa-
tive example, Deutsche Bank’s Total Capital Requirements for 2018
are 14.5%.22 In the calibration I set the total capital buffer θ to 20%
of the risk weighted assets. In this sense, I consider the representa-
tive bank as a big systemic bank with the maximum values for each
specific buffer.
The risk weights for each asset are parametrised as follows: The
risk-weight for the bonds (∆) is 50%. This corresponds to bonds with
BBB+ to BBB- grade (following the Standard & Poor’s notation) which
is the median in the bond grade ranking. The risk-weight for the
claims on BBB+ to BBB- corporates is 100%. Lastly, the risk-weight
for the banks’ reserves (ω) is 0%.23
For the remainder of the parameters of the banking sector, I set the
values for parameters ξ,σB such that the model yields a steady state
leverage (φ) equal to 4 for the banks and a bank capital to lending
ratio of 0.25 close to the value suggested by Christoffel and Schabert
(2015). Also with these parameter values, the model yields a steady
state excess return on private securities of 100 basis points which
is also close to the aforementioned reference, a steady state annual
bond spread of 50 basis points and a steady state excess return on the
deposit facility less that the penalty rate. Lastly, I define τ equal to
one as I set the rate on reserves equal to the rate of the riskless asset
which is the case according to the pre-2009 Euro data.
Next, I follow the macro literature in order to choose the conven-
tional parameter values. The values for the share of capital α and
the depreciation rate δ are chosen to 0.3 and 0.025 respectively. The
elasticity of substitution between goods  also follows a standard ap-
proach and the government spending as a fraction of the GDP (20%)
is a reasonable value used in most studies. I choose the value of β
to be 0.99, in order to yield a quarterly discount rate R “ 1.01 which
is equivalent to a 4% annual interest rate. Regarding the consumers,
the relative utility weight of labour χ is chosen to ensure a level of
labour close to 1{3 in steady state, a fairly common benchmark in
21 More information from the European Systemic Risk Board
22 Minimum capital requirements and additional capital buffers
23 BIS - Minimum Capital Requirements
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the literature (see Corsetti et al. (2014)). Lastly, the inverse Frisch elas-
ticity of labour supply B is 0.33 similar to Christoffel and Schabert
(2015). The inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital η
equal to 10.09 as the estimated value from Gerali et al. (2010) for the
Eurozone. Finally, the share of rule of thumb consumers is chosen to
be λ “ 0.4. Using the data from the Eurosystem Household Finance
and Consumption Survey, as explained in Section 3.1, the bottom 40%
of the Euro Area households hold essentially no net worth at all. Tax
rule on profits follows the fiscal rule mention in the government sec-
tor with a tax coefficient of 5%.24
Lastly, for the model specific parameters I follow Gertler and Karadi
(2013). The value used for the proportion of shares and bond holdings
of the Ricardian households are 0.5 and 0.75 respectively. Also the
portfolio adjustment cost for both bonds and shares is 1. Lastly, the
bond purchase shock follows an AR(2) process with the first AR coef-
ficient being 1.700 and the second being -0.710, following Andrade et
al. (2016) who do the same exercise for the Euro Area. The choice of
the monetary policy shock parameters are chosen such that the GDP
matches the same increase of the QE shock.
3.4.2 Impulse Response Analysis
I approximate the model by log-linearising it around the determin-
istic steady state, and look at impulse responses to various shocks
under different scenarios and parametrizations.
central bank bond purchases and conventional mone-
tary policy I begin the quantitative analysis by giving an overall
overview of how a bond purchasing programme and an expansion-
ary monetary policy shock affect main macro variables shown in Fig-
ure 15. I calibrate both shocks so as to produce the same increase in
output of about 1.5%. In bold lines the responses of a bond shock
reflect the responses of a conventional interest rate reduction. As it
was mentioned above, central bank can purchase government bonds
and private assets and finance those purchases with reserves issued
to the banking sector. In the simulations, the nominal interest rate re-
mains constant for the first four quarters when a bond buying shock
is on. In other words, the nominal interest rates for those four periods
does not adjust according to the Taylor Rule specified above. Observ-
ing the recent QE episodes in Europe and the US, central banks do
not increase interest rates immediately after a QE implementation as
a conventional Taylor Rule would suggest. Bond purchases from the
central bank stimulate the economy and increase output as Figure 15
shows. The main stimulating mechanism works through the increase
of the asset prices Qt after the CB’s bonds purchases. An increase in
24 Results remain qualitatively similar under any reasonable tax coefficient.
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Figure 15: Government Asset Purchase Shock: Aggregates
the bonds’ prices drives banks to buy more assets which leads to an
increase in assets’ prices. This increases the banks’ net worth making
the banks increase their demand for capital leading to a cycle. As a re-
sult both spreads decrease (bonds and assets) and total employment
increases because now firms demand more labour.
Because of the model’s calibration we are in the standard aggregate
demand logic region. This means that a monetary policy shock will in-
crease aggregate demand. The responses of this shock and of a bond
buying program with constant nominal rate are qualitatively identi-
cal. The only differences are on the demand side of capital. In the case
of the bond buying, due to the direct purchases of bonds from banks,
both spreads reduce much more than in the conventional shock case.
This shifts banks’ net worth up and due to more demand for capital,
increase in investment is higher for the bond buying case.
income and consumption inequality I move to the decom-
position of income and consumption responses between the two agents
in the economy. In Figure 16, I present the responses of those vari-
ables after the same two shocks defined above. Both agents consump-
tion increases. Keynesian consumption strictly follows the real wage
path which after both shocks goes up due to more demand for labour.
Ricardian consumption increases as well after both shocks. Notice
that were the nominal interest not constant for the first four periods,
consumption of the Ricardian agents would have been decreasing.
This is because after a stimulating bond shock, the Taylor Rule dic-
tates the interest rate to increase. Through the standard intertempo-
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ral substitution mechanism the Ricardian agents would have lowered
their consumption. Although both agents’ consumption increase, con-
sumption inequality defined as CRt {Ct decreases. This is in line with
the well established fact that hand to mouth consumers have a higher
marginal propensity to consume than the financially unconstrained
agents (Auclert (2019), Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018) among oth-
ers).
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Figure 16: Government Asset Purchase Shock: Consumption and Income In-
equality
Turning to the income of the two agents, at the second row of Fig-
ure 16, the interesting part is the Ricardians’ income decline. After a
QE shock, Ricardians are forced to sell a fraction of their bond hold-
ings to the central bank and exchange them with risk free interest
bearing reserves. This has a negative impact on their balance sheet
since they lose form the interest rate differential and also from the
risk free rate reduction after both shocks. Furthermore due to the re-
duction in the shares’ spread they tend to hold less shares reducing
further their income. Due to the exchange of bonds to reserves, the
income reduction is much more amplified during the QE shock. Key-
nesian agents’ income is just their labour wage therefore this exactly
follows the wage path and so consumption.
3.5 conclusion
Since 2008, the major central banks have extensively used so-called
unconventional monetary policy tools. Quantitative easing, the pur-
chase of long term bonds and assets and exchange with interest bear-
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ing reserves, was the one mostly used. Although the recent literature
shows that the main target, the lowering of long term assets’ yields,
has been achieved, there is a recent debate on the impact of the QE
on inequality. In this paper I assess the impact of the QE employed by
the ECB using a calibrated DSGE model with limited assets market
participation and financial frictions. I find that QE leads to a reduc-
tion of consumption and income inequality.
The main economic intuition is as follows. Consider an increase in
the bond holdings of a central bank in an economy with two types
of consumers, bond holders and hand to mouth consumers. The out-
come of this operation will have direct and indirect effects. The direct
effects, namely the reduction of the interest rates and the asset price
increases will harm and benefit the bond holders respectively. On the
other hand, the indirect or general equilibrium effects such as the em-
ployment level and real wage increases will benefit hand to mouth
consumers. In the model calibrated for the Euro Area I show that the
general equilibrium effects are stronger than the direct effects. This
leads to a reduction of the income and consumption inequality be-
tween asset holders and hand to mouth consumers.
Additionally, I provide a set of results on the relationship between
QE’s expansionary effect and the degree of asset market participa-
tion. I assess the effect of QE on aggregate demand under two tax
schemes: a no-redistribution scheme and a profits redistribution be-
tween the two agents. In the no-redistribution case, a threshold level
of financial inclusion exists. When the degree of financial inclusion
is below this threshold, QE has contractionary effects. This result de-
pends on the countercyclical behaviour of profits. In the calibrated
model, when the fraction of population with access to asset markets
is below 53%, QE has contractionary effects. In the second case, when
a redistribution tax scheme is assumed, contractionary effects of QE
do not longer hold.
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T H E G R E E K G R E AT D E P R E S S I O N A N D T H E T O TA L
FA C T O R P R O D U C T I V I T Y
abstract This chapter studies the origins of the recent Greek cri-
sis and the role of the total factor productivity (TFP). Following the
work of Kehoe and Prescott (2002) this crisis episode can be char-
acterised as a great depression. We use this methodology and ask
whether, given the observed exogenous path of TFP, i) a dynamic,
stochastic, general equilibrium model with financial frictions in the
sense of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and ii) the neoclas-
sical growth model can generate an equilibrium behaviour that has
growth accounting characteristics similar to those in the data. The an-
swer is affirmative: changes in TFP are crucial in accounting for the
Greek great depression. Moreover, the model successfully mimics the
actual data with respect to the timing of peaks and troughs and the
time paths of most key macroeconomic variables.
Most of this chapter has been written during my internship in the Bank of Greece
in the summer of 2018. It includes research from ongoing joint work with Dimitris
Papageorgiou (Bank of Greece).
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4.1 introduction
Greece has suffered one of the longest recessions of advanced economies
to date. Notably, its per capita output in real terms dropped by 26.3%
from 2008 to 2013. Many academic studies and media articles focused
on the Greek Crisis have been published and a series of factors which
could be the origin for this economic downturn have been outlined.1
Gourinchas, Philippon, and Vayanos (2017) argue that fiscal consol-
idation was the primary reason for almost half of the GDP drop
while Chodorow-Reich, Karabarbounis, and Kekre (2019) find that
among fiscal consolidation, TFP drop played a crucial role as well.
This study, following the methodology by Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
and Conesa, Kehoe, and Ruhl (2007), argues that this period can be
characterized a great depression and quantifies the role of productivity
growth played in the development of the Greek Recession. To pur-
sue this, we employ two widely used macroeconomic models and
test them empirically on whether they can explain the crisis episode
while treating TFP as exogenous: the neoclassical growth model and
the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) financial accelerator model
(NG and BGG hereafter).
In this paper we ask two questions. First, is the TFP decline a fac-
tor responsible for the Greek Recession? Secondly, assuming that the
TFP is the sole source of fluctuations, can the two models employed
match the data given the TFP exogenously? Model simulations show
that both models, calibrated to the Greek data can, to a large degree,
match the macro variables of interest such as GDP, labour and cap-
ital factor during the Greek great depression. This result is in line
with the growth theory findings on the importance of the TFP in
explaining depressions (Prescott (2002), Hayashi and Prescott (2002),
Conesa, Kehoe, and Ruhl (2007) among others). Nevertheless, the TFP
collapse does not appear to be sufficient to account for this episode
as the only source of fluctuations. Fiscal or monetary policy changes
might be of importance as well as mentioned in recent academic re-
search on the Greek crisis (Gourinchas, Philippon, and Vayanos (2017)
and Chodorow-Reich, Karabarbounis, and Kekre (2019)).
Similar results are obtained for the pre-crisis 2000:2007 period and
the full sample period 2000:2017. Both models perform well also in
terms of timing concerning the peaks and troughs of the data. To en-
hance the financial frictions model’s fit with the data, we add an extra
source of fluctuation: the policy uncertainty index by Hardouvelis et
al. (2018) which we feed as a risk shock in the BGG model. Results re-
main very close with the predictions of the model when only the TFP
series are used revealing that the uncertainty index does not contain
information that enhances the model’s predictive power.
1 Explaining Greece’s Debt Crisis, The New York Times (17/06/16), What went wrong in
Greece and how to fix it: Lessons for Europe from the Greek crisis, Paolo Manasse, VoxEU
(12/06/2015) among many others.
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In our simulations, the recession produced by both models using
the TFP time series is slightly milder than in the data. This indi-
cates that other factors such as fiscal consolidation or monetary policy
changes that took place matter as well. Overall, the simple NG model
without a financial sector outperforms the financial frictions model
in most of the exercises under the baseline calibration. This crucially
depends on the elasticity of labour supply. Following Beaudry and
Portier (2002), we test both models for different values of the labour
supply elasticity. As the elasticity drops to more plausible -from a mi-
crodata perspective- values, the NG model loses its prediction power
much more than the BGG model.
The Greek Recession accounts for one of the most severe recessions
in the developed world. This is due to the big loss of output occurred
in a very short time. Contractions as large as in Greece rarely occur.
Figures 17 and 18 present the time series of the Greek real per capita
GDP from 1995-2017 and the growth of real per capita GDP respec-
tively. Based upon the set of criteria defined by Kehoe and Prescott
(2002) (which will be explained in detail momentarily) we can charac-
terize this period as a great depression.
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Figure 17: Real per capita GDP
The research method we employ is the following: Using the criteria
set by Kehoe and Prescott (2002), we identify and date the great de-
pression incident. Second, using a standard constant returns to scale
production function (Cobb-Douglas) we compute the implied series
of total factor productivity for the period under consideration. Third,
we set up the neoclassical growth model and the Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999) model, calibrate both to the Greek economy and
solve for the competitive equilibrium. We then feed the actual TFP
series into each model and generate artificial data for the main aggre-
gate economic variables. Finally, we compare the growth accounting
characteristics of the actual data to those of the artificial economy.
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Figure 18: Real per Capita GDP Growth Rate
the definition of great depressions According to Kehoe
and Prescott (2002), an economic downturn of the real per capita GDP
over the time periodD “ rT0, T1s can be labelled as a great depression
if three conditions relating output to its trend are met. Let us first
define de-trended real per capita GDP in period t, y˜t, as the ratio of
real per capita GDP, yt, over trend real per capita GDP, gt´T0yT0 ,
y˜t “ yt
gt´T0yT0
(67)
where g is the gross trend growth rate and T0 is the starting year
of the de-trending period. We define the trend growth rate as the
average growth rate of Greece of the full sample period (1995:2017),
0.74%.
The three conditions are:
i) The deviation of the per capita GDP from its trend must be suffi-
ciently negative (20% or larger). That is, there is some year t in such
that:
yt
gt´T0yT0
ď 80%.
ii) The deviation must occur rapidly (with a negative deviation of 15%
in the first decade). That is, there is some year t ď T0 ` 10 such that:
yt
gt´T0yT0
ď 85%.
iii) The deviation must be sustained, in the sense that real per capita
GDP cannot return to trend growth rate for a decade. That is, there
are no T 2 and T 1 in D, T 2 ě T 1 ` 10, such that
yT 2
gT
2´T 1yT 1
ě 100%.
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As can be seen in Figure 19, the Greek economy during the period
2008-2017 strictly meets all the above criteria. The year 2008 is identi-
fied as the starting year of the depression. This is also clear from the
two previous graphs, indicating the year 2008 as the peak of the busi-
ness cycle. According to our terminology, T0 “ 2008. Real per capita
GDP is characterized by a sharp and large fall following 2008. By 2013,
real per capita GDP has decreased about 26.18% below its trend. Fur-
thermore, by 2011 the drop of real per capita GDP was already more
than 15% below its trend (notably 18.02%). Therefore both the first
and second criteria are met. The third criterion requires that real per
capita GDP should not grow at the trend growth rate of 0.74% during
any decade over the depression period. Although the data available is
up to the year 2017, it is clear that on average the real per capita GDP
does not grow at a 0.74% growth rate. Looking at Figure 19 confirms
that this criterion is also met. Consequently, the Greek economy for
the period 2008-2017 meets all the aforementioned criteria identifying
this period as a great depression.
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Figure 19: Detrended Real per Capita GDP 2008-2017
related literature A growing strand of the literature related
to the causes of boom and bust of the Greek economy has emerged
after the prolonged period of the Greek Recession. Gourinchas, Philip-
pon, and Vayanos (2017) were among the first studies on the causes of
the Greek Depression. Using a DSGE framework with a rich fiscal sec-
tor and financial frictions they find that fiscal consolidation accounted
for approximately 50% of the output drop from peak to trough. They
also show that much of the remainder drop (around 40%) can be ex-
plained by the increase in funding costs for the private sector and
the sovereign. The main difference between our study and Gourin-
chas, Philippon, and Vayanos (2017) is that they impose constant TFP,
whereas the TFP collapse is the main driver of the recession in our
study. Chodorow-Reich, Karabarbounis, and Kekre (2019) using an
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estimated DSGE model find that lower external demand for traded
goods and contractionary fiscal policies account for the largest frac-
tion of the Greek depression. Furthermore, in line with this paper’s
findings, they show that a decline in total factor productivity sub-
stantially amplified the depression. Economides, Papageorgiou, and
Philippopoulos (2017) show that the fiscal policy mix adopted in the
years 2000-2009, jointly with the deterioration in institutional quality
and, specifically, in the degree of protection of property rights, can
explain essentially all the total loss in GDP between 2010 and 2015
(around 26%). Finally, Ardagna and Caselli (2014) focuses on the sub-
optimality of the bailout agreements between Greece and its lenders
as an explanation for the big GDP downturn.
In terms of methodology, this paper has borrowed from the great
depressions literature. Most notably, the book edited by Kehoe and
Prescott (2007) Depressions of the Twentieth Century (Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis) was a collection of articles discussing the im-
portance of TFP fluctuations for explaining depressions and reces-
sions. These studies use the general equilibrium growth model and
an exogenous variation of the TFP to explain recessions in a number
of different countries and it is the approach followed by the present
study. 2 Using the aforementioned methodology, the study mostly re-
lated to this paper is Gogos et al. (2014). They employ the standard
neoclassical growth model, feeding the model with the TFP series for
Greece for the period 1979-2001. They find that this period can be
characterised as a great depression according to Kehoe and Prescott
(2002) criteria and that changes in TFP are crucial in accounting for
the Greek great depression.
One of the models used in this study is a seminal paper that intro-
duced financial frictions in the macro literature. This enriched frame-
work of macroeconomic models goes back to Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989). Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) is the first paper to identify the financial accelerator mechanism
by introducing non-linear costs in the adjustment of capital leading
to variations in Tobin’s q. The choice of BGG as the financial frictions
representative model in this study is due to its empirical plausibility
as has been shown by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) and
its popularity as one of the first and widely used financial frictions
models.
The plan of the article is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the two
models. All the data exercises including the estimation of the capi-
tal and TFP series and the calibration of the model are reported in
Section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the growth accounting results. Lastly,
Section 4.5 presents the main results and the quantitative analysis.
2 Country studies presented in the book include France Beaudry and Portier (2002),
Japan Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and Argentina Kydland and Zarazaga (2002)
among others.
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4.2 the model
In this section we present the two models that are employed in the
study. The presentation here takes advantage of the similarities the
two models share. Section 4.2.1 describes the NG model while Sec-
tion 4.2.2 presents the financial frictions BGG model. We want to fo-
cus entirely on the impact the exogenously given TFP has on both
models. This is why in our setting fiscal policy is absent. Lastly, we
abstract from the effects of future uncertainty by assuming that the
agents can form perfect foresights. Specifically, if the current produc-
tivity departs from its equilibrium level, all the agents can perfectly
anticipate the productivity’s return path to its steady state.
4.2.1 The Neoclassical Growth Model
In the canonical neoclassical growth model there are two types of
agents: households and firms. Firms’ role in the model is to produce
consumption goods by combining capital and labour borrowed from
the households. Households are the owners of capital which they
lend to the firms at a cost specified from the rental rate of capital and
they also work in the production firm where their compensation is
their marginal product of labour.
households There is a continuum of households with identical
preferences. Households work and get their labour wage, invest in
capital receiving the rental rate of capital, and retain the profits of the
non-financial firms.3
The preferences of the representative household take the mostly
standard following form:
8ÿ
i“0
βirlnpCt`iq ´ χ
1` N
1`
t`i s, (68)
Ct denotes the per capita consumption of the household members
and Nt the supply of labour. β P r0, 1s is the discount factor,  is the
inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply, χ ą 0 is the relative utility
weight of labour and t` i is the time subscript.
The household allocates funds to consumption and transfers wealth
across time and states by investing It. We assume that the holding
capital bears no risk and we call the rental rate of capital Zt. The
household’s financial resources originate from its labour income, Wt
is the real wage, capital returns and the net payouts to the household
3 This is different from the BGG framework which will be explained bellow. In the
BGG model households are divided in two different types according to their occu-
pation (workers and entrepreneurs).
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from ownership of both non-financial firms Πt. The budget constraint
of the representative household is:
Ct ` It “WtNt `Πt `ZtKt.
Furthermore, the law of motion of capital is:
Kt`1 “ It ` p1´ δqKt. (69)
The problem of the representative household is to choose Ct,Nt,Kt`1
in order to maximize its utility (68) subject to the budget constraint
(72) and the law of motion of capital (81) at every period.
Let uc,t denote the marginal utility of consumption and Λt,t`1 de-
note the household’s discount factor (the intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution):
Λt,t`1 ” βuc,t`1
uc,t
, (70)
where uc,t “ C´1t .
Maximizing household’s utility subject to the constraint, get the
two standard intertemporal and intratemporal equations of the NG
model4: namely the Euler equation
Λt,t`1rZt`1 ` p1´ δqs “ 1
and the optimality condition for labour supply
uc,tWt “ χNt .
production Production process is limited to the production of a
consumption good. As it will be clear in the next section, the produc-
tion framework of the BGG model includes also the production of the
capital good.
Goods Producers.— Goods producers combine capital and labour
both rented from the households to produce goods under a constant
returns to scale production function. Production is subject to a total
factor productivity shock At.
Yt “ AtpKtqαN1´αt . (71)
The decision problem of the goods producers is to choose Kt and
Nt in order to maximize their profits. Profit maximization implies
standard input demands for labour and capital:
Wt “ p1´αq
`Kt
Nt
˘α
4 The solution is provided in Appendix C.1.
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Zt “ α
`Nt
Kt
˘1´α.
resource constraint The resource constraint of the model im-
plies aggregate demand to be equal with aggregate supply:
Yt “ Ct ` It.
Lastly, to be consistent with the BGG framework that follows, we call
the gross return on capital net of depreciation as Rk,t “ Zt ` p1´ δq.
4.2.2 The Financial Frictions Model
The economy of the financial frictions model, a version of the Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), is populated by five agents: Households,
entrepreneurs, bankers, capital and consumption good producers. A
crucial difference with the NG model is that now the representative
household is not the direct owner of capital. Capital is being interme-
diated by banks from households to entrepreneurs. Households hold
bank deposits which are the only source of bank funding. Banks then
give loans to the entrepreneurs which are the capital holders. Put it
simply, households are the lenders of the entrepreneurs with banks
acting as an intermediary. What gives rise to the financial accelerator
mechanism, is the addition of the capital goods producers and the
non-linear adjustment costs. Tobin’s q, the price of capital, creates an
extra feedback mechanism in the perturbations of the model, namely
the financial accelerator.
households There is a continuum of households with prefer-
ences defined in a similar manner as in the NG model by (68). House-
hold members are divided according to their occupation. Within each
household there are two different member types: $ workers and
p1´$q entrepreneurs. Household members differ in the way they ob-
tain earnings. Workers supply labour and entrepreneurs manage the
non-financial firms. All return their earnings back to their families.5
Lastly, within the family there is perfect consumption insurance.
The household allocates funds to consumption and bank deposits
Dt. We assume that deposits bear no risk and we call the riskless
gross return to deposits, Rt (the interest factor). The rest of the house-
hold income sources are the wage income and the profits from the
non-financial corporations. Therefore, the budget constraint of the
representative household is:
Ct `Dt`1 “WtNt `Πt ` RtDt. (72)
5 This approach follows Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and allows for within-household
heterogeneity but also sticks to the representative approach representation. Abstract-
ing from the entrepreneurs’ consumption makes the model presentation simpler.
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The problem of the representative household is to choose Ct,Nt,Dt
in order to maximize its utility (68) subject to the budget constraint
(72) at every period.
Solving household’s problem we get as previously in the NG model
the two standard intertemporal and intratemporal equations6: the Eu-
ler equation
Λt,t`1Rt`1 “ 1
and by combining the optimality condition for labour supply
uc,tWt “ χNt .
entrepreneurs Each entrepreneur i purchases raw capital Ki,t`1
from the capital goods producers at price Qt in a competitive market
and fund this purchase with their equity NEi,t`1 and credit Li,t`1
obtained from the financial institutions. The entrepreneur’s balance
sheet is:
QtKi,t`1 “ Li,t`1 `NEi,t`1. (73)
The entrepreneur transfers the purchased capital to the retail firm in
order to produce goods. Capital yields its marginal product Zt`1. At
the end of the period, she sells the undepreciated capital back to the
capital goods producer at price Qt`1. Therefore, the average return
per nominal unit invested in period t is:
Rk,t`1 “ rZt`1 ` p1´ δqQt`1s
Qt
, (74)
In every period t an idiosyncratic shock ψi transforms the newly
purchased Ki,t`1 raw units of capital into ψiKi,t`1 effective units of
capital. It is assumed that ψ follows a unit-mean log normal distribu-
tion. The idiosyncratic shock is drawn from a density fpψtq and the
probability of default is then given by:
ppψ¯q “
ż ψ¯
0
fpψqdψ. (75)
Following Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) we call the stan-
dard deviation of logpψq denoted by σψ, the risk shock. It is the cross
sectional dispersion in ψ and it is allowed to vary over time. This will
introduce another source of fluctuations in the model’s perturbations
in addition to the TFP.
6 Solution provided in Appendix C.2.
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A threshold value of ψi called ψ¯t`1 divides the entrepreneurs that
cannot pay back the loan and interest from those who can repay. It is
defined by
Rl,t`1Li,t`1 “ ψ¯t`1Rk,t`1QtKi,t`1. (76)
Rl,t`1 is the rate to be decided in the debt contract between the en-
trepreneur and the banker. When ψi ě ψ¯t`1 the entrepreneur re-
pays the bank the amount Rl,t`1Li,t`1 keeps the profits equal to
ψ¯t`1Rk,t`1QtKi,t`1´Rl,t`1Li,t`1 and continues production. If ψi ă
ψ¯t`1 the entrepreneur has negative net worth resulting in bankruptcy
and default. When an entrepreneur defaults, is then being monitored
by a bank which acquires her assets. The expected net worth of the
entrepreneurs is
rp1´ Γtpψ¯t`1qqRk,t`1QtKi,t`1s, (77)
where
Γtpψ¯t`1q “
ż ψ¯t`1
0
ψfpψqdψ` ψ¯t`1p1´ ppψ¯t`1qq. (78)
and 1´ Γtpψ¯t`1q represents the average weight of the entrepreneurs’
gains.
If there was no cost for the banker to observe the idiosyncratic
shock ψi,t, then there would have been state-contingent contracts
that would perfectly insure the banker. Instead, in order to make en-
trepreneurs’ default costly for the banking sector, ψi is costlessly ob-
served by the entrepreneur, but it is not observed by the lender unless
he pays a fraction of their ex-post revenues. Specifically, the financial
intermediary must pay a “monitoring cost” to observe the borrower’s
realized return on capital. This follows the “costly state verification”
illustration proposed by Townsend (1979). Monitoring costs can be
interpreted as legal costs that the banks pay in the case of borrowers’
default. This cost destroys part of the capital produced by the project
and equals a proportion µ of the gross pay-off of the firms capital, i.e.
µψi,t`1Rk,t`1QtKi,t`1.
The optimal contract maximizes the expected profits of the en-
trepreneur under the condition that the expected return on lending
is no less that the opportunity cost of lending. In other words, for the
financial intermediary to continue extending credit to entrepreneurs,
their expected return from credit must be always greater or equal to
the opportunity cost of its funds. The opportunity cost is the riskless
rate Rt. The loan contract must satisfy:
p1´µqRk,t`1QtKi,t`1
ż ψ¯t`1
0
ψfpψqdψ`p1´ppψ¯t`1qqRl,t`1Li,t`1 ě RtLi,t`1.
(79)
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The left hand side shows the expected gross return that the financial
intermediary receives over all realizations of the shock and the right
hand side the opportunity cost of lending that the intermediary has.
Using (78) the zero profit condition (79) becomes :
Rk,t`1QtKi,t`1rΓtpψ¯t`1q´µGtpψ¯t`1qs ě RtpQtKi,t`1´NEi,t`1q, (80)
where µGtpψ¯t`1q are the expected monitoring costs:
Gtpψ¯t`1q “
ż ψ¯t`1
0
ψfpψqdψ
respectively. The optimal contract for the entrepreneur solves the en-
trepreneur’s expected net worth (77) subject to the zero profit condi-
tion (80). The solution is presented in Appendix C.3. Combining the
first order conditions leads to the external finance premium between
the interest gain on capital and the riskless rate as in the BGG:
Rk,t`1 “ ρpĘψt`1qRt`1
where ρpĘψt`1q is given by
ρpĘψt`1q “ Γ 1pĘψt`1qrpΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qqΓ 1pĘψt`1q ` p1´ ΓpĘψt`1qpΓ 1pĘψt`1q ´ µG 1pĘψt`1qqs .
Aggregation.— At the end of the period t a fraction σE,t of en-
trepreneurs continues and the rest disappears and is replaced by an
equal number of workers. This assumption ensures that entrepreneurs
will not fund all investments from their own accumulated capital. The
probability of remaining is a constant parameter calibrated such as to
target a specific leverage ratio for the entrepreneurs.7 The new en-
trants receive a start up fund transferred from the old entrepreneurs
which is equal to a proportion ξE of their wealth. By the law of large
numbers the aggregate net worth for every entrepreneurs i at the end
of the period t is p1 ´ Γt´1qψ¯tRk,tQt´1ki,t. Integrating over all en-
trepreneurs we get the aggregate net worth at the end of period t
where capital letters denote aggregate variables.
NEt`1 “ pσE,t ` ξEqpr1´ Γt´1pĎψtqsRk,tQt´1Ktq.
Capital Goods Producers.— Capital goods producers produce new
capital and sell it to entrepreneurs at a priceQt. Investment on capital
7 This follows Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler, Kiy-
otaki, and Queralto (2012).
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(It) is subject to adjustment costs. Therefore, the new law of motion
of capital is
Kt`1 “ Itr1` f˜
´ It
It´1
¯
s ` p1´ δqKt. (81)
where the adjustment cost function f˜ captures the cost of investors to
increase their capital stock:
f˜
˜
Iτ
Iτ´1
¸
“ η
2
˜
Iτ
Iτ´1
´ 1
¸2
Iτ
and η is the inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital.
Their objective is to choose tItu8t“0 to solve:
max
Iτ
8ÿ
τ“t
Λt,τ
"
QtIt ´ r1` f˜
˜
Iτ
Iτ´1
¸
Iτs
*
.
The solution to the decision problem of the investors yields the com-
petitive price of capital:
Qt “ 1`
´
η
Iτ
Iτ´1
´ Iτ
Iτ´1
´1
¯
` η
2
´ Iτ
Iτ´1
´1
¯2´ηΛt,τ I2τ`1
I2τ
´ Iτ
Iτ´1
´1
¯¯
.
banks Each bank j allocates its funds to credit Lj,t`1. It funds its
operations by receiving deposits from households Dj,t`1 “ Lj,t`1
remunerated at the discount rate Rt. From the above specification
and by the law of large numbers, it follows that the bank’s balance
sheet is:
Lt`1 “ Dt`1. (82)
resource constraint The resource constraint of the economy
is:
Yt “ Ct ` It ` µGtpψtqRk,tQtKt.
Final output may be either transformed into consumption good, in-
vested, used by the government for its spending or used up in moni-
toring costs and reserve costs. Lastly, the amount of capital available
for production is given by Kft “ p1´ µGtqKt. Available capital equals
the initial capital net of the capital destroyed due to the expected
monitoring costs.
4.3 data & calibration
Before applying the great depressions methodology, we must first
ensure that the variables in the proposed model match with the data.
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In this section we show how we treat some variables that are missing
from the data and then the process of the model’s calibration. The
data sources are Eurostat and the Bank of Greece, unless otherwise
indicated and span the period 1995-2017.
4.3.1 Data
In this section we describe how we construct two variables that are
absent from the data, namely the capital stock and the total factor
productivity (TFP) series for the Greek economy.
4.3.1.1 Capital Stock
In order to obtain a time series for the real capital stock, Kt, we follow
the procedure described in Conesa, Kehoe, and Ruhl (2007). Taking
as given the equation for the law of motion of capital (81) we need
data on real investment expenditure, a value for the depreciation rate,
δ, which we assume to be constant, and an initial value for the real
capital stock, K0. Firstly, we begin by calculating the value of the de-
preciation rate. We obtain the value of δ as the average consumption
of fixed capital to GDP ratio observed in the data. This number over
the period 2000-2017 is 16.29%, that is:
1
23
2017ÿ
t“2000
δKt
Yt
“ 16.29%. (83)
Secondly, we choose the initial value for the capital to output ratio to
be equal to the average of the ratio for the period 1995-2000:
K1995
Y1995
“ 1
5
2000ÿ
t“1996
Kt
Yt
. (84)
We use the period 1995-2000 to obtain the initial value for the capital
stock in a way to minimize the impact of the ad-hoc initial value on
the constructed series. Given that the period of interest is the 2008-
2017, the impact of the capital starting value is small. The capital
stock of each period and the depreciation rate are the solution to
the system of equations given by (81), (83) and (84). The solution to
this non-linear system yields an annual depreciation rate equal to
δ “ 0.051.
4.3.1.2 Labour Share
To compute the labour share in output (1´α), we add total compen-
sation of the self-employed to total compensation of employees and
then divide this number with GDP at factor prices (that is GDP minus
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taxes less substitutes on production and imports). Then we take the
average of it for the period 1995-2008:
1´α “ TCE
DE ` TCESE
Yt ´NIT .
TCEDE is total compensation of employees that belong to dependent
employment, TCESE is the imputed total compensation of the self-
employed, and NIT is net indirect taxes, i.e. indirect taxes less subsi-
dies on production and imports. This yields an annual capital share
in output α = 0.45.
4.3.1.3 TFP
Having constructed the capital stock series and given the data for
real GDP Yt, hours of work Nt and the value for the capital share
parameter α calculated above, the TFP series will be pinned down as
a residual from the production function (71):
At “ Yt
KαtN
1´α
t
.
4.3.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the Greek economy at an annual frequency.
We calibrate the model using data from the period 1995-2008, the pre-
crisis period. The parameters of the NG model are a subset of the
parameters of the BGG. We treat the BGG as our main model and
we calibrate it to match certain data characteristics. As a result, the
common parameters of the two models have the same values for both
models.
Most of the parameters are parametrized such that the model yields
the average of the Greek economy macro variables in the steady state.
Additionally, four parameters take values such that four targets are
met: the probability of default for the non-financial corporations, the
lending margin to NFCs, the proportion devoted to working hours
and the ratio of loans to net worth held by the NFCs. All the cali-
brated parameters are summarized in Table 7 .
Starting from the parameters for the standard part of the model, β
is parametrized such as the model yields a 5.1% risk free interest rate
in steady state, which corresponds to the average of the benchmark 10
year Greek bond from 1995-2008. We get δ and α the depreciation pa-
rameter and capital share respectively from the two procedures anal-
ysed above in detail. This yields an annual depreciation rate of capi-
tal equal to 0.051 and a capital share equal to 0.45. Finally, following
models parametrised for Greece, we parametrize the inverse of Frisch
elasticity of labour  and the inverse elasticity of net investment to the
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price of capital η as in Balfoussia and Papageorgiou (2016). Lastly, the
distributed income of the exiting to the new entrepreneurs, ξE, can be
found in the data as the annual distributed income of non-financial
corporations relative to their net worth which is 3.4%.
We now proceed to the four calibration targets. Firstly, to calculate
the fraction of hours devoted to work in the steady state (N˚) we pro-
ceed as follows: We multiply the annual hours worked with the total
employment population and we divide that with the total population
multiplied by the total annual hours available for work (365 ˚ 16). This
yields N˚ “ 0.22. To match this we solve for χ taking the steady state
hours as given and this yields χ equal to 11.781 for the BGG model
and 6.86 for the NG model. The next target is the external finance pre-
mium for non-financial corporations (NFCs). To identify that in the
data, we use the lending margin to NFCs.8 The difference between
banks’ interest rates on new business loans and a weighted average
interest rate on new deposits from non-financial corporations is up
to 2008, on average 1.912%. To pin down this target in the model’s
steady state we use the monitoring costs parameter which for this
level of the finance premium it yields µ to 0.0025. Next, the third tar-
get is the average probability of default of the NFCs which during
that period was 3%. To pin down this target we calibrate the steady
state value of the dispersion of the idiosyncratic shock (σω˚) to 0.954.
Finally, our forth target is the average loan to GDP ratio which in data
is 64.8%. This target is met as we set the fraction of entrepreneurs that
continue to the next period to 0.912.
4.4 growth accounting
For our growth accounting analysis we follow the approach of the
“great depressions methodology” literature (see Conesa, Kehoe, and
Ruhl (2007) and Kehoe and Prescott (2007)). More specifically, we
want to quantify which of the TFP, capital and labour factors drive the
GDP growth. We proceed by calculating each factor from the actual
data and then we plot the factors against the real per capita GDP
path.
The aggregate production function can be equivalently written as:
Yt
Lt
“ A
1
1´α
t
ˆ
Kt
Yt
˙ α
1´α Nt
Lt
(85)
and in natural logarithms:
ln
Yt
Lt
“ 1
1´α lnAt `
α
1´α ln
Kt
Yt
` ln Nt
Lt
. (86)
8 Greece, Lending margins of MFIs on loans in Euro to non-financial corporations
(Based on MIR data) (Risk Assessment Indicators) from the ECB Warehouse.
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Par. Value Definition
Households
β 0.951 Discount rate
χ 11.781 (BGG) Relative utility weight of labour
6.864 (NG)
 0.500 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
Entrepreneurs
µ 0.0025 Monitoring Costs
σE 0.912 Fraction of entrepreneurs survived
σψ˚ 0.954 Steady-state cross dectional Dispersion of ψ
ξE 0.034 Entering entrepreneurs initial capital
Intermediate Goods Firms
δ 0.051 Depreciation of capital
α 0.456 Capital share
Capital Goods Producers
η 1.500 Inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital
Table 7: Parameter Values
where Nt are the total hours worked and Lt is the total workong
age population. To proceed we decompose real per capita GDP into
three factors: The TFP factor, A
1
1´α
t , the capital factor, pKtYt q
α
1´α and the
labour factor, LtNt .
In figures 20 and 21 we show the evolution of the real per capita
GDP together with the three growth accounting factors. Figure 20
shows the evolution of the variables spanning the time 1995-2018 nor-
malized by the value of each factor’s value at 1995 while Figure 21
shows the evolution of the factors in the period 2008-2017 normalized
by each factors’ value at the year 2008, the onset of the great depres-
sion in Greece. It is evident that the fall of the real per capita GDP
starts at the year 2008 and starts to rebound gradually in 2013.
During the Greek period of growth, 1995-2007, the real per capita
output increased by 45.45%. The growth of GDP has been driven ex-
tensively by the TFP factor, increased by 33.46% and the labour factor
(7.85%) especially in the post-2001 period. The capital factor increased
as well in the same time span by 2.54%.
Turning to Figure 21 and the great depression period, 2008-2017,
real per capita output has been reduced by 19.86% compared to its
value at the year 2008. The TFP factor dropped by 22.84% while the
drop of the labour factor (11.32%) has been less compared to the
labour factor and output. On the other hand, the capital factor in-
creased this period by 17.12%.
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Figure 20: Growth Accounting 1995-2017 (Index 1995=100)
An important takeaway from the growth accounting exercise is the
procyclicality of the TFP and the labour factors and the countercycli-
cal behaviour of capital. The countercyclical behaviour of the capital
factor is clear after 2001 and even more in Figure 2 showing the re-
cession years. More specifically, the capital factor increased by 17.12%
during the period 2008-2017. It started from the value of 3.270 in 2008,
reaching a first peak of 4.165 in 2013 amidst the depression episode.
Then as GDP started to grow gradually the capital factor scaled down
to 3.95 in 2017. This behaviour of capital is consistent with other stud-
ies on the Greek economy (Gogos et al. (2014)) where the authors
use the same growth accounting methodology for the period 1971-
2001. Other great depression episodes in other countries present the
same pattern as well (see for example Hayashi and Prescott (2002) for
the case of Japan, Bergoeing et al. (2002) for the case of Mexico, and
Conesa, Kehoe, and Ruhl (2007) for the case of Finland), although at
a relatively smaller magnitude. What lies behind this large increase
in the case of Greece? First of all, this increase can be attributed to
Greece’s poor GDP growth performance during the periods 2008-
2017. Secondly as it is shown by Gogos et al. (2014) this reduction in
real GDP growth is complemented and reinforced by the high growth
rate of real capital stock throughout the 1979-2012 period. An addi-
tional factor lies in the low (relative to other countries) calibrated
values of the labour share, 1´ α, and the depreciation rate, δ which
could inflate even more the capital stock values.
4.5 quantitative analysis
In this section we present the findings of the perfect foresight solu-
tion of the two models namely the financial frictions BGG model and
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Figure 21: Growth Accounting 2008-2017 (Index 2008=100)
the NG model. We split our sample in two different time spans: the
“before crisis” period, 2000:2007, and the “great depression” period,
2008:2017. Lastly, we provide a full sample analysis for the period
2000:2017. We begin our analysis by presenting the two models when
the only source of fluctuations is the TFP factor. Next, we will show
how the analysis changes when we include a series for the idiosyn-
cratic variance of the BGG model.
We provide a number of different statistics and exercises in order
to check the models performance and how they fit to the data for
four macro variables of interests: GDP per capita, capital, labour and
TFP factors. Table 8 shows the levels of these four variables from the
perfect foresight simulation of each model along with the data levels
of the same variables at the end of each sub-period. The values are
normalized with the value of each variable at the beginning of each
period. Table 9 presents the average annual growth of each variable
from the models’ simulation and the data.
Overall, the predicted variable levels and growth rates of both mod-
els seem to be very close to the values corresponding in the data. TFP
fluctuations seem to be an important factor in explaining the perfor-
mance of the Greek economy in both the pre-crisis and the post-crisis
periods using either the BGG or the NG models. Notably, both mod-
els can account well for the great depression episode especially in
terms of the real per capita GDP. The annual average GDP growth in
data for the depression period is -2.36% while BGG predicts a drop
of 2.60% and the NG a 2.87% reduction in GDP. The models’ perfor-
mance is less robust in the pre-crisis period with a deviation from
the true real per capita GDP growth rate of almost 1% (2.02% in the
BGG model compared to a 3% in the data). The two models perform
equally in predicting the capital factor values while in predicting the
labour factor the NG model comes first. This can be attributed in the
high elasticity of labour supply used in the baseline calibration. We
will show later how this changes to different values of the elasticity.
We proceed with a detailed analysis of the models’ performance in
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each sub-period by showing the the predicted values of each model
relative to the data values for each variable.
Components Data BGG NG
2007 (2000 = 100)
Detrended Real per Capita GDP 120.6 117.19 119.16
TFP Factor 111.60 111.60 111.60
Capital Factor 104.77 97.78 99.54
Labour Factor 108.13 104.80 105.00
2017 (2008 = 100)
Detrended Real per Capita GDP 74.99 78.38 76.52
TFP Factor 77.15 77.15 77.15
Capital Factor 117.12 107.15 107.81
Labour Factor 88.67 95.29 89.38
Table 8: Data, BGG and NG models (levels)
Components Data BGG NG
2000-2008
Real per Capita GDP 2,92 2.35 2.57
TFP Factor 1.37 2.30 2.30
Capital Factor 0.58 -0.54 -0.30
Labour Factor 0.97 0.65 0.85
2008-2017
Real per Capita GDP -2.46 -2.60 -2.87
TFP Factor -2.88 -2.73 -2.73
Capital Factor 1.75 0.89 0.83
Labour Factor -1.33 -0.52 -1.20
2000-2017
Real per Capita GDP 0.07 0.48 0.77
TFP Factor -0.88 -0.76 -0.76
Capital Factor 1.20 0.52 0.56
Labour Factor -0.24 0.06 -0.01
Table 9: Data, BGG and NG models (average annual changes)
4.5.1 Great Depression 2008:2017
The Greek great depression period is characterised by a drop of the
real per capita GDP by 26.3% between 2008 and 2013 and a subse-
quent gradual growth. Both models match those two facts relatively
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well. Figure 22 shows the model and data paths of the four macro
variables relative to their 2008 value. In predicting the real per capita
GDP, both models do well for the recession period. The timing of the
output drop and the subsequent output stabilization is correct. Nev-
ertheless, they cannot capture the full magnitude of the output drop.
Both models predict a drop of about 3 percent lower than the ac-
tual shown by the data. Lastly, although BGG follows closely the NG
model, it deviates significantly after 2014 predicting a faster growth
than the BGG prediction and the one shown by the actual data.
To enhance the understanding of the propagation mechanism, Fig-
ure 23 shows the paths for the price of capital, consumption, invest-
ment and the deposit interest rate for BGG and return of capital for
the NG. All variables except interest rates are expressed as relative
deviations from the first period. Interest rates are reported in levels.
After the negative TFP innovation at the start of the Greek depres-
sion, Tobin’s Q, the price of capital, drops. This reduces the demand
for capital and thus investment. At the same time, an increase in the
deposit interest rate reduces consumption for the BGG model sub-
stantially more than the NG model’s consumption. Since agents can
perfectly predict the future (increasing) path of interest rates, their in-
tertemporal substitution decision leads to more bank deposits which
in this frictionless credit setting lead to a higher volume of loans.
Therefore, the high supply of loans counteracts with the reduction in
the price of capital resulting to a drop in investment which is rela-
tively smaller than the one observed in the NG model. Consumption
for the BGG model drops more than the NG. The reduction, in abso-
lute terms, is even lower than the reduction in investment. This leads
to a lower GDP per capita during the crisis predicted by the BGG. The
fast recovery of the investment in the BGG model after 2012, pushes
the real per capita GDP of the model higher compared to the NG.
In predicting the capital factor path, both models perform simi-
larly, underestimating its true path given by the data by almost 10
points. The labour factor path given by the data is undoubtedly bet-
ter matched by the NG model. The absence of any friction in the
NG setting and the high labour elasticity in our baseline calibration
can explain this predictive power. On the other hand, BGG performs
poorly on capturing the labour factor. It is able to encapsulate only
the negative sign of the labour factor growth during the great depres-
sion period.
4.5.2 Pre-Crisis 2000:2007
Apart from the ability of the models to capture the crisis, we are also
interested in observing their performance during the growth period
before the crisis. Figure 24 shows the results of the simulations to-
gether with the data for the pre-crisis period. All model and data
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Figure 22: Crisis Period I. Index (2008=100)
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Figure 23: Crisis Period II. Index (2008=100)
variables are expressed relative to their 2000 value. The detrended
real per capita Greek GDP experienced an increase of 20.6% by 2007
compared to its value in 2000. Clearly, both models successfully cap-
ture this increasing behaviour of the Greek GDP during that period.
In detail, they seem to over-perform compared to the actual data until
2004 and under-perform when the Greek per capita GDP skyrockets
after 2005. This is also evident from the average annual changes pre-
sented in Table 9. While the GDP annual growth in data is 3.49%,
the BGG predicts a 2.35% and the NG 2.57% growth every year. The
capital factor is more closely predicted by the model without finan-
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cial frictions. Notably, although the data shows that the capital factor
steadily increases, both models show a gradual drop until 2004 fol-
lowed by an increase after 2006. In terms of the labour factor, both
models predict its increase but the NG model, similarly to the crisis
period, doing a more consistent prediction.
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Figure 24: Pre - Crisis Period. Index (2000=100)
4.5.3 Full Sample 2000:2017
Observing the full sample we can have a more complete insight of
how the two models perform relative to the data. Figure 25 shows
the path of per capita GDP, capital, labour and TFP factor for the
period 2000:2017. All variables are expressed in terms of their 2008
value. Both models perform well in capturing the recession as we
have already seen in the Great Depression section. At the same time
both models overestimate the increase of the 2000:2008 period when
GDP is plotted relative to its 2008 value. As we’ve already seen, both
models lack in their prediction of the capital factor and, especially
during crisis, labour factor is predicted better by the NG.
4.5.4 The BGG Model with Exogenous Change in Idiosyncratic Variance
In the previous analysis, we showed the performance of the mod-
els when the TFP series was the only source of fluctuations. In this
section, we take advantage of the BGG model’s rich setting and we
add one more source of exogenous disturbance in the model to see
whether it improves the model’s performance: the cross sectional dis-
persion in ψ, the idiosyncratic shock each entrepreneur receives. This
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risk shock as introduced by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) is
proxied by the economic uncertainty index for Greece by Hardouvelis
et al. (2018). To enhance the intuition the index is plotted in Figure
26.
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Figure 26: Economic Uncertainty Index
Results for the great depression period are plotted in Figure 27.
There are no significant differences between the case of including
both the risk shock and the TFP as source of fluctuation and the case
of including the TFP only (section 4.5.1). The model predicts a very
similar path for the per capita GDP which is very close to the actual
one. It does a better prediction in the case of the capital factor and per-
forms worse in predicting the labour factor. Figures for the other two
sub periods, the post-crisis and the full sample are in the Appendix.
There are two explanations on why the introduction of the uncer-
tainty index does not change the model’s predictions significantly
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and most importantly does not improve them. Firstly, the index might
not be that informative for the model as the TFP series. Secondly, due
to low monitoring costs of the model’s calibration, the risk shock does
not have a significant impact on the model’s predictions. Monitoring
costs are calibrated such as to reach the default target in the steady
state, 3%. Therefore, increasing the monitoring costs, deviating from
the baseline calibration, will have an effect on the impact of the uncer-
tainty index. Lastly, since the agents can have perfect foresight of the
future risk shocks, this makes the impact of less magnitude. A depart
from the perfect foresight hypothesis, will enhance the difference of
the two series.
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Figure 27: Impulse Response Functions - The Case of Risk Shock
4.5.5 Changes in the Elasticity of Labour Supply
The elasticity of labour supply is of particular interest in contempo-
rary macroeconomic models since it crucially determines how em-
ployment, and hence output, responds to fluctuations in productivity.
There is a long-standing debate between macro and micro-estimates
of the labour supply elasticity.9 Micro studies typically estimate small
labour supply elasticities (0-0.5) while macro models’ calibration im-
ply a higher number for this elasticity (around 2-4).
Determining the robustness of the predictions of the two models is
a crucial point for our analysis. In this section, we present the mod-
els’ simulations for different values of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in labour supply. Comparisons between different model
9 See Chetty et al. (2011), Keane and Rogerson (2012) among others.
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calibrations regarding the labour supply elasticity are motivated by
Beaudry and Portier (2002) who perform a similar exercise for the
French Depression in the 1930s using a similar methodology. They
find that the two versions of their model with low and high labour
elasticity produce very different results.
Our baseline calibration implies a labour supply elasticity of 2 (
is 0.5), consistent to recent studies calibrated to the Greek economy.
We perform four different simulations for each of the two models re-
ducing each time the labour supply elasticity. Equivalently, bringing
its value closer to the micro estimates. The Frisch inverse elasticity
of labour supply varies from 0.5 (baseline) to 2 meaning a range of
the labour supply elasticity from 2 to 0.5. Our goal is to identify the
importance the elasticity plays in our models’ predictions. Results for
the Greek great depression period are plotted in Figure 28 for the NG
model and in Figure 29 for the BGG.
Not surprisingly, a small change in the labour supply elasticity
changes both models’ path. We firstly focus on the NG model perfor-
mance shown in Figure 28. Under our baseline calibration, the main
predictive advantage of the NG model relative to the BGG was the es-
timation of the labour factor path. Up to 2012, the predicted path was
very close to the true one with a small deviation of 3 points until 2017.
In the present exercise, as the parameter dictating the labour elasticity
increases and the labour elasticity declines this predictive ability is no
longer present, at least in the same level. A change of 0.5 in  (from
0.5 to 1) changes the predicted labour factor path by 5 points. As the
elasticity continues to decrease, the deviation of the predicted labour
factor from the true path increases. This has direct effects on the esti-
mation of per capita GDP. The predicted path for the per capita GDP
underestimates the recession as elasticity increases. Lastly, the change
in the parameter is bringing capital factor path slightly closer to the
data.
The performance of the BGG model, (Figure 29) is also affected by
the elasticity changes but significantly less than the NG. In particular,
in contrast to the NG, the estimates of the real per capita GDP are very
stable along the parameter space. The deviations from the true path
of the labour factor increase as the elasticity goes up while capital
factor is brought closer to the true path.
A main takeaway of the above exercise is the dependence of the
simple neoclassical growth model to the parameter that dictates the
labour elasticity. As shown, the higher the elasticity, the greater the
deviation of the true labour factor and consequently the per capita
GDP. The BGG model seem more tolerant to changes in the elasticity.
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Figure 28: Changes in the labour supply elasticity : NG
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Figure 29: Changes in the labour supply elasticity : BGG
4.6 conclusion
Greece, at the onset of the financial crisis, experienced a severe re-
cession. The Greek real per capita output experienced a shortfall of
26.3 percent from 2008 to 2013. In this paper we identify and anal-
yse Greece’s great depression episode in 2008:2017 from a neoclassi-
cal perspective. Following the literature commenced by Kehoe and
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Prescott (2002) we study whether the Greek great depression can be
explained by the TFP growth changes. To pursue this we use two
models, the neoclassical growth model and the Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999). We assess their predictive power when the TFP
is exogenous. Our results suggest that the two models can account
rather well for this incident: changes in TFP are crucial in accounting
for the Greek great depression. Given the exogenous path of TFP both
models predict a big decline in economic activity since 2008 and until
2013, and a relative recovery for the period 2013-2017. This is exactly
what happened in Greece during this period. In terms of timing, both
concerning the peaks–troughs, as well as the paths as a whole, for
most key macroeconomic variables our model economy moves syn-
chronously with the data. Additionally, we feed to the BGG model the
uncertainty index by Hardouvelis et al. (2018) to improve its predic-
tive power. Simulations show that there is a non-significant difference
with the simulations using only the TFP as exogenous variable. How-
ever, puzzles between theory’s predictions and the observed data are
not missing. For instance, both models predict a lower than actually
observed recession, implying that the TFP factor is not the only fac-
tor responsible for the Greek great depression and other exogenous
factors such as monetary or fiscal policy might be of importance.
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A
A P P E N D I X F O R C H A P T E R 2
a.1 household’s problem
Let uc,t denote the marginal utility of consumption and Λt,t`1 de-
note the household’s stochastic discount factor (the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution):
Λt,t`1 ” βuc,t`1
uc,t
, (A.1.1)
uc,t “ pCt ´ γCt´1q´1 ´βEt γpCt`1 ´ γCtq´1.
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household prob-
lem, the Lagrangian is
L “ Et
8ÿ
i“0
βi
 
lnpCt`i ´ γCt`i´1q ´ χ
1` N
1`
t`i ` λtrWtNt `Πt ` RtDh,t
´pCt ` Tt `Dh,t`1qs
(
.
The first order conditions yield:
θL
θCt
: uc,t ´ λt “ 0 (A.1.2)
θL
θDh,t`1
: ´λt `βλt`1pRt`1q “ 0 (A.1.3)
θL
θNt
: ´χNt ` λtWt “ 0 (A.1.4)
Combining (A.1.2) and (A.1.3) we get the Euler equation
EtΛt,t`1Rt`1 “ 1
and by combining (A.1.2) and (A.1.4) we get the optimality condition
for labour supply
uc,tWt “ χNt
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a.2 entrepreneur’s problem
Let L be the Lagrangian of the maximization problem and λet the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the zero profit condition.
L “ r1´ ΓpĘψt`1qRk,t`1QtKt`1s ` λet rRk,tQtKtrΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qs
´Rt`1pQtKt ´Netqs.
The first order and Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximization
problem are:
θL
θKt
: 1´ ΓpĘψt`1qRk,t`1 ` λet rΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qRk,t`1 ´ Rt`1s “ 0
(A.2.1)
θL
θĘψt`1 : ´Γ 1pĘψt`1q ` λet rΓ 1pĘψt`1q ´ µG 1pĘψt`1qs “ 0
(A.2.2)
From equation A.2.2 we get
λt “ Γ
1pĘψt`1q
Γ 1pĘψt`1q ´ µG 1pĘψt`1q . (A.2.3)
Inserting A.2.3 to A.2.1 we get:
Rk,t “ Γ
1pĘψt`1q
pΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qqΓ 1pĘψt`1q ` p1´ ΓpĘψt`1qqpΓ 1pĘψt`1q ´ µG 1pĘψt`1qRt,
which gives the external finance premium as shown in the BGG:
Et Rk,t`1 “ Et ρpĘψt`1qRt`1
where ρpĘψt`1q is given by
ρpĘψt`1q “ Γ 1pĘψt`1qrpΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qqΓ 1pĘψt`1q ` p1´ ΓpĘψt`1qpΓ 1pĘψt`1q ´ µG 1pĘψt`1qqs .
a.3 entrepreneur’s choice of remain
Proof. The zero profit condition is
Rk,tQtKtrΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qs ě Rt`1pQtKt ´Netq
and divided by Net becomes
Rk,t
QtKt
Net
rΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qs ě Rt`1pQtKt
Net
´ 1q.
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Substituting the definition of Net
Rk,t
QtKt
pσE ` ξqp1´ ΓpĎψtqqRk,tQt´1Kt´1 rΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qs
ě Rt`1p QtKtpσE ` ξqp1´ ΓpĎψtqqRk,tQt´1Kt´1 ´ 1q,
we have
rΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qs
pσE ` ξqp1´ ΓpĎψtqq ě Rt`1p 1pσE ` ξqp1´ ΓpĎψtqqRk,t ´ 1q
and we get the equation for σet
σet “ 1
Rkp1´ ΓpĎψtqq ´ ΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qRtp1´ ΓpĎψtqq ´ ξ
and the derivative with respect to ψ¯
Bσet
Bsψ “ Γ 1pĎψtqqRkrRkp1´ Γ 1pĎψtqqs2 ´ Γ
1pĘψt`1q ´ µG 1pĘψt`1q
Rtp1´ Γ 1pĎψtqqq
´ΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qRtΓ 1pĘψt`1qrRtpp1´ Γ 1pĎψtqqs2 .
The σE,t the values of r0, 1s (so it is actually a probability measure),
when ψ¯ P r0.49, 0.65s, everything else remain constant. In the calibra-
tion there should be a restriction in the values of ψ¯. That is in the
variance of ψ¯, σψ.
For those values of ψ¯ as ψ increases, σE,t decreases. Hence the
derivative is negative for those values. The path of σE,t for the values
of ψ¯ is shown in Figure 30.
As ψ¯ increases the probability of default increase too. It is much
more likely for ψ ď ψ¯. Therefore, as the probability of default in-
creases, the remain probability decrease up to the point it becomes
zero.
a.4 bank’s problem
This appendix describes the method used for solving the banker’s
problem. I solve this, with the method of undetermined coefficient in
the same fashion as in Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010. I conjecture that a
value function has the following linear form:
Vtplj,t,dj,t, xj,t,mj,tq “ νl,j,tlj,tp1´ pq ` νx,j,txj,t
´νd,j,tdj,t ´ νm,j,tmj,t ´Φpxtq, (A.4.1)
where νs,j,t is the marginal value from credit for bank j, νd,t the
marginal cost of deposits, νx,j,t the marginal value from the deposit
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Figure 30: Path of σE,t for the values of ψ¯
facility and νm,j,t the marginal cost of the emergency funding. The
banker’s decision problem is to choose sj,t, xj,t,dj,t,mj,t to maximize
Vj,t subject to the incentive constraint (17) and the balance sheet con-
straint (14). Using (14) we can eliminate dj,t from the value function.
This yields:
Vj,t “ lj,tpνl,tp1´ pq ´ νd,tq ` xj,tpνx,j,t ´ νd,j,tq ´mj,tpνm,j,t ´ νd,j,tq
`νk,j,tQtkt ` νd,tnBj,t ´Φpxtq.
I define the ratio of excess liquidity to the net worth as
Υt “ xt
nBt
and assume that the reserves penalty function has the following form:
Φpxtq “
´κ
2
Υ2tn
B
t ` Υt
¯
ζt.
Let L be the Lagrangian of the maximization problem and λt the
Lagrange multiplier.
L “ Vt`λtrVt´θpp1´pqlt´ωmtqs “ p1`λtqVt´λtθpp1´pqlt´ωmtq.
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The first order and Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximization
problem are:
θL
θlj,t
: p1` λtqpνl,j,tp1´ pq ´ νd,tq “ λtp1´ pqθ (A.4.2)
θL
θχj,t
: p1` λtqppνx,j,t ´ νd,tqnt ´ κΥtntq “ 0 (A.4.3)
θL
θmj,t
: p1` λtqpνm,t ´ νd,j,tq “ ωλtθ (A.4.4)
θL
θkj,t
: p1` λtqνk,j,tQt “ 0 (A.4.5)
Equation (A.4.3) shows the optimal rule for the reserves’ supply of
the bank:
νx,j,t ´ νd,j,t “ κΥt ´ .
The Kuhn-Tucker condition yields:
KT : λtrlj,tpνl,j,tp1´ pq ´ νd,tq ` xj,tpνx,j,t ´ νd,j,tq
´mj,tpνm,j,t ´ νd,j,tq ` νd,j,tnBj,t ´Φt ´ θpp1´ pqlj,t ´ωmj,tqs “ 0.
(A.4.6)
I define the excess value of bank’s financial claim holdings as
µt “ νl,j,tp1´ pq ´ νd,j,t. (A.4.7)
The excess cost to a bank of LTRO credit relative to deposits
µmt “ νm,j,t ´ νd,j,t.
Then from the first order conditions we have:
µmt “ ωµt 11´ p . (A.4.8)
From (A.4.6) and (A.4.8) when the constraint is binding pλt ą 0q we
get:
lj,tpνl,tp1´ pq ´ νd,tq ` xj,tpνx,j,t ´ νd,j,tq ´mj,tpνm,j,t ´ νd,j,tq
`νd,tnj,t ´Φt “ θpp1´ pqlt ´ωmtq ñ
ñ lj,tpνl,tp1´ pq ´ νd,tq `ΥtntpκΥtq ´mj,tpνm,j,t ´ νd,j,tq
`νd,tnj,t ´ κ
2
Υ2tnt “ θpp1´ pqlt ´ωmtq ñ
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ñ lj,tpνl,tp1´ pq ´ νd,tq ´mj,tpνm,j,t ´ νd,j,tq
`νd,tnj,t ` κ
2
Υ2tnt “ θpp1´ pqlt ´ωmtq ñ
ñ lj,tpθp1´ pq ´ µtq ´mj,tpωθ´ µmt q “ νd,tnj,t ` κ2Υ
2
tnt ñ
ñ lj,tpθp1´ pq ´ µtq ´mj,tpωθ´ωµt 1
1´ pq “ νd,tnj,t `
κ
2
Υ2tnt ñ
ñ lj,tpθp1´ pq ´ µtq ´ 1
1´ pωmj,tpθp1´ pq ´ µtq “ νd,tnj,t `
κ
2
Υ2tnt,
and by rearranging terms, we get equation (22) on the main text :
lj,t ´ 1
1´ ppωmj,tq “
pνd,j,t ` κ2Υ2tqnt
θp1´ pq ´ µt ,
which gives the bank asset funding. It is given by the constraint at
equality, where φt is the maximum leverage allowed for the bank.
The constraint limits the portfolio size to the point where the bank’s
incentive to cheat is exactly balanced by the cost of losing the fran-
chise value. Hence, in times of crisis, where a deterioration of banks’
net worth takes place, supply for assets will decline.
Now, in order to find the unknown coefficients I return to the
guessed value function
Vj,t “ lj,tpµtq`xj,tpνx,j,t´νd,j,tq´mj,tpµmt q`νd,tnBj,t´Φt. (A.4.9)
Substituting (22) into the guessed value function yields:
Vt “ pnj,tφt ` 1
1´ ppωmj,tqqµt ` xj,tκΥt ´mj,tµ
m
t ` νd,j,tnj,t ´Φt ñ
ñ Vt “ pnj,tφt ` 1
1´ ppωmj,tqqµt ` κΥ
2
tnt ´mj,tµmt ` νd,j,tnj,t ´ κ2Υ
2
tnt ñ
ñ Vt “ nj,tpφtµt ` νd,j,t ` κ
2
Υ2tq ´mj,tpµmt ´ωµt 11´ pq,
(A.4.10)
and by (A.4.8) the guessed value function (A.4.10) becomes:
Vt “ nBj,tpφtµt ` νd,j,t ` κ2Υ
2
tq.
Given the linearity of the value function we get that
AB “ φtµt ` νd,j,t ` κ
2
Υ2t . (A.4.11)
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The Bellman equation (18) now is:
Vj,t´1psj,t´1, xj,t´1,dj,t,mj,t´1q “ Et´1Λt´1,t
8ÿ
i“1
tp1´ σBqnBj,t
` σBpφtµt ` νd,j,t ` κ
2
Υ2tqnBj,tu. (A.4.12)
By collecting terms with nj,t the common factor and defining the
variable Ωt as the marginal value of net worth:
Ωt`1 “ p1´ σBq ` σBpµt`1φt`1 ` νd,t`1 ` κ
2
Υ2tq. (A.4.13)
The Bellman equation becomes:
Vj,tpsj,t, xj,t,dj,t,mj,tq “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1nBt`1 “
“ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1rRk,tlj,t´1p1´ pq ` Rx,txj,t ´ Rtdj,t ´ Rm,tmj,t ´Φts.
(A.4.14)
The marginal value of net worth implies the following: Bankers who
exit with probability p1´ σBq have a marginal net worth value of 1.
Bankers who survive and continue with probability σB, by gaining
one more unit of net worth, they can increase their assets by φt and
have a net profit of µt per assets. By this action they acquire also the
marginal cost of deposits νd,t which is saved by the extra amount
of net worth instead of an additional unit of deposits and also the
additional cost of reserves κ2Υ
2
t . Using the method of undetermined
coefficients and comparing (A.4.1) with (A.4.14) we have the final
solutions for the coefficients:
νl,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1Rl,t`1
νx,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1Rx,t`1
νm,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1Rm,t`1
νd,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1Rt`1
µt “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1rRl,t`1p1´ pq ´ Rt`1s
µxt “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1rRx,t`1 ´ Rt`1s (A.4.15)
µmt “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1rRm,t`1 ´ Rt`1s (A.4.16)
The first order condition (A.4.2) implies that when the incentive
constraint is not binding (λt “ 0), µt “ 0 the spread is zero, but in
the case where constraint is binding (λt ą 0) excess value of assets
is positive µt ą 0. The same follows for µxt and µmt by equations
(A.4.3) and (??) respectively. An important feature is that two effects
take place to form the marginal value of the loans for the bank. The
one is the case of the binding constraint and the other is the case of
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increased default probability. Taking equations (A.4.7) and the FOC
(A.4.2) we have that
νl,j,t “ λtp1` λtqθ` νd,j,t
1
1´ p .
The marginal value from extending a unit of loan is equal to the
marginal cost from getting deposits which is increasing in default (as
the banks’ net worth is decreasing), plus the cost from the binding
constraint.
From (A.4.9) we can get the following relationship between the ex-
pected loan rate, the riskless rate and the default probability.
EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1Rl,t`1 “ λtp1` λtqθ` EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1Rt`1
1
1´ ppψtq
(A.4.17)
.
This shows the two effects on the expected loan rate. The first, is
due to the binding funding constraints for the bankers. This can be
referred as the liquidity component. The second one reflects the com-
pensation that bankers demand when the firms’ probability of default
increases. This can be called as risk component.
B
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b.1 equilibrium analysis
Algebraic manipulation of the optimality conditions can provide us
with some analytical results to gain intuition of the model. Using the
consumption aggregator (33), the labour supply aggregator (34) and
the optimality conditions of the two consumers (29), (32) we get the
following relationship of aggregate consumption, wage and the share
of Keynesian agents.
Ct “λCKt ` p1´ λqCRt
Ct “λWtLKt ` p1´ λq Wt
χpLRt q
Ct “λWtLKt ` p1´ λqWtχ
ˆ
1´ λ
Lt ´ λLKt
˙
Ct “WtrλLKt ` p1´ λq
1`
χ
pLt ´ λLKt q´s. (B.1.1)
Solving with respect to the real wageWt “ rλLKt `p1´λq1` pLt´λL
K
t q´
χ s´1Ct
and substituting back to optimality condition (29) of the Ricardian
agents using the labour aggregator as well yields a condition linking
the aggregate consumption with the Keynesian consumption:
CRt “ κRpLtqCt (B.1.2)
where κRpLtq “ p1´λqp1´λq1``λLKt χpLt´λLKt q . The level of the Ricardian
agents consumption depends on the aggregate consumption by a
function κRpLtq which is decreasing in total hours worked. A key
take-away of this decomposition is that function κRpLtq due to the
very form of the utility function of the agents depends only on aggre-
gate labour, since the optimal hours worked for the Keynesian agents,
LK, is always constant.
Applying the same procedure for the Keynesian agents optimality
condition (32), yields:
CKt “ κKpLtqCt
where κKpLtq “ pLKt q´λLKt χ`p1´λq1`pLt´λLKt q´ . This is very similar to the
Ricardians consumptions schedule. The difference is that this is in-
creasing to the total hours worked. Due to the strong non-linearity of
125
126 appendix for chapter 3
both κRpLtq and κKpLtq functions, Figure 31 shows the paths of both
functions to changes in aggregate hours worked in steady state.
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Figure 31: Path of the consumption multiplier for Ricardians (κR) and Key-
nesian (κK) agents
Notice here that as λ Ñ 0, there are no rule of thumb agents and
κR Ñ 0, that is the Ricardians consumption moves one to one with
the aggregate. As λ Ñ 1, the only rule of thumb agents economy,
κK Ñ 1.
Using (B.1.2) we can rephrase the Euler equation of the Ricardian
agents in aggregate terms. The new aggregate Euler equation is then:
EtΛ
T
t,t`1Rd,t`1 “ 1 (B.1.3)
with the new aggregate stochastic discount factor using utcR,tu “ uc,tκR :
ΛTt,t`1 ” βuc,t`1uc,t
κRpLtq
κRpLt`1q .
where now uc,t denotes the marginal utility of the total consumption.
Note that up to a first order approximation
log κRpLtq “ log κRpLq ´ ωλ
θu
lt
where ωλ “ λLKχpL´λLKqλLKχpL´λLKq`p1´λq1` and θu “ L´λL
K
L .
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Proof: We know that logκRpLtq “  logp1´ λq ´ logrp1´ λq1` `
λLKt χpLt ´ λLKt qs Taking a first order Taylor expansion of logκRpLtq
at Lt “ L:
log κRpLtq “ log κRpLq´rp1´λq1``λLKχpL´λLKqs´1λLKχpL´λLKq´1pLt´Lq
Multiplying and dividing by LpL´ λLKq and using the fact that lt “
Lt´L
L we get the above equation.
Using this fact, the log-linearised version of the aggregate Euler
equation:
ct “ Ettct`1u ´ prt ´Ettpit`1uq ´ ωλ
θu
∆lt`1
b.2 steady state
As it is shown on the main text, the Keynesian agents will always
supply constant labour hours equal to and the first order condition
for labour supply the Keynesian agent:
LK “
ˆ
1
χ
˙p 11` q
From labour hours the aggregator (34) we get the labour hours sup-
plied by the Ricardian agents:
LR “ L´ λL
K
1´ λ .
Rearranging the Ricardian agents’ first order condition for labour, uti-
lizing the fact that URc “ 1{CR, we can get an expression between
consumption of the agents and labour supply:
CR “ W
χpLRq .
Utilizing the above relation and the optimal consumption path of the
Keynesian agents, the consumption aggregator (33) becomes
C “ λWLK ` p1´ λq W
χpLRq .
After some algebraic manipulation we end up to the total consump-
tion coming from the demand side of the economy:
C “W
„
λLK ` p1´ λq1` pL´ λL
Kq´
χ

(B.2.1)
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In addition, from the resource constraint we have:
C “ Y ´ I´G´ τbBG ´ τsSG,
where in a steady state BG “ SG “ 0. Therefore:
C “ L
„
p1´ γq
ˆ
K
L
˙α
´ δ K
N

(B.2.2)
To get an expression of K{L we make use of the marginal product
of capital (52):
L
K
“ p Z
Aα
q 11´α ,
yielding
K
L
“
˜
α
`
´1

˘
Rk ´ p1´ δq
¸ 1
1´α
. (B.2.3)
Thus, combining the expressions (B.2.1), (B.2.2), (B.2.3) we obtain
an equation depending only on parameters, calibrated values (spreadRk)
and Lk and determines steady state hours L. Having found L, using
the labour hours aggregator (34) we can easily find the labour hours
worked by the Keynesian agents LR. Thus, consumption of the Ricar-
dian agents can be pinned down. Notice that an equation between
Ricardians’ consumption and aggregate consumption can be found
by combining the first order condition for labour supply and the de-
mand side aggregate consumption equation(B.2.1) and solving for W.
Then:
CR “ Cp1´ λq
{χ
λLRpL´ λLRq ` p1´ λq1`{χ (B.2.4)
b.3 bank’s problem
This appendix describes the method used for solving the banker’s
problem. I solve this, with the method of undetermined coefficient in
the same fashion as in Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010. I conjecture that a
value function has the following linear form:
Vtpsj,t,dj,t,bBj,t,mBj,tq “ νl,j,tsj,t`νb,j,tbBj,t`νmB,j,tmBj,t´νd,j,tdj,t
(B.3.1)
where νs,j,t is the marginal value from credit for bank j, νd,t the
marginal cost of deposits, νmB,j,t the marginal value from the central
bank reserves and νbB,j,t the marginal value from purchasing one
extra unit of sovereign bonds. The banker’s decision problem is to
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choose sj,t,bBj,t,m
B
j,t,dj,t to maximize Vj,t subject to the minimum
capital requirement constraint (38) and the balance sheet constraint
(36). Using (36) we can eliminate dj,t from the value function. This
yields:
Vj,t “ sj,tpνs,t´νd,tQtq`bBj,tpνb,j,t´νd,j,tqtq`mBj,tpνm,j,t´νd,j,tq`νd,tnBj,t.
Let L be the Lagrangian of the maximization problem and λt the
Lagrange multiplier.
L “ Vt ` λtrVt ´ θpQtsj,t `∆qtbBj,t `ωmBj,tqs “ p1` λtqVt
´λtθpQtsj,t `∆qtbBj,t `ωmBj,tq.
The first order and Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximization
problem are:
θL
θsj,t
: p1` λtqpνs,j,t
Qt
´ νd,j,tq “ λtθ (B.3.2)
θL
θbBj,t
: p1` λtqpνbB,t
qt
´ νd,j,tq “ ∆λtθ (B.3.3)
θL
θmBj,t
: p1` λtqpνmB,t ´ νd,j,tq “ ωλtθ (B.3.4)
The Kuhn-Tucker condition yields:
KT : λtrsj,tpνs,j,t ´ νd,tQtq ` bBj,tpνbB,j,t ´ νd,j,tqtq `mBj,tpνmB,j,t ´ νd,j,tq
` νd,j,tnBj,t ´ θpQtsj,t `∆qtbBj,t `ωmBj,tqs “ 0. (B.3.5)
I define the excess value of bank’s financial claim holdings as
µst “
νs,j,t
Qt
´ νd,j,t. (B.3.6)
The excess value of bank’s bond holdings relative to deposits
µbt “
νbB,t
qt
´ νd,j,t,
and the excess value of bank’s reserve holdings relative to deposits
µmt “ νmB,j,t ´ νd,j,t.
Then from the first order conditions we have:
µbt “ ∆µst . (B.3.7)
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If we implement the Basel III direction of attaching 0% of risk-
weighting to reserves (ω “ 0), the reserves first order condition (B.3.4)
implies that
νmB,t “ νd,j,t. (B.3.8)
This relationship implies that the gain from one extra unit of reserves
is exactly the same with the cost of raising one extra unit of deposits.
This helps us to show that when reserves is a strictly riskless asset, the
bank is not taking them into account when the optimization problem
is formulated. From (B.3.5) and (B.3.7) when the constraint is binding
pλt ą 0q we get:
sj,tpνs,t ´ νd,tQtq ` bBj,tpνbB,j,t ´ νd,j,tqtq `mBj,tpνBm,j,t ´ νd,j,tq
`νd,tnj,t “ θpQtsj,t `∆qtbBj,t `ωmBj,tq ñ
ñ sj,tpµstQtq ` bBj,tpµbt qtq `mBj,tpµmt q
`νd,tnj,t “ θpQtsj,t `∆qtbBj,t `ωmBj,tq ñ
ñ Qtsj,tpµst ´ θq ` qtbBj,tp∆µst ´∆θq `mBj,tpωµst ´ωθq
`νd,tnj,t “ 0ñ
ñ Qtsj,tpµst ´ θq `∆qtbBj,tpµst ´ θq `ωmBj,tpµst ´ θq
`νd,tnj,t “ 0,
and by rearranging terms, we get equation the adjusted leverage con-
straint:
Qtsj,t `∆qtbBj,t `ωmBj,t “
νd,tnj,t
θ´ µst
(B.3.9)
which gives the bank asset funding. It is given by the constraint at
equality, where φt is the maximum leverage allowed for the bank.
The constraint limits the portfolio size to the point where the bank’s
required capital is exactly balanced by the fraction of the risk-weighted
measure of its assets. Hence, in times of crisis, where a deterioration
of banks’ net worth takes place, supply for assets will decline.
Now, in order to find the unknown coefficients I return to the
guessed value function
Vj,t “ Qtsj,tpµstq ` qtbBj,tpµbt q `mBj,tpµmt q ` νd,tnBj,t. (B.3.10)
Substituting (B.3.9) into the guessed value function yields:
Vt “ pnj,tφt ´∆qtbBj,t ´ωmBj,tqµst ` qtbBj,tpµbt q `mBj,tpµmt q ` νd,tnBj,t ñ
Vt “ pnj,tφtqµst ` qtbBj,tpµbt ´∆µstq `mBj,tpµmt ´ωµstq ` νd,tnBj,t,
(B.3.11)
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and by (B.3.7) the guessed value function (B.3.11) becomes:
Vt “ pnj,tφtqµst ` νd,j,tnj,t
Given the linearity of the value function we get that
AB “ φtµst ` νd,j,t. (B.3.12)
The Bellman equation (39) now is:
Vj,t´1psj,t´1, xj,t´1,dj,t,mj,t´1q “ Et´1Λt´1,t
8ÿ
i“1
tp1´ σBqnBj,t
` σBpφtµst ` νd,j,tqnBj,tu. (B.3.13)
By collecting terms with nj,t the common factor and defining the
variable Ωt as the marginal value of net worth:
Ωt`1 “ p1´ σBq ` σBpµst`1φt`1 ` νd,t`1q. (B.3.14)
The Bellman equation becomes:
Vj,tpsj,t,bBj,t,mBj,t,dj,tq “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1nBt`1 “
“ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1rRk,tQt´1sj,t´1 ` Rb,tqt´1bBj,t´1 ` RtmBj,t ´ Rtdj,ts.
(B.3.15)
The marginal value of net worth implies the following: Bankers who
exit with probability p1´ σBq have a marginal net worth value of 1.
Bankers who survive and continue with probability σB, by gaining
one more unit of net worth, they can increase their assets by φt and
have a net profit of µt per assets. By this action they acquire also the
marginal cost of deposits νd,t which is saved by the extra amount
of net worth instead of an additional unit of deposits and also the
additional cost of reserves κ2Υ
2
t . Using the method of undetermined
coefficients and comparing (B.3.1) with (B.3.15) we have the final so-
lutions for the coefficients:
νs,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1Rk,t`1Qt
νbB,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1Rb,t`1qt
νmB,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1Rt`1
νd,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1Rt`1
µst “
νs,j,t
Qt
´ νd,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1rRk,t`1 ´ Rt`1s
µbt “
νb,j,t
Qt
´ νd,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1rRb,t`1 ´ Rt`1s
(B.3.16)
µmt “ νm,j,t ´ νd,j,t “ EtΛt,t`1Ωt`1rRt`1 ´ Rt`1s “ 0
(B.3.17)
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b.4 some derivations
Proof of (54):
ct “ λcKt ` p1´ λqcRt
ct “ λwt ` p1´ λqpwt ´ nRt q
ct “ λwt ` p1´ λqpwt ´  nt
1´ λq
therefore
wt “ ct ` nt.
Proof of IS equation (56): Assuming no TFP process in the produc-
tion function, its log-linearised form is: yt “ αkt`p1´αqnt. Solving
for nt and substituting to (55) we get
cRt “ ct ´
ˆ
λ
1´ λ
˙„
yt ´αkt
1´α

(B.4.1)
Log-linearising the resource constraint we get yt “ ctsc ` itsi ` sg
since the proportion of government bond and shares are zero in the
steady state. Solving for ct “ yt´itsi´sgsc and inserting the resource
constraint we have:
cRt “ ytp 1sc ´ 
λ
p1´ λq
1
p1´αqq´ it
si
sc
´ sg
sc
`  λp1´ λq
1
p1´αqαkt.
(B.4.2)
Inserting the above into the Ricardians Euler equation cRt “ EttcRt`1u`
rEttpit`1u ´ rts, we get
yt “ Ettyt`1u´ 1
δ
rrt´Ettpit`1us´ 1
δ
si
sc
∆it`1` 1
δ
λ
p1´ λqp1´αqrα∆kt`1s.
(B.4.3)
where
δ “ 1
sc
´  λp1´ λqp1´αq (B.4.4)
and sc “ Css{Yss, si “ Iss{Yss and sg “ Gss{Yss.
C
A P P E N D I X F O R C H A P T E R 4
c.1 ng model : household problem
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household prob-
lem, the Lagrangian is
L “
8ÿ
i“0
βi
 
lnpCt`iq´ χ
1` N
1`
t`i `λtrWtNt`Πt`ZtKt´pCt`Kt`1´p1´δqKtqs
(
.
The first order conditions yield:
θL
θCt
: uc,t ´ λt “ 0 (C.1.1)
θL
θKt`1
: ´λt `βλt`1pZt`1 ` p1´ δqq “ 0 (C.1.2)
θL
θNt
: ´χNt ` λtWt “ 0 (C.1.3)
Combining (C.1.1) and (C.1.2) we get the two standard intertempo-
ral and intratemporal equations of the NG model: namely the Euler
equation
Λt,t`1rZt`1 ` p1´ δqs “ 1
and by combining (C.1.1) and (C.1.3) the optimality condition for
labour supply
uc,tWt “ χNt .
c.2 bgg model : household problem
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household prob-
lem, the Lagrangian is
L “ Et
8ÿ
i“0
βi
 
lnpCt`iq´ χ
1` N
1`
t`i `λtrWtNt`Πt`RtDt´pCt`Dt`1qs
(
.
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The first order conditions yield:
θL
θCt
: uc,t ´ λt “ 0 (C.2.1)
θL
θDt`1
: ´λt `βλt`1pRt`1q “ 0 (C.2.2)
θL
θNt
: ´χNt ` λtWt “ 0 (C.2.3)
Combining (C.2.1) and (C.2.2) we get the two standard intertempo-
ral and intratemporal equations of the NG model: namely the Euler
equation
Λt,t`1Rt`1 “ 1
and by combining (C.2.1) and (C.2.3) the optimality condition for
labour supply
uc,tWt “ χNt .
c.3 bgg model : entrepreneur problem
Let L be the Lagrangian of the maximization problem and λet the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the zero profit condition.
L “ r1´ ΓpĘψt`1qRk,t`1QtKt`1s`λet rRk,tQtKtrΓpĘψt`1q´µGpĘψt`1qs´Rt`1pQtKt´Netqs.
The first order and Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximization
problem are:
θL
θKt
: 1´ ΓpĘψt`1qRk,t`1 ` λet rΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qRk,t`1 ´ Rt`1s “ 0
(C.3.1)
θL
θĘψt`1 : ´Γ 1pĘψt`1q ` λet rΓ 1pĘψt`1q ´ µG 1pĘψt`1qs “ 0
(C.3.2)
From equation (C.3.2) we get
λt “ Γ
1pĘψt`1q
Γ 1pĘψt`1q ´ µG 1pĘψt`1q . (C.3.3)
Inserting (C.3.3) to (C.3.1) we get:
Rk,t “ Γ
1pĘψt`1q
pΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qqΓ 1pĘψt`1q ` p1´ ΓpĘψt`1qqpΓ 1pĘψt`1q ´ µG 1pĘψt`1qRt,
which gives the external finance premium as shown in the BGG:
Rk,t`1 “ ρpĘψt`1qRt`1
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where ρpĘψt`1q is given by
ρpĘψt`1q “ Γ 1pĘψt`1qrpΓpĘψt`1q ´ µGpĘψt`1qqΓ 1pĘψt`1q ` p1´ ΓpĘψt`1qpΓ 1pĘψt`1q ´ µG 1pĘψt`1qqs .
